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ABSTRACT 
As the 2000 campaign reached its climax, some renegade supporters of 
Green Party candidate Ralph Nader countered critics’ charges that they 
were “handing the election to Bush” by creating websites encouraging 
vote-swapping. The theory of this practice was: A Nader supporter in a 
hotly contested state would agree to vote for Al Gore if a Gore supporter 
in an uncontested state would vote for Ralph Nader. The object was to 
help deliver five percent of the popular vote to the Green Party (so that the 
Greens would receive federal matching funds for the 2004 presidential 
election) while simultaneously working to prevent a George W. Bush 
presidency. 
With the election less than a week away, and the poll margins closer 
than any election in recent history, several state election officials acted to 
snuff out the online vote-swapping movement by threatening vote-swap 
site operators with fines and/or imprisonment. The chilling effect brought 
about by the letters from state regulators may have tipped the scales in the 
2000 campaign, even though no one knew whether prohibiting vote-
swapping was constitutional. 
This study introduces the reader to the concept and practice of vote-
swapping. It examines the chilling effect of the threats of prosecution 
issued during the 2000 election and these effects’ possible electoral 
consequences. This study analyzes online vote-swapping under various 
state laws and state constitutions and extends the analysis to encompass 
federal election law and federal constitutional law. Finally, this study 
examines the ethics of vote-swapping and concludes that the practice is 
legal under most state election laws, protected under most state 
constitutions, protected by the federal Constitution, and an ethical use of 
personal voting power. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Issue 
The 2000 presidential election will be remembered as one full of 
irregularities and controversy. In fact, the 2000 presidential election 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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produced approximately forty lawsuits during the Florida recount alone.1 
Before the election, multiple candidates filed lawsuits in order to gain full 
access to the political process. Ralph Nader,2 Pat Buchanan,3 and John 
McCain4 all brought their campaigns into the courtroom in order to 
participate in American democracy. 
The circumstances surrounding the 2000 Florida recount are unlikely to 
repeat. The Florida vote recount that never was, and the subsequent 
jurisprudential farce of Bush v. Gore,5 will remain in memory for many 
years, but their impact on future elections is likely to be purely 
mechanical.6 There was, however, a less-reported controversy during 
November of 2000 that is likely to re-emerge in the future: online vote-
pairing.7 This was yet another attempt by individuals outside the 
traditional Democratic and Republican Party structure to gain access to the 
political process. 
Online vote-pairing started when some members of the Texas 
Democratic Party, resigned to the fact that Texas was firmly in George W. 
 1. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For information about other cases, see ROBERT 
CROWN LAW LIBRARY, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, ELECTION 2000, at http://election2000.stanford.edu/ 
(last visited July 7, 2003).  
 2. See Nader v. Blackwell, 230 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2000) (Nader seeking access to the ballot in 
Ohio); Nader 2000 Primary Comm. v. Hazeltine, 226 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2000) (Nader seeking access 
to the ballot in South Dakota); Nader 2000 Primary Comm. v. Bartlett, 230 F.3d 1353 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision) (Nader seeking ballot access in North Carolina). 
 3. See Becker v. Fed. Election Comm., 230 F.3d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 2000) (Buchanan’s attempt 
to participate in presidential debates); Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000) (same). 
 4. See Molinari v. Powers, 82 F. Supp. 2d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (John McCain challenging New 
York Republican party ballot access). 
 5. Whatever the motivation of the five justices who selected George W. Bush as president in 
2000, it cannot be seriously asserted that it was grounded in proper jurisprudence. Even the majority, 
made up of justices who traditionally shunned equal protection analysis and embraced strong notions 
of federalism, but supported the converse logic in the 2000 election decision, knew that the logic in 
Bush v. Gore was so poorly crafted that no future courts should rely upon its analysis. See Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the 
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities”). See also 
Laurence Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and its Disguises, Freeing Bush v. Gore From its Hall of Mirrors, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001); Nelson Lund, “Equal Protection My Ass!” Bush v. Gore and Laurence 
Tribe’s Hall of Mirrors, 19 CONST. COMMENT 543 (2002); Laurence Tribe, The Unbearable 
Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 571 (2002); Nelson Lund, Carnival of Mirrors: 
Laurence Tribe’s “Unbearable Wrongness,” 19 CONST. COMM. 609 (2003). 
 6. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny, Michael J. Berens, and Geoff Dougherty, Ballots, Rules, Voter Error 
Led to 2000 Election Muddle, Review Shows, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 2001, available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/sns-ballots-tribune,0,2317084.story?coll=chi-newsspeci
als-hed (last visited July 9, 2003) (“The most comprehensive study of the troubled presidential election 
in Florida shows the main culprits were simple and fixable: ballot design, inconsistent election rules 
and voter error.”). 
 7. See, e.g., John Morris, Julie Carpenter, and Jodie Kelley, Free Speech on the Internet, in 
INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 24–18, at 24–27 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/4
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Bush’s column, proposed trading their votes with Nader supporters in 
swing states.8 As the 2000 campaign raged, many individuals opposed to 
the specter of a George W. Bush presidency lobbed charges at Green Party 
voters that their support would “hand Bush a victory.”9 Presumably, these 
critics held the belief that a Nader supporter would rather see Gore in 
office than Bush.10  
To counter these charges, some Nader-Gore supporters used the 
relatively new medium of the Internet to play an ancient political game.11 
They launched websites to encourage or facilitate strategic voting, which 
would take on the cyberspace moniker of “online vote-swapping.”12  
It is unfortunate that this phenomenon was so widely referred to as vote 
“swapping.”13 Perhaps the term invoked images of Napster, the file-
swapping service that was under siege during the 2000 campaign season.14 
In fact, some commentators called online vote-swapping “electoral 
Napster.”15  
 8. Molly Ivins, Democratic Steak and Republican Pink Clouds, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, 
Aug. 22, 2000, at B6 [hereinafter Democratic Steak]. 
 9. See, e.g., Michael Jonas, Nader Has Stage to Himself, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2000, City 
Weekly at 2; Jeff Mapes, Nader-Gore Choice Disrupts Unity Among Leftist Activists, PORTLAND 
OREGONIAN, Nov. 2, 2000, at A13; Lynn Sweet, Looks Like a Photo Finish, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 6, 
2000, at 6. 
 10. The assumption that all Nader voters would have voted for Gore was false. Twenty-three 
percent of Nader supporters said that they would have voted for Bush had Nader not been running. See 
Peter Dizikes & David Ruppe, Will Nader Fare Well? How Strong Will Green Party Candidate’s 
Support be on Election Day?, ABCNEWS.COM, Oct. 26, 2000, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/ 
politics/DailyNews/naderthreat_001026.html (last visited Jul. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Dizikes & Ruppe]. 
 11. One author cites “theoretical interest in strategic voting” as far back as the Roman Empire. 
See Gary W. Cox, Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Nontransferable Vote, 88 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 608, 608 (1994) [hereinafter Cox] (discussing theoretical interest in the practice dating back 
to Pliny the Younger). See also David P. Myatt, Strategic Voting Under the Qualified Majority Rule, 
at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2000/w7/qualified.pdf [hereinafter Myatt], citing 
ROBIN FARQUHARSON, THEORY OF VOTING (1969). More recent examples are the 1932 German 
election that led to the rise of Adolf Hitler and the U.S. presidential race in the same year that led to 
the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Paul Abramson et al., Third-Party and Independent Candidates 
in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 349, 354 (1995) [hereinafter 
Abramson et al.]. 
 12. See, e.g., http://www.voteswap2000.com (last visited Dec. 7, 2000) (now defunct); 
http://www.winwincampaign.org (last visited Dec. 7, 2000) (now defunct); http://www. 
voteexchange.com (last visited Dec. 7, 2000) (now defunct); http://www.nadertrader.org (last visited 
Dec. 7, 2000) (now defunct); http://www.voteswap.com (last visited July 14, 2003) (no longer operates 
as a vote-pairing site but as a clearinghouse of information on the subject); http://www.votetrader.org 
(last visited July 25, 2003); http://www.voteexchange2000.com (last visited July 25, 2003). 
 13. See Jamin Raskin, Nader’s Traders: How to Save Al Gore’s Bacon by Swapping Votes on the 
Internet, SLATE, Oct. 24, 2000, at http://slate.msn.com/Concept/00-10-24/Concept.asp (last visited 
July 7, 2003) [hereinafter Raskin]. 
 14. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 15. See, e.g., Andy Hoefer, Nader Traders: Electoral Napster!, POLITICS ONLINE, at 
http://www.politicsonline.com/pol2000/hotsite.asp?id=88 (last visited July 25, 2003). 
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Writing catchy headlines sometimes necessitates setting aside semantic 
accuracy, and no headline writer should be criticized for it. This study is 
more in-depth than a mere headline, and in order to accurately study this 
strategic voting behavior and attendant political assembly, it is necessary 
to remove the word “swap” and this word’s attendant baggage from the 
discussion. “Vote-swapping” is more accurately described as “online 
coalition building” or “online political assembly.” Nothing actually 
changed hands and was thus “swapped.” Jamin Raskin, a constitutional 
law professor at American University, who popularized the term “vote-
swapping,” originally referred to the practice as “vote-pairing.”16 In this 
study, I revert to Raskin’s less catchy, but more accurate (and baggage-
free) rough-draft term. 
The online vote-pairing movement seemed to attract primarily 
Green/Democrat alliance voters.17 Nevertheless, this strategy could have 
been beneficial to, for example, Libertarians seeking to increase their 
party’s power by forming alliances with Republican voters. In fact, one 
site, Votexchange2000.com, allowed voters to first enter their state before 
entering their party affiliations.18 As discussed in Part V, criticism of the 
practice was almost completely the province of Republican secretaries of 
state, and praise of the practice was almost completely reserved to 
Democrats and Greens.19 Although hypothetical hindsight is blurry at best, 
perhaps if the practice stood to benefit Bush as much as it stood to benefit 
Gore, Republican election officials would have been less inclined to 
attempt to suppress the movement. 
Building an online vote-pairing coalition is simple and entirely 
Internet-dependent. For example, in the 2000 election, a voter who wished 
to support Ralph Nader might have lived in a hotly contested “swing state” 
 16. Jamin Raskin, Litigating The Presidency: The Election 2000 Decision and Its Ramifications 
for the Supreme Court: What’s Wrong with Bush v. Gore and Why We Need To Amend the 
Constitution To Ensure It Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652, 699 n.246 (2002) [hereinafter 
Raskin, Litigating] (noting that Raskin originally called the practice vote-pairing). 
 17. See, e.g., David Foster, Greens Face Voting Dilemma, CNN.COM, at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/11/03/greenparty.ap/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2004); Albert Eisele and Jeff 
Dufour, Under the Dome, THE HILL, Feb. 26, 2004, at http://www.hillnews.com/under_dome/ 
022604.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2004); Christine Cupaiuolo, When a Personal Vote Isn’t Personal, 
at http://www.poppolitics.com/articles/2000-11-02-nadergorelegal.shtml; Scott Duke Harris, Ballot 
Busters: The Archaic Mechanism Used to Elect U.S. Presidents Is Under Assault by People Who Meet 
on the Internet and Pledge to Swap Votes in Next Year’s Election, L.A. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 2, 
2003, available at 2003 WL 2445497.  
 18. See http://www.votexchange2000.com (last visited July 25, 2003). 
 19. But see Talk of the Nation, Interview with Ralph Nader (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 17, 
2000), transcript available at 2000 WL 21459177 (Nader criticizing vote-pairing). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/4
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such as Florida.20 Assuming that the Nader supporter, faced with Nader’s 
inevitable defeat, would have preferred to see Al Gore elected over George 
Bush,21 the Nader supporter faced a quandary. Should he vote his 
conscience and actually contribute to his third choice at the expense of his 
second choice?22 One alternative was to pair himself with a Gore supporter 
in a relatively uncontested state such as Massachusetts with the help of an 
online vote-pairing site.23 The Nader supporter in Florida and the Gore 
supporter in Massachusetts would both recognize that Gore would easily 
carry Massachusetts; accordingly, the two would agree that taking a vote 
from Gore in a Democratic stronghold would have no impact on 
Massachusetts’ electoral votes. The Gore supporter in Massachusetts 
would agree to cast her vote for Ralph Nader, thereby giving the Greens 
one more vote toward the magic five percent they sought in order to 
receive federal matching election funds for the 2004 presidential 
election.24 In exchange, the Nader supporter in Florida would cast a vote 
for Gore, giving Gore a much-needed vote in a hotly contested and 
ultimately pivotal state.25 One email vote exchange was later regretted by 
one of the participants, who happened to use his U.S. government email 
address.26 The exchange became a matter of public record when the 
Washington Times published the following text obtained from a vote-
pairing participant: 
Congratulations! You have been matched with Fred Turner from 
this state: VA. This person’s first choice candidate is Al Gore, but 
he/she is planning on voting for your candidate, Ralph Nader, 
 20. See Michael Lind, If a Swing State Cares, It’s an Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at A27 
[hereinafter Lind] (discussing the importance of “swing states” in American politics, and using Florida 
as an example). 
 21. See supra note 10. 
 22. The notion that a vote for Nader was a vote for Bush was not one hundred percent accurate. 
A vote for Nader would have kept a left-leaning vote from Gore, but did not actually place a vote in 
Bush’s totals. Therefore it was a half vote at best.  
 23. See Lind, supra note 20, at A27 (discussing the importance of “swing states” in United States 
politics, noting that most of New England was uncontested). 
 24. See, e.g., Charles Pope, Take a Stand, Nader Urges Seattle Crowd, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 3, 2000, at A1 (“Nader’s aim is to collect 5 percent of the vote nationally to 
establish the Green Party as a major political organization. ‘It’s time to take a stand’ Nader said. ‘We 
want to build a permanent new party of citizens who have been closed out by their own 
government.’”). 
 25. See Scott Harris, ‘Nader Traders’ May Have Affected Outcome in Florida, Nov. 17, 2000 
[hereinafter Harris], at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/11/17/nader.traders.help.gore.idg/ 
index.html (last visited July 7, 2003). 
 26. “Nader Traders” Shut Down Their Web Site Under Pressure, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, 
at A12. (Fred Turner, legislative director for Rep. Alcee L. Hastings used his government email 
address to participate and when questioned by the Associated Press, he said, “That was a mistake.”). 
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trusting that you will in turn vote for Al Gore according to an honor 
system that we all support by registering at 
http://VoteExchange.com.27  
James Ridgeway introduced America to the concept of online vote-
pairing in The Village Voice in September 2000.28 Ridgeway reported that 
since the election promised to be so close, Nader supporters feared that 
their efforts could bring about a conservative victory.29 Many believed that 
if Nader were not running, Gore would have been more securely in the 
lead in the late days of the campaign.30 Concerned with spoiling Gore’s 
chances in what was never more than a two-way race, after the Ridgeway 
article hit the stands, Nader supporters got to work.31 On October 1, 2000, 
Steve Yoder, a Washington, D.C. technical writer, launched 
Voteexchange.org.32  
By October 2, 2000 conservative voters were in on the act as well.33 On 
that day a message board for FreeRepublic.com34 encouraged of 
Republican, Libertarian, constitutional, and Reform party candidates to 
vote-swap with Bush voters in Massachusetts, New York, and 
Washington, D.C.35 Nevertheless, the conservative vote-swappers did not 
gain the same momentum and media attention as the “Nader-traders.”36
Although there was some media and Internet discussion of the subject, 
the idea did not truly catch fire until American University constitutional 
law professor Jamin Raskin promoted the idea in the MSN online 
 27. Id. 
 28. Professor James Raskin of the American University College of Law is often credited with 
introducing the practice of vote-swapping, see Raskin, Litigating, supra note 16, at 699 n.246 (“[Vote-
swapping] is a phenomenon I am familiar with because I introduced the idea of vote-trading, which I 
actually first called ‘vote-pairing,’ to America in Slate Magazine on October 24, 2000, several weeks 
before election day.”). But see James Ridgeway, Beatification of Ralph, VILLAGE VOICE ONLINE, Sept. 
27–Oct. 3, 2000 [hereinafter Beatification], available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0039/ 
ridgeway3.php (last visited July 25, 2003); Democratic Steak, supra note 8, at B6. 
 29. Beatification, supra note 28. 
 30. See, e.g., Dizikes & Ruppe, supra note 10. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See David Brancaccio, Marketplace: Internet Vote Broker Appears to Broaden the Playing 
Field For Voters in A Tight Presidential Race (NPR Radio Broadcast, Nov. 1, 2000). 
 33. See Tall Texan, Vote Swapping? Attn: Bush, Buchanon, Browne, Phillips Voters!, Oct. 2, 
2000, at http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a39d85fb603a8.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2004). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. The practice was so heavily slanted toward Democrat/Green alliances that commentators 
referred to it as “Nader Trading.” See, e.g., A Guide to Online Gore/Nader Vote-swapping, at 
http://www.voteswap.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2004); Raskin, supra note 13; Lisa Napoli, Trading 
Nader, Gore Votes, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 31, 2000 [hereinafter Napoli], at http://www.msnbc.com/ 
news/482104.asp (link now defunct, but site also cited at 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1298 n.5). 
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magazine SLATE on October 24, 2000.37 In his article, Raskin explained 
that the presidential race had narrowed enough that a strong showing by 
Ralph Nader in ten battleground states had the potential to give George W. 
Bush the 270 Electoral College votes he needed to win.38 Upon publication 
of Raskin’s article, hits to vote-pairing sites increased exponentially. Prior 
to the SLATE article, VoteExchange.org arranged 500 swaps in one week. 
After the Raskin article, VoteSwap2000 arranged 500 trades in 24 hours, 
and in its short life exchanged more than 5,000 votes.39 Votetrader.org 
claimed that it arranged 15,000 vote exchanges in several battleground 
states.40
With the election less than a week away, and the poll margins closer 
than any election in recent history,41 election officials in Oregon and 
California struck out against online vote-pairing.42 Officials in Florida, 
Arizona, Minnesota, and Wisconsin declared the practice illegal but did 
not act with the same zeal as their west-coast counterparts.43
The California Secretary of State, Bill Jones (R) sent an email to Jim 
Cody, co-creator of VoteSwap2000,44 threatening him with prosecution45 
under California’s election code sections 1852146 and 1852247 as well as 
criminal conspiracy under Penal Code section 182.48 Oregon Secretary of 
State Bill Bradbury (D) said online vote-pairing, “even without the 
exchange of money, violate[d] state election laws.”49 Bradbury sent desist 
 37. See Raskin, supra note 13. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Napoli, supra note 36. 
 40. Harris, supra note 25. 
 41. Rutherford B. Hayes won the 1876 presidential race by a single electoral vote. See Abramson 
et al., supra note 11. See also Bronislaus B. Kush, Every Vote Counts in Fight for the White House, 
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 2000, at 2 (“The Kennedy/Nixon race of 1960 had a 
118,574 popular vote margin, but was a clear electoral college victory for Kennedy. In 1880, James 
Garfield prevailed over Winfield S. Hancock by a mere 7,018 votes.”).  
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. See infra Part III. 
 44. http://www.voteswap2000.com (last visited Dec. 7, 2000) (now defunct). 
 45. See infra notes 211–12. 
 46. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521(a) (West 2000) (“A person shall not directly or through any other 
person receive, agree, or contract for, before, during or after an election, any money, gift, loan, or other 
valuable consideration . . . because he or any other person voted . . . agreed to vote, refrained from 
voting, or agreed to refrain from voting for any particular person or measure.”). 
 47. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(a)(2) (West 2000) (“Neither a person nor a controlled committee 
shall directly or through any other person or controlled committee pay, lend, or contribute, or offer or 
promise to pay, lend, or contribute, any money or other valuable consideration or to or for any voter to 
or for any other person to . . . induce any voter to . . . vote or refrain from voting at an election for any 
particular person or measure.”). 
 48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (criminal conspiracy). 
 49. Oregon Warns Websites that Promote Vote Trading, THE RECORD, Nov. 3, 2000, at A26 
[hereinafter Oregon Warns]. 
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letters to six vote-trading sites—all based outside Oregon—which stated 
that the sites would be subject to civil penalties in Oregon if they 
facilitated the trading of Oregonians’ votes.50 However, Bradbury, the only 
Democrat to take a swipe at vote-swappers quickly reversed himself.51
Prior to her involvement in the Florida recount debacle, Katherine 
Harris (R) declared vote-pairing “illegal.”52 Arizona’s state election 
director publicly stated that vote-pairing violated state law.53 Wisconsin 
officials personally met with one vote-pairing site operator.54 Because the 
law Wisconsin officials relied upon contained penalties of a $10,000 fine 
and three years in prison,55 the website operator modified his website to 
include disclaimers which stated that the practice of vote-swapping is 
illegal; Wisconsin officials took no further action.56 Minnesota’s Secretary 
of State made her position clear when she stated, “Vote-swapping 
undercuts the fundamental tenets that hold our country together.”57
On the other hand, Maine and Nebraska officials came to a different 
conclusion than those in Florida, Arizona, and Wisconsin. Maine 
Secretary of State Dan Gwadosky (D) said that online vote trading was 
“perfectly legal.”58 In fact Gwadosky not only dispelled any notion of its 
illegality but also endorsed the practice. “It’s a provocative way to use a 
new medium,” he said.59 He continued to praise the practice as likely to 
increase voter turnout even in Maine, a state with historically one of the 
best turnout rates in the United States.60
Nebraska Secretary of State Scott Moore (R) seemed to accept the 
legality of the practice. He stated, “Obviously, if money was changing 
hands or threats or intimidation was occurring, then I would have a 
 50. See Scott Harris, ACLU Takes Up Vote-Swapping Fight, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 2, 
2000, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,19890,00.html (now defunct) (on file with 
author). 
 51. See Jeff Mapes, Bradbury Says Vote Trading Sites OK, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 4, 2000, at 
Bl. 
 52. Telephone Interview with Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State (Nov. 1, 2000). 
 53. Websites Shut Selves Down, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 2000, at A8 [hereinafter Websites]; 
Margie Wylie, Nader Backers Elect to Trade Their Vote, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 1, 2000, at 2A 
[hereinafter Wylie]. 
 54. Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A. 
 55. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 12.11 (West 2002). 
 56. Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A. 
 57. See Press Release, Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer Asks Vote-Swap Web Sites to “Cease 
and Desist” in MN (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/office/voteswap%2011-1-00.doc 
(last visited July 7, 2003). 
 58. David Connerty-Marin, Nader-Gore Vote-swapping is Deemed Legal in Maine, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, Nov. 1, 2000, at A1 [hereinafter Connerty-Marin]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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problem.”61 Moore added, “I’m not saying it’s right, I’m just not saying 
there is any illegal activity in this one.”62
B. Research Questions 
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that Americans have 
the right to speak freely in a public forum on matters of political 
importance.63 With the rise of the Internet as a powerful medium of mass 
communication and a new public forum, anyone with a dial-up account 
“can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could 
from any soapbox.”64 The fact that the medium is new does not justify a 
change in our established core values regarding freedom of expression and 
association.65 However, online vote-pairing needs to be studied in the 
context of how technology and law interact with strategic voting behavior. 
Accordingly, the following questions will be answered by this study: 
What was the reaction of state election officials toward this behavior? 
How did different states confront the issue? Which state election officials 
acted within the confines of their proper authority, and which officials, if 
any, exceeded their mandate, or shirked their responsibility? 
What was the reaction of the Federal Elections Commission toward 
online vote-pairing? Did this behavior run afoul of any federal laws?  
What are the constitutional considerations of online vote-pairing? Does 
the federal Constitution demand that it be permitted, even in states which 
may properly suppress it under their state laws and constitution? 
Finally, this study will address the ethics of online vote-pairing. If the 
practice is not prohibited, should it be?  
This study explores one of the effects the Internet had, and will 
continue to have, on presidential politics. There have been studies on the 
effect of Internet communication on voting behavior but only by looking 
at the Internet as a more evolved medium of mass communication.66 
 61. Andrew Cain, “Nader Traders” Shut Down Under Pressure, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at 
A12. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(1948) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN]. See also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971) [hereinafter Bork] (“[E]ven without a first amendment 
. . . representative democracy . . . would be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and 
its policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first 
amendment.”). 
 64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (striking down the Communications Decency Act 
and stating that restrictions on website content are afforded the same protection as traditional print). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Politicking on the Internet, FORTUNE, Mar. 6, 2000 at 84; Torsten 
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Online vote-pairing takes the interaction of voting behavior and the 
Internet to a higher level, where political coalitions and movements are 
actually created in cyberspace. An assessment of the legal questions raised 
by vote-pairing facilitates understanding how this practice is, will, and 
should be governed. Evolution in Internet technology will likely move 
more traditional political activity into cyberspace. Therefore, a study of 
online vote-pairing is a study of the genesis of the next level of political 
action and activism in cyberspace. 
C. Research Methodology 
The majority of this study will rely on federal and state election codes, 
case law, attorney general opinions, and official statements. Oregon and 
California are the only states that took punitive action against online vote-
pairing operations.67 However, since Arizona, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, and Nebraska officials weighed in on the issue with some 
degree of credibility, this study will include an analysis of the vote-pairing 
phenomena in the context of these states’ laws and constitutions as well. 
There were other states whose officials publicly voiced opposition to 
online vote-swapping. Kansas’ Secretary of State Ron Thornburgh was 
quoted as saying, “I will do everything I can to vigorously prosecute vote-
swapping.”68 However, Thornburgh admitted a lack of knowledge as to 
whether it was illegal.69 Given that Thornburgh spoke with what some 
could characterize as questionable credibility, his comments will not 
warrant an exploration of Kansas law. Additionally, unnamed Missouri 
and Texas officials allegedly spoke against the practice but took no action 
and were not named in the news source that reported their comments.70 
Accordingly, although the article noting these comments has significant 
indicia of reliability, none of these states presents a novel enough legal 
issue to warrant analysis based on unnamed sources.71
Busse, Global Politicking Hits Web, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 12, 1996, at 12; Thomas J. Johnson, 
Doing the Traditional Media Sidestep: Comparing the Effects of the Internet and Other Nontraditional 
Media with Traditional Media in the 1996 Presidential Campaign, JOURNALISM AND MASS COMM. 
Q., Spring 1999, at 99; Catherine A. Steele et al., The Impact of Traditional and Nontraditional Media 
Forms in the 1992 Presidential Election, JOURNALISM AND MASS COMM. Q., Summer 1996, at 2; 
Noreen O’Leary, Audio and Video Newscasts Proliferate on the Internet, ADWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 
52. 
 67. See infra Part III. 
 68. Another Lost Cause?, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Nov. 6, 2000, at A4.  
 69. See id.  
 70. See Lynda Gledhill, California Shuts Down Vote-Trader Web Site, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., 
Oct. 31, 2000, at A3. 
 71. See id. 
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D. Part Outline 
Part I contains the research questions, the literature review, and the 
research methodology. 
Part II is divided into four sections: a study of strategic voting 
behavior; a study of political action in cyberspace before the 2000 
presidential election; an introduction to the re-electoral college; and a 
study of the chilling effect. 
Part III looks at online vote-pairing through the prism of state law. 
California, Oregon, Minnesota, Florida, Wisconsin, Maine, Nebraska, and 
Arizona are included due to the fact that these states acted, directly or 
indirectly, on the issue. Each state’s election law is presented and studied, 
with attendant constitutional analysis where the state’s jurisprudence 
deviates from, or offers more instruction than, federal constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
Part IV analyzes federal law. The Federal Election Law—42 United 
States Code § 1973i(C)—begins Part IV, and federal constitutional 
concerns follow. I theorize that strict scrutiny is applicable to state action 
against online vote-pairing.72 Thereafter, the study works through each 
prong of the strict-scrutiny test. 
Part V adds an ethical dimension to the study by looking at the practice 
of online vote-pairing beyond the question of whether it is legally 
permissible and answering the question whether it is ethical.  
Part VI gives the reader the author’s legal and ethical conclusions on 
the matter of online vote-pairing.  
E. Literature Review  
Soon after vote-pairing became a legal controversy, three 
commentators jumped into the fray with scholarly articles examining the 
legality of the practice.73 To date, my research has identified six scholarly 
works that examine the issue of online vote-pairing in the 2000 
presidential race. The author of this Article, an associate at Becker & 
 72. The lack of case law on this subject at the time of this writing requires a certain amount of 
theorizing. 
 73. Jesse Sisgold, Note: Vote-Swapping Over the Internet: Free Speech or Voter Corruption?, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149 (2001) [hereinafter Sisgold]; Brad Worley, Comment: Nader’s 
Traders v. State Regulators: Examining the Controversy Over Internet Vote-Swapping in the 2000 
Presidential Election, 2 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 32 (2001) [hereinafter Worley]; Marc J. Randazza, The 
Constitutionality of Online Vote-Swapping, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297 (2001) [hereinafter Randazza 
II]; Marc J. Randazza, Breaking Duverger’s Law is not Illegal; Strategic Voting, the Internet and the 
2000 Presidential Election, UCLA J. L. & TECH. 6 (2001) [hereinafter Randazza I]. 
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Poliakoff, wrote two of the six. An associate at Covington and Burling 
authored a newsletter article,74 and an associate at Sidley & Austin 
authored a law review article.75 Third-year law students at the University 
of North Carolina and the University of California, Hastings College of 
Law, wrote the remaining two law review articles as student notes.76  
My article in the LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW77 examines 
the online vote-pairing phenomenon in the context of other Internet-based 
political activity. The article examines the actions of state regulators in 
California and Oregon against a backdrop consisting of their respective 
state election laws,78 state constitutions,79 the federal election laws,80 and 
finally the federal Constitution.81 After a discussion of the constitutionality 
of online vote-pairing, I concluded that the practice of online vote-pairing 
was permissible under both California and Oregon election law, protected 
by the California and Oregon Constitutions, and fully-protected under the 
federal Constitution.82 In the LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW, I 
only studied California and Oregon.83 Additionally, this article failed to 
dig into the politics behind or political implications of online vote-pairing. 
Finally, the question of whether the practice of online vote-pairing is 
ethical was beyond the scope of this first article.  
Deborah Matties published a short piece about the vote-pairing 
controversy in the COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, a newsletter.84 In this 
piece, Matties reported on the issue of online vote-trading and 
foreshadowed a later appellate decision on the issue by questioning Judge 
Kelleher’s decision85 to reject the vote-pairing site operators’ petition for 
an injunction against the California Secretary of State that would have 
prohibited the Secretary from threatening vote-pairing site operators.86
 74. Deborah Matties, The First Amendment, the California Secretary of State, and Nader Trader 
Websites, 18 COMM. LAW. 32 (2001). 
 75. John M. Rushing, Vote-swapping and Free Speech: Voice, Politics, and Choice, 7 TEX. F. ON 
C.L. & C.R. 73 (2002) [hereinafter Rushing]. 
 76. Sisgold, supra note 73; Worley, supra note 73. 
 77. Randazza II, supra note 73. 
 78. Id. at 1312–23. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 1323–35. 
 82. Id. at 1312–35. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Deborah Matties, The First Amendment, the California Secretary of State, and Nader Trader 
Websites, 18 COMM. LAW. 32 (2001). 
 85. Id. at 33–34. Kelleher was the judge who decided Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-
11700), the federal district court decision regarding online vote-pairing. His decision was later 
reversed by Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 86. See infra Part III for a full discussion of this issue. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/4
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] HIGH-TECH POLITICS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brad Worley’s article, Nader’s Traders vs. State Regulators87 
recognizes that the model of vote-pairing can affect its legality, and he 
categorizes the vote-pairing sites as falling into the “encouragement 
model,” “bulletin board model,” or “the automatic brokering model.”88  
Worley calls sites that offer “little practical assistance” in facilitating a 
vote-pairing action, but merely opine on the subject, the “encouragement 
model.”89 Worley’s “bulletin board model” describes chatboards designed 
to facilitate person-to-person contact among potential vote-swappers; 
however, these sites provide nothing more than an electronic bulletin 
board for one’s contact information.90 The “automatic brokering model” is 
the model that actually links users together to facilitate a private 
agreement to vote-swap91 and is the only model that constitutes online 
vote-pairing. 
After describing his three models of online vote-pairing, Worley’s legal 
analysis focuses on state election statutes and the concept of “valuable 
consideration.”92 Worley’s article rests on the premise that the issue of the 
legality of online vote-pairing will be resolved by (1) whether a vote is a 
thing of value;93 and (2) whether the individual state examining the 
practice has case law which draws analogies to online vote-pairing in its 
analysis of its election law.94 Worley examines neither the constitutional 
implications nor the federal law implications of online vote-pairing. In all 
reality, Worley has a point. As discussed in Part III of this study, from a 
tactical standpoint, it would have been better to fight for vote-pairing sites 
on the “valuable consideration” front. Regardless, the issue contains 
questions of such constitutional gravity that Worley’s article is 
handicapped by a lack of any constitutional or federal analysis. A 
constitutional analysis is important because any regulation of online vote-
pairing (at the very least) implicates free speech and free assembly 
concerns. 
In Breaking Duverger’s Law Is Not Illegal,95 I expanded the 
scholarship on this issue by examining online vote-pairing against a 
backdrop of political science research pertaining to strategic or tactical 
 87. Worley, supra note 73. 
 88. Worley, supra note 73, at 60. 
 89. Id. at 60–61. 
 90. Id. at 61–62. 
 91. Id. at 62–64. 
 92. Id. at 64. 
 93. Id. at 64–65. 
 94. Id. at 52–60. 
 95. Randazza I, supra note 73. 
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voting. This article substantially consists of my first article, The 
Constitutionality of Online Vote-Swapping,96 with a few improvements, 
updates, and an added-on section discussing strategic voting theory. While 
this is an important issue to consider when looking at online vote-pairing, I 
would be overly egotistical if I claimed that Breaking Duverger’s Law Is 
Not Illegal contributed a great amount to legal scholarship on this issue.  
Jessie Sisgold authored an article on the subject in the HASTINGS 
COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL.97 Sisgold’s 
study covers a lot of the same ground covered by The Constitutionality of 
Online Vote Swapping.98 Sisgold, like Worley, devotes a great amount of 
analysis to a consideration of what the term “valuable consideration” 
means in the context of California election law.99 Sisgold most notably 
delves into a discussion of legislative logrolling and campaign 
contributions as legally similar to the practice of online vote-pairing100 and 
alludes to the possible slippery slope of outlawing vote-pairing, which 
could lead to absurd legal and political conclusions.101  
Sisgold analyzes the possible rationales for prohibiting the brokering of 
votes,102 essentially running online vote-trading through Richard Hasen’s 
vote-buying analysis.103 Sisgold adopts Hasen’s analysis of vote-alienation 
on political equality and political efficiency rationales and concludes that 
neither justifies a prohibition of vote-pairing.104 Sisgold’s eventual 
conclusion states, “This is good for democracy” without studying the 
ethical implications of online vote-pairing.105  
Sisgold adds to the existing scholarship by applying Hasen’s logic and 
describes the rationales behind vote-bribery statutes as protective of 
equality, efficiency, or merely a proper use of state power to determine 
that a vote is not property to be bought or sold.106 Sisgold states that as a 
result of the technology gap between rich and poor, the equality rationale 
may be somewhat applicable to efforts to stifle vote-pairing since the poor 
will have less computer access and Internet access than the wealthy.107  
 96. See supra note 73. 
 97. Sisgold, supra note 73. 
 98. See supra note 73. 
 99. Sisgold, supra note 73, at 159–60. 
 100. Id. at 160–61. 
 101. Id. at 163. 
 102. Id. at 164–67. 
 103. Richard Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2000). 
 104. Id. at 161. 
 105. Id. at 167. 
 106. Id. at 164–67. 
 107. Id. at 165. 
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The efficiency rationale for prohibiting vote-pairing stems from the 
fact that online vote-swaps are inherently unpoliceable, and therefore, it is 
inefficient to permit the practice.108 Sisgold suggests that this is an 
inadequate argument to require state anti-fraud laws to come to bear 
against online vote-swappers.109
Sisgold finally offers an alternative rationale for prohibiting vote-
swapping: “that votes belong to the community as a whole and thus should 
not be alienable by individual voters.”110 However, he states that, “this is a 
thin branch on which to rest an argument against an encroachment of core 
First Amendment protection—political speech.”111 Sisgold gives no 
analysis of online vote-pairing against a backdrop of political science 
theory and omits a study of most states that weighed in on the issue. 
John Rushing’s article in the TEXAS FORUM ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS112 covers the same ground as Sisgold’s, with a brief 
discussion of the electoral college. Rushing provides a well-written but 
limited analysis of the issue with little added scholarship regarding state 
concerns, political theory, or ethics. 
In conducting my research on this issue for this study, it came as a 
surprise that only six scholarly works existed, even more than three years 
after the events of 2000 unfolded. To be certain that no additional works 
had been written, I returned to the University of Florida, all of its 
databases and journals, the Internet, Westlaw, and Lexis. I searched for 
any term that might possibly describe online vote-pairing and even looked 
through every scholarly article that mentioned the word “Nader.” I 
conducted an exhaustive search of the literature (popular as well as 
academic) available at the University of Florida, in print and 
electronically113 under multiple searches.114 On a weekly basis, from 
 108. Id. at 166. 
 109. Id. at 166. 
 110. Id. at 166. 
 111. Id. at 167. 
 112. Rushing, supra note 75. 
 113. I searched to the following publications until July 21, 2003: Academy of Management 
Journal; Administrative Science Quarterly; African Historical Studies; American Historical Review; 
American Journal of International Law; American Journal of Sociology; American Political Science 
Review; American Quarterly; American Sociological Review; Asian Survey; Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers; British Journal of Political Science; British Journal of 
Sociology; Comparative Politics; Comparative Studies in Society and History; Economic Geography; 
Economic History Review; Eighteenth-Century Studies; English Historical Review; Ethnohistory; 
Family Coordinator; French Historical Studies; Hispanic American Historical Review; Historical 
Journal; History and Theory; History of Education Quarterly; History Teacher; Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review; International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs); International Journal 
of Middle East Studies; International Organization, International Studies Quarterly; Journal of African 
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January 8, 2003 until July 22, 2003, I conducted repeated Lexis, Westlaw, 
and Internet searches (primarily using Google) with redundant search 
terms with multiple combinations of “vote,” “trade,” “swap” “strategic,” 
and “Nader.” After all of these exhaustive searches, only the original six 
law journal articles revealed any kind of research on this subject. This 
study also reflects the most serious comments in the news media and 
newsletters as well, even though almost all of what was written did not 
involve academic research or an otherwise helpful discussion of the issues. 
I cannot testify as to why so little was written about this topic, but my 
theory is that given the fact that the recount of 2000 was such a media 
frenzy, this narrower issue was subsumed in the tidal wave of commentary 
and observation surrounding the recount, Katharine Harris, Bush v. 
Gore,115 and dimpled chads. In any event, those issues are behind us, but 
online vote-pairing lies ahead. 
History; Journal of American History; Journal of Black Studies; Journal of British Studies; Journal of 
Conflict Resolution; Journal of Contemporary History; Journal of Economic History; Journal of Health 
and Social Behavior; Journal of Human Resources; Journal of Interdisciplinary History; Journal of 
Marriage and the Family; Journal of Modern African Studies; Journal of Modern History; Journal of 
Negro History; Journal of Peace Research; Journal of Politics; Journal of Southern History; Journal of 
the History of Ideas; Midwest Journal of Political Science; Military Affairs; New England Quarterly; 
PS, Past and Present; Political Science Quarterly; Public Opinion Quarterly; Renaissance Quarterly; 
Russian Review; Social Forces; Sociology of Education; Sociometry; Speculum; Western Political 
Quarterly; William and Mary Quarterly; World Politics; MERIP Reports; Reviews in American 
History; Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies; Sociological Methodology; Studies in the Renaissance; 
Political Theory; American Journal of Political Science; Contemporary Sociology; Journal of Health 
and Human Behavior; Modern China; Social Psychology; Mississippi Valley Historical Review; 
International Security; Social Psychology Quarterly; Political Behavior; Family Relations; European 
Sociological Review; Renaissance News; Theory and Society; Journal of Southern African Studies; 
Annual Review of Sociology; Sixteenth Century Journal; International Journal of African Historical 
Studies; Far Eastern Survey; Legislative Studies Quarterly; Academy of Management Review; Journal 
of Palestine Studies; Conflict Resolution; Sociological Theory Sociological Forum; Journal of 
Educational Sociology; Marriage and Family Living; Family Life Coordinator; MERIP Middle East 
Report; Gender and Society; Middle East Report; Journal of Military History; PS: Political Science 
and Politics; Political Research Quarterly; Mershon International Studies Review; Journal of the 
British Institute of International Affairs; Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939); International Affairs 
Review Supplement; Cambridge Historical Journal; Proceedings of the American Political Science 
Association; Journal of the American Military Institute; Journal of the American Military History 
Foundation; Journal of Social Forces; Background on World Politics; Journal of the Academy of 
Management; Memorandum (Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council); Living; and 
Coordinator. 
 114. The search terms and connectors used in this follow-up research were: “vote-swapping” OR 
“vote-swapping” OR “voteswap” OR “vote-swap.” Then I searched the same publications, Lexis, 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, Westlaw, Google, JSTOR, Ebsco, and Dogpile for the same. I then 
repeated my search in all aforementioned search engines, databases, and publications for “strategic” 
AND “voting” AND “nader” AND “2000”; “swap” AND “online” AND “nader” AND “2000”; and, 
“vote” and “swapping” within ten words of each other. 
 115. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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II. DUVERGER’S LAW, POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE CHILLING 
EFFECT 
A. Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law 
Ostensibly, the purpose of a democratic election is to poll the electorate 
to measure its preference concerning an issue or a candidate. However, the 
simple-majority and single-ballot (SMSB) system, such as that in the 
United States, has an inherent flaw in gauging the actual preferences of the 
electorate.116 The SMSB system directs voting behavior in a manner that 
prefers a two-party system, regardless of the actual preference of the 
electorate. As a result, “the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the 
two-party system.”117 (In the 1950’s Maurice Duverger wrote on this topic 
so successfully that this concept has taken on his name—Duverger’s Law.) 
In SMSB systems as we have in the United States, some voters who would 
prefer the leadership of a third-party do not vote for their preferred 
candidate.118 Instead, voters frequently abandon their preferred candidate 
in favor of another because of contextual factors (such as a candidate’s 
chance to ultimately win) that surround the election.119 Usually this occurs 
when the voter’s most preferred candidate is a less viable candidate than 
the two front-runners in an election. To reduce the chances of his or her 
least-preferred candidate winning, the voter selects a lesser choice among 
the two front-runners.120 Traditional political science and logic tells us that 
the net effect is the reduction of the number of viable political parties.121  
 116. See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE 
MODERN STATE (Barbara & Robert North trans., 1954) [hereinafter DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES]. 
 117. See id. See also MAURICE DUVERGER, LES PARTIS POLITIQUES 247 (3d ed. 1958) (“le scrutin 
majoriataire à un seul tour tend au dualisme des parties”).  
 118. See, e.g., DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 116, at 217; GARY COX, MAKING 
VOTES COUNT: STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN THE WORLD’S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 13 (1997) 
[hereinafter MAKING VOTES COUNT]. 
 119. See Cox, supra note 11, at 611; Thomas Gschwend, Ticket Splitting and Strategic Voting: 
Evidence from the 1998 Election in Germany, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Ass’n (Aug. 30–Sept. 3, 2000), at http://www.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/lehrstuehle/ 
lspol1/gschwend_apsa00.pdf (last visited July 10, 2003). 
 120. This is what Duverger referred to as the “psychological effect” of the simple plurality system. 
See DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, supra note 116, at 207–35 (discussing the coalescence of two 
main parties); MAKING VOTES COUNT, supra note 118, at 13 (discussing Duverger’s propositions); 
Cox, supra note 11, at 611, 616; John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh et al., Strategic Voting in the 1994 Taipei City 
Mayoral Election, 16 ELECTION STUD. 153, 154 (1997) [hereinafter Hsieh et al.] (discussing the 
meaning of “strategic voting”). 
 121. This is commonly referred to as “Duverger’s Law.” See DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, 
supra note 116, at 217. See also Cox, supra note 11; William Riker, The Two Party System and 
Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 753, 757 (1982) 
[hereinafter Riker] (showing support for Duverger’s Law while demonstrating that writing on the law 
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In the 1990s, Gary Cox followed up on Duverger’s research and 
published multiple works describing what he called the Duvergerian and 
non-Duvergerian equilibria.122 Cox wrote that in an SMSB election, the 
electorate may reach an equilibrium under which only the two dominant 
candidates survive, and third parties are marginalized to the point of non-
importance.123 This, the current dominant condition of American politics, 
is known as the Duvergerian equilibrium.124 Alternatively, a non-
Duvergerian equilibrium exists when there is a clear front-runner, but the 
two candidates fighting for second place are of sufficient parity that 
neither candidate’s backers are willing to forego their support.125 This is 
rare in U.S. politics but occurred in the Chilean National Election in 
1978126 and in the Taipei mayoral race in 1994.127
Arthur Holcombe recognized Duverger’s Law (before it took on that 
moniker) in 1910, when Holcombe wrote, “the tendency under the system 
of plurality elections toward the establishment of the two-party system is 
almost irresistible.”128 Even Holcombe was not the first to write about the 
shortcomings of the SMSB system. In 1869, Henry Droop, an English 
barrister, posited that each voter in an SMSB system has a choice between 
the two front-runners, suggesting that voting for a trailing candidate is 
essentially throwing the vote away.129
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock examined the legislative 
equivalent of vote-pairing by looking at “vote trading” or “logrolling” in 
legislative bodies.130 Buchanan and Tullock described how the practice 
predates Duverger); A.N. Holcombe, Direct Primaries and the Second Ballot, 5 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
532, 540 (1911) [hereinafter Holcombe] (the tendency of plurality elections to create a two-party 
system is “irresistible”). 
 122. Cox, supra note 11. 
 123. Id. 
 124. MAKING VOTES COUNT, supra note 118. See also William Riker, A Mathematical Proof of 
Duverger’s Law, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS (Peter C. Ordeshook ed. 1989). 
 125. Roger Myerson and Robert Weber, A Theory of Voting Equilibria, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
102 (1993) [hereinafter Myerson & Weber]; Cox, supra note 11; ARTURO VALENZUELA, THE 
BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CHILE (1978) [hereinafter VALENZUELA] (discussing the 
1958 Chilean presidential election in which the right wing candidate won the election with 31.2% of 
the vote, the leftist candidate gathered 28.5%, and the centrist received 20.5%. Although the left and 
center were more likely to ally against the right and could have easily changed the results had there 
been strategic voting, the relative strength of both non-right candidates dampened any incentive to 
enter into strategic voting); Hsieh, supra note 120, at 160 (demonstrating the non-Duvergerian 
equilibrium in the 1994 Taipei City election). 
 126. VALENZUELA, supra note 125. 
 127. Hsieh et al., supra note 120, at 154. 
 128. Holcombe, supra note 121, at 535–52. 
 129. H.R. Droop, On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods of Electing 
Representatives, cited in Riker, supra note 121, at 756. 
 130. JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) [hereinafter 
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permits legislators to add levels of preference to simple yea or nay 
votes.131 For example, a legislator engaging in logrolling may improve his 
position by voting for a measure that he does not strongly support in 
exchange for receiving support on a matter he advocates strongly.132
Steven Brams and William Riker elaborated on this phenomenon in 
The Paradox of Vote Trading.133 In this work, Riker and Brams studied 
legislative bodies and wrote that although logrolling improves the relative 
position of legislative vote-traders, it also creates external costs for the 
non-traders.134 For example, a failure to engage in vote-trades with 
legislative colleagues could encourage retributive action by a legislator 
who might otherwise have supported another’s bill but refuses to do so out 
of a desire to encourage the other legislator to “play ball.”135 Accordingly, 
Riker and Brams theorized that although the sum of a vote-swap may be 
good for the traders, in the end, the trade may disadvantage everyone 
involved, including the traders themselves.136 However, this theory is 
based on the likelihood that vote-trading in legislative bodies will 
inevitably repeat, with trades continuing ad infinitum.137 While this 
possibility is understandable in the legislative context, it is unlikely that 
citizen voters will have enough regular interaction surrounding votes to 
create a pattern of compromise and mutual reliance.138
A slew of authors have discussed the principles Duverger articulated. 
Gary Cox,139 T.R. Palfrey,140 and Roger Myerson and Robert Weber141 all 
used mathematical models to demonstrate that multi-candidate elections 
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK]. But see COLO. CONST. art V., § 40 (prohibiting legislative vote-trading by 
constitutional mandate in Colorado); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.05 (West 2003) (prohibiting legislative 
vote-trading by statute); Roberts v. Millikin, 93 P. 2d 393 (Wash. 1939) (equating vote-trading with 
“malfeasance in office”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.0l0 (West 2003) (“‘Misfeasance’ or 
‘malfeasance’ in office means any wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts, or interferes with the 
performance of official duty”), amended by 2003 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 111 (S.S.B. 5221) (West 
2003). 
 131. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 130, at 145. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Legislators are colleagues who work together on a regular basis, while the electorate is called 
together to vote only periodically. 
 139. Cox, supra note 11. 
 140. T.R. Palfrey, A Mathematical Proof of Duverger’s Law, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE 
IN POLITICS (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989). However, Palfrey recognizes that the law may not hold up 
in some unusual situations. Id.  
 141. Myerson & Weber, supra note 125. 
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under the plurality rule will tend to result in only two candidates receiving 
a significant number of votes.142
There is great political scientific evidence that many voters in a SMSB 
election do not vote for their preference, as they would be expected to.143 
Instead, they tend to vote for the “lesser of two evils” or they vote on other 
strategic grounds (e.g., against one candidate by voting for the next 
strongest candidate).144 Therefore, the idea that voters would vote for 
someone other than their first choice is not alien to the practice of 
democracy. However, online vote-pairing placed a new twist in 
Duverger’s law by allowing electors to upset the Duvergian equilibrium 
and promote their true preferences in an election without the constraints 
that inhere in the SMSB election. 
B. Political Movements and the Internet 
The Internet, as a ganglion of online networks, has created a rapid 
global communication system that permits new forms of social and 
political organization and coordination.145 Vincent Casaregola and Robert 
Cropf wrote that the Internet provides citizens with “the opportunity to 
engage in an unprecedented communal process of sharing information and 
creating new knowledge.”146
It did not take long for political candidates, parties, and political action 
committees to recognize the Internet’s potential as “a powerful campaign 
tool with the potential to significantly influence the outcome of 
[elections].”147 The vast communicative power of the Internet makes it a 
super-broadcasting tool that allows nearly anyone to jump into the 
political fray, regardless of economic means.148  
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 11; Holcombe, supra note 121. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Vincent Casaregola & Robert A. Cropf, Virtual Town Halls: Using Computer Networks to 
Improve Public Discourse and Facilitate Service Delivery, RES. AND REFLECTION, Vol. 4, No. 1, (Oct. 
1998), at http://www.iog.ca/policity/CP/Public%20Library/library_reference_virtual_town_halls.html 
(last visited July 10, 2003). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,360 (Nov. 5, 1999); see also 
Mark S. Bonchek, Grassroots in Cyberspace: Using Computer Networks to Facilitate Political 
Participation, at §§ 5.1–5.3 (1994) [hereinafter Bonchek], at http://organizenow.net/techtips/bonchek-
grassroots.html (now defunct) (on file with author). 
 148. Id. 
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1. First-Level Online Political Organization 
In July of 1989, an organization of Chinese students living in the U.S. 
organized a lobbying campaign to persuade Congress to protect them from 
Communist Chinese threats of reprisal for their support of the Tiananmen 
Square pro-democracy demonstrators.149 The lobbying committee used 
email and Internet newsgroups to organize 43,000 students at 160 colleges 
and universities and gain widespread media attention with only four days 
notice.150 The bill passed, largely as a result of the students’ use of 
telecommunications to coordinate the disparate parts within their 
coalition.151
Also in 1989, a group of twenty activists in Santa Monica, California, 
organized the SHWASHLOCK (showers, washers, and lockers) 
movement online.152 “They eventually overcame neighborhood and City 
Council resistance, obtaining a $150,000 line item in the budget and 
approval for converting an old bath house to a facility for the homeless.”153 
The group also created a job bank co-op for the homeless and a campaign 
to include Santa Monica schools in an international program to educate 
school children about electronic communication.154 A follow-up survey of 
the activists revealed that “it was the online process that enabled the group 
to plan and execute these various efforts.”155
As another example of first-level online political organization, The 
Christian Coalition used its website on July 7, 1994 to urge its allies to 
contact Congress and demand an end to federal support for the National 
Endowment for the Arts.156 Three days later, a group of freshman 
Republican Congressmen called for an end to federal support for the 
 149. See Mark S. Bonchek, From Broadcast to Netcast: The Internet and the Flow of Political 
Information 45 (1997), available at http://www.esri.salford.ac.uk/ESRCResearchproject/papers/ 
bonch97.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004). See also, Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989 (now defunct) (on file with author) 
(discussing Tiananmen Square uprising as the event that led to the creation of the Independent 
Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars). Many Chinese found themselves persecuted by the 
Chinese government after it crushed the nascent and ill-fated pro-democracy movement of the summer 
of 1989. See Arnold Zeitlin, Nearly 10 Years on, Bloody Crackdown at Tiananmen Square Stirs 
Vigorous Debate, at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/ document.asp?documentID=5817 (now 
defunct) (on file with author).  
 150. See Bonchek, supra note 147, at § 5.2. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Ed Schwartz, NetActivism: How Citizens Use the Internet, at http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/ 
netactivism/excerpt/ (last visited July 14, 2003). 
 156. Id. 
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NEA.157 Analysts credited the Congressmens’ actions to the online 
coalition building power of the Internet.158
These actions could theoretically have been accomplished without the 
Internet. Had the Chinese students or the Christian Coalition owned a TV 
network, or possessed enough funds to buy sufficient airtime to make their 
cause heard nationwide, the result may have been the same. In these 
examples of first-level online organization, the Internet brought a powerful 
voice to people who otherwise might not have an impact, but their actions 
were not unique to cyberspace. The Internet acted as a tool of 
democratization, but the conduct was not entirely Internet-dependent. The 
Internet, in these circumstances, acted as a super-leafleting tool or a cheap 
means of advertising to a mass audience. 
2. Second-Level Online Political Organization  
The next level of using the Internet as a political action tool is the 
actual use of cyberspace as a “place” for the creation of online 
coalitions.159 In 1998, Bart-Jan Flos of the Politeia Network for 
Citizenship and Democracy in Europe suggested the use of the Internet to 
form coalitions led by already elected politicians.160 Mark Bonchek and 
Edward Schwartz demonstrated the strength of the Internet as a 
replacement for capital in the organization of grassroots political 
movements.161  
Dave D’Alessio studied the impact of the world wide web on the 1996 
presidential election.162 He found that the potential for the Internet to 
compensate for a lack of campaign funds was great, but that this was not 
the true value of Internet campaigning.163 D’Alessio wrote that the true 
value of the Internet in political campaigns would be socializing voters to 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Philip Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1998) (suggesting that the Internet is not just a means of communication, but a “place”); 
Linda M. Harasim, Networks as Social Space, in GLOBAL NETWORKS 15–34 (Linda M. Harasim ed., 
1993) (same). 
 160. Bart-Jan Flos, Teledemocracy VIII: The Formation of On-line Coalitions, 11 Politeia Online 
Newsletter (Sept. 1998), at http://www.dds.nl/~scene/newsletter/archive/okt_98/nl_11198.html (last 
visited June 20, 2001) (now defunct). 
 161. Bonchek, supra note 147, at §§ 5.1–5.3; Ed Schwartz, NetActivism: How Citizens Use the 
Internet, at http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/netactivism/excerpt/ (last visited July 14, 2003). 
 162. Dave D’Alessio, Use of the World Wide Web in the 1996 US Election, 16 ELECTORAL STUD. 
489 (1997) [hereinafter D’Alessio]. 
 163. Id. at 492. 
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seek out political information on the web.164 Furthermore, D’Alessio found 
that web hits to political sites hovered at an unremarkable level until 
approximately 60 days before the election, when hit counts jumped 
substantially and continued on a rising trend until the week before the 
election.165 In the day before the election, hits increased precipitously from 
the previous day, and on the day of the election, hits spiked even more.166
The idea of the Internet as a tool of political organization evolved into 
its next form in November of 2000. At that time, the Internet became more 
than an alternative to phone banks and expensive advertising. Instead, 
users harnessed the Internet to create a vote-pairing, coalition-building 
movement unique to cyberspace with the potential for massive political 
repercussions.  
C. The Electoral College167
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the existence 
of the Electoral College, establishing a mechanism whereby each state has 
a number of electors equal to the number of senators and representatives it 
sends to Congress.168 These electors are then entrusted to vote for the 
President and Vice-President of the United States.169 Each state must 
appoint its electors by the Tuesday following the first Monday in 
November, and no Senator, Representative, or person holding an office of 
trust or profit under the United States may serve as an elector.170 Aside 
from these requirements, there are no constitutional or federal constraints 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id at 495. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Although the construction and function of the Electoral College in the United States might be 
common knowledge to some readers, a perfunctory review of the mechanics of the Electoral College is 
nonetheless valuable. 
 168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1–2 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with 
the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows: Each State shall appoint, in such 
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of 
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an Elector.”). This is further codified by 3 U.S.C. § 3 (2000): 
The number of electors shall be equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which 
the several States are by law entitled at the time when the President and Vice President to be 
chosen come into office; except, that where no apportionment of Representatives has been 
made after any enumeration, at the time of choosing electors, the number of electors shall be 
according to the then existing apportionment of Senators and Representatives. 
For the purposes of the Electoral College, the District of Columbia is a “State.” 3 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). 
 169. Id. 
 170. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
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on the states’ selection of electors, provided that the individual electors are 
constitutionally fit to serve.171
In forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, the electoral votes for 
each state are awarded by state-wide popular election, with the majority 
winner taking all the electoral votes for that state. Yet almost half of the 
states impose no restrictions upon elector conduct. Once appointed, the 
electors may cast their vote for whomever they please regardless of the 
result of the popular vote in these states.172 Most remaining states’ electors 
are bound to vote for the candidate determined by the popular vote in their 
states.173 Only Maine and Nebraska apportion their electors proportionally 
based on how the state vote is split.174 Each congressional district in these 
states is polled to apportion its electoral vote, and the winner overall in the 
state takes the two senatorial electoral votes. 
To understand online vote-pairing, the operative fact regarding the 
Electoral College is that whether a candidate for president wins a state by 
a single vote or a landslide, the electoral votes are apportioned to the 
winner. Even in Maine and Nebraska, it is a “winner take all” 
apportionment of congressional districts: electoral votes.  
D. The Chilling Effect 
1. What is the Chilling Effect? 
The secretaries of state who sought to stamp out online vote-pairing 
certainly achieved their goal. Although nobody was certain whether 
prohibiting vote-pairing was constitutional, the effect brought about by 
state action in California, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin was immediate.175 
 171. The author notes that the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits anyone from 
serving as an elector if the person engaged in insurrection, rebellion, or gave comfort to an enemy of 
the United States, after previously taking an oath not to do so. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. 
 172. These states are: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION WEBSITE, at http://www.archives.gov/ 
federal_register/ electoral_college/electoral_college.html (last visited July 10, 2003). 
 173. The states with restrictions are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District 
of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. 
 174. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (West 2003) (“One Presidential elector shall be 
chosen from each congressional district and 2 at large”); NEB. REV. STAT. 32-710 (1999) (“One 
presidential elector shall be chosen from each congressional district, and two presidential electors shall 
be chosen at large”). 
 175. See Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 492–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that California’s 
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The statements made by secretaries of state of Arizona, Florida, and 
Minnesota, while threatening no prosecutorial action176 (or in the case of 
Minnesota, threatening prosecution after the sites had already shut 
down)177 certainly contributed to the existing detrimental effect. 
The Supreme Court defines the “chilling effect” as the “collateral effect 
of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the more 
reluctant to exercise it.”178 This effect is recognized as affecting free 
association rights179 as well as free speech rights.180 A chilling effect exists 
when citizens are apprehensive to exercise their rights to free expression 
or free association due to the threat of the expense and inconvenience of 
criminal prosecution.181 This effect may exist when there is direct 
prosecution or restraint or when the state action is merely a comment by 
an official perceived to have the requisite power to prosecute.182 The 
landmark case of Near v. Minnesota explains that when citizens are 
apprehensive about exercising their rights to free expression or free 
association due to the threat of criminal prosecution, constitutionally 
protected rights can be chilled.183  
Nonetheless, the Court hinted that it might allow restraint on the lawful 
“publication of the sailing dates of [military] transports or the number and 
location of troops.”184 Courts engage in a balancing test to determine 
actions taken against vote-pairing sites constituted a chilling effect and stating that plaintiffs alleged a 
“colorable prior restraint claim”); http://www.voteswap2000.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2000) (now 
defunct); Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A; Scott Harris, Vote Green—Somewhere Else, INDUSTRY 
STANDARD, Nov. 13, 2000, available at http://www.findarticles.com. 
 176. See Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A (discussing Arizona’s response). 
 177. See Christine Cupaiuolo, When a Personal Vote Isn’t Personal, at 
http://www.poppolitics.com/articles/2000-11-02_nadergorelegal.shtml (now defunct) (“Minnesota 
Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer e-mailed VoteSwap2000.com on Monday, asking them to ‘cease 
and desist’ vote-swapping activities in the state of Minnesota. (They already had.)”). 
 178. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (holding ordinance that prohibited the 
possession of “obscene” or “indecent” material in a bookstore to be unconstitutional due to its 
tendency to inhibit not only unprotected expression but also protected expression). 
 179. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 493–94 (1965) (holding statute that defined 
“subversive organization” was unconstitutional due to potential “chilling effect” on defendant’s 
associational rights). 
 180. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940) (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713). 
 181. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310.U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940). 
 182. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972) (“[C]onstitutional violations may arise from 
the deterrent, or ‘chilling’ effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition 
against the exercise of First Amendment rights.”); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 
(1963) (internal citations omitted). 
 183. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (holding Minnesota statute that 
authorized prior restraints on publication of defamatory materials unconstitutional). 
 184. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716. See also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726–27 
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that when national security information is implicated, the 
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whether the detrimental effect is sufficiently counterbalanced by valid 
governmental interests, but the government must meet a heavy burden to 
convince a court to sustain state action that chills constitutionally 
protected activity.185 Therefore, a chilling effect is not per se 
unconstitutional, but since its existence can stifle “the flow of democratic 
expression and controversy at one of its chief sources,”186 state actions that 
chill free expression are held up to heightened scrutiny.187
2. Was There a Chilling Effect? 
The statements and actions of the secretaries of state, in their quest to 
shut-down the vote-pairing sites, sent shivers through cyberspace that 
affected website operators nationwide.188 For example, the day after 
California contacted VoteSwap2000, the website posted the following 
message: “We are not lawyers . . . Our advice is to err on the side of 
caution, and if you can’t determine for sure that you are not in violation of 
any laws, you should not participate in vote-swapping.”189
Despite site operators’ support of Ralph Nader, and the questionable 
constitutionality of the actions of the secretaries of state, none of the site 
operators were willing to risk prison or fines. At least three vote-pairing 
sites, citing threats of litigation, closed down immediately after California 
Secretary of State Jones’s letter to VoteSwap2000 became public.190 One 
Florida-based site, PresidentGore.com191 was designed to specifically 
exclude Californians because its operator was uncertain of California’s 
jurisdiction over its operator.192 Without determining whether the 
secretaries of states’ actions were permissible or unconstitutional, it is not 
far-fetched to theorize that the secretaries of state may have had a 
profound effect on the outcome of the 2000 presidential election by 
government has the burden of proving that disclosure would have severe consequences for national 
security). 
 185. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).  
 186. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (invalidating loyalty oath that ignored the 
element of scienter). 
 187. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256.  
 188. See Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A. 
 189. http://www.voteswap2000.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2000) (now defunct). 
 190. Oregon Warns, supra note 49, at A26. 
 191. http://www.presidentgore.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2000) (now defunct). 
 192. When the user filled out the vote-swap form, if the user entered “California” in the “state” 
field, he received the following message: “As at least one other site has had issues with CALIFORNIA 
law not permitting the swap of their votes, we have disallowed submissions from California. I’m sorry 
for this, but I don’t want to get in trouble over this.” http://www.presidentgore.com/ (last visited Nov. 
5, 2000) (now defunct). 
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creating a nationwide “chilling effect” on the publication and use of vote-
pairing websites.193
3. What Were the Electoral Consequences of the Chilling Effect? 
Had the 2000 election been decided by a large margin, the vote-pairing 
debate would still be of constitutional importance because political speech 
and association was crushed by the mere threat of prosecution.194 
However, because the entire election was resolved by a razor-thin margin, 
it is easy to speculate that the vote-pairing movement could have had a 
profound effect upon the outcome of the election. As late as November 17, 
2000, pundits claimed “Nader Traders” could have tipped Florida toward 
Al Gore.195  
The effect of online vote-pairing upon the 2000 election is not based on 
hindsight alone. In its waning days, the 2000 presidential campaign was a 
cliffhanger between Al Gore and George W. Bush. With less than a week 
to go, no pundits could definitively say who was actually in the lead. With 
a total of 538 electoral votes up for grabs and 270 needed to win the 
presidency, as of October 30, 2000, Bush securely held 202 electoral votes 
to Gore’s 190, and 146 electoral votes were too close to call.196 On 
November 3, CNN.com reported 224 electoral votes for Bush, 181 for 
Gore, and 133 that were too close for CNN.com to call.197 Meanwhile 
REUTERS reported that Bush had 217 electoral votes, Gore had 200, and 
121 electoral votes were too close to call.198  
The candidacy of Ralph Nader, the Green Party’s nominee for 
President, added to the unpredictability of the 2000 race. The Greens, 
previously notable only for their insignificance in American politics, 
promised to have resounding influence in the presidential election. The 
Florida polls as of November 3, 2000, showed Gore with 46% of the vote, 
Bush with 42% of the vote, and Nader with 6% of the vote.199 With a 
 193. See Harris, supra note 25. 
 194. See supra note 179. 
 195. Harris, supra note 25. 
 196. See Michael Griffin, An Electoral Elite Will Have Last Word: In a Close Race, Florida and 
12 Other States Likely Will Choose the Next President, According to an Orlando Sentinel Analysis, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 30, 2000, at A1. 
 197. http://www.cnn.com/interactive/allpolitics/0010/electoral.map/map3.html (last visited Jan. 
17, 2004). 
 198. See REUTERS, Bush With Slight Edge in Electoral College Count (Nov. 3, 2000), at 
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20001103/pl/campaign_electoral_dc.html. (now defunct). 
 199. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll, conducted from October 31 to November 
2, 2000, for Reuters/MSNBC, which surveyed 659 likely Florida voters with a margin of error of plus 
or minus 4% (released, 11/2/00). This tracking poll was a rolling sample of 200 likely voters each 24-
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margin of error of +/- 4%, Florida’s all-important twenty-five electoral 
votes remained unclaimed.200 Pennsylvania’s twenty-three electoral votes 
were similarly precarious with 45% supporting Gore, 41% supporting 
Bush, and 8% supporting Nader.201 Washington, formerly narrowly in the 
Gore column,202 went to a dead toss-up on November 3 with 44% 
supporting both Gore and Bush and 6% supporting Nader.203 Nationally 
speaking, as of October 27, 2000, 56% of Nader supporters said that if 
Nader were not running, they would have voted for Gore, while 23% 
favored Bush, and 21% would not have voted at all.204 Given these 
numbers, had Nader not been in the race, Gore would have appeared to 
have had a firm lead in Florida, Pennsylvania, and Washington a week 
before the election. 
As the wind blew out of California and chilled vote-pairing operations 
nationwide, the national race for electoral votes was tight, with Bush 
holding 217 likely votes, Gore holding 200, and 121 too close to call.205 
With the race as close as it was, even New Hampshire’s four electoral 
votes, traditionally forgotten about the day after its primary race,206 were 
still influential enough that neither campaign had abandoned the state 
(Bush 45%, Gore 40%, Nader 5%).207
Voteexchange2000.org arranged 257 exchanges for Florida voters 
between October 26, 2000 and October 30, 2000, when it shut down due 
hour period, with the three most recent 24-hour surveys added together for a likely voter sample of 
600. For an additional poll compilation, see http://www.electyou.com/electoralmap.htm (last visited 
July 25, 2003). 
 200. Id. 
 201. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll, conducted from October 31 to November 
2, 2000 for the TOLEDO BLADE and the PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE that surveyed 603 likely 
Pennsylvania voters with a margin of error of plus or minus 4% (released, 11/2/00). This tracking poll 
was a rolling sample of 200 likely voters for each 24-hour period, with the three most recent 24-hour 
surveys added together for likely voter sample of 600. For an additional poll compilation, see 
http://www.electyou.com/electoralmap.htm (last visited July 25, 2003). 
 202. See Ronald Brownstein, Campaign 2000: Liberals Beat Drum For Gore, Hope Nader 
Backers Listen, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at A16.
 203. These percentages are from a Zogby tracking poll conducted October 31 to November 2, 
2000, for REUTERS and MSNBC. The poll surveyed 508 likely Washington voters with a margin of 
error of plus or minus 4.5% (released, 11/2/00). This tracking poll was a rolling sample of 200 likely 
voters for each 24-hour period, with the three most recent 24-hour surveys added together for a likely 
voter sample of 600. For an additional poll compilation, see http://www.electyou.com/ 
electoralmap.htm (last visited July 25, 20030. 
 204. See Dizikes & Ruppe, supra note 10. 
 205. Inside Politics (CNN TV Broadcast Nov. 6, 2000) (Transcript # 00110600V15). 
 206. Mike Recht, Close Presidential Race Pulls Small States Out of Obscurity, TELEGRAPH 
ONLINE (Nashwa, N.H.), Oct. 31, 2000, at http://www.nashuatelegraph.com. 
 207. An American Research Group poll that was conducted from October 31 to November 1, 
2000, surveyed 600 likely New Hampshire voters with a margin of error of +/- 4% (release, 11/2/00) 
(source on file with author). 
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to fear of prosecution from California’s and Oregon’s Secretaries of 
State.208 Given that the buzz surrounding the vote-pairing phenomenon 
had just begun, it is likely that the rate of votes being swapped would have 
increased until Election Day.209 However, had the rate of vote-pairing 
remained constant, 2056 votes could have been exchanged by this one site 
in Florida alone. That many more votes for Al Gore in Florida would have 
given twenty-five more electoral votes to Gore nationally, which thus 
would have changed the outcome of the 2000 presidential race. Had the 
sites continued to run, the circus following the election may never have 
occurred. Alternatively, had the sites been shut down immediately, the 
race may not have been decided by such a close margin, and George W. 
Bush may have been able to claim victory on Tuesday, November 7 
instead of waiting until December and the resolution of Bush v. Gore.210
Given the razor-thin margin of the election during the first days of 
November 2000, the secretaries of state should have foreseen the potential 
effect of their actions upon the election. Did they act correctly? Had they 
not acted, could it have changed the outcome of the election? Were other 
secretaries of state delinquent in not acting similarly? Although any effect 
upon the results of the election is mere speculation, at the time that the 
secretaries of state acted (or refrained from acting), such an effect was 
certainly foreseeable. The resolution of the debate over the propriety of 
their conduct could have great implications for future elections and the 
concept of democracy in a new-media society. 
III. VOTE-PAIRING AND STATE LAW 
While federal constitutional concerns may ultimately govern the legal 
status of online vote-pairing, it is important to study this new method of 
political organization under state election law. In most circumstances, it 
appears that the secretaries of state who sought to prohibit the practice 
relied upon a misapplication of their state’s respective electoral laws. This 
part of the study will analyze the state election law of each state where 
officials took some kind of action or issued a statement on the legality of 
vote-pairing. Where appropriate, it will also discuss state constitutional 
protections. 
 208. See, e.g., James Rosen, Backers of Gore, Nader Make Deal: E-trades; Green Voters in Close 
States ‘Swap’ Votes for Gore in Pro-Bush States, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 2, 2000, at A1. 
 209. See D’Alessio, supra note 162, at 494–95 (demonstrating that during the 1996 campaign, hits 
to election oriented websites increased rapidly as election day approached, with 1996’s election day 
attracting “more than twice as many [hits] than on any other day.”). 
 210. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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A. Procedural History and Kelleher’s Abstention 
California’s secretary of state Bill Jones (R) fired the first volley in the 
battle over vote-pairing by threatening to imprison the operators of 
VoteSwap2000.org.211 “You can’t trade a dollar for a vote, a job for a vote, 
or a vote for a vote,” said Jones spokesman Alfie Charles. Justifying 
Jones’ crackdown on vote-pairing, Charles said, “[I]t’s the Secretary of 
State’s job to protect the integrity of the election process.”212
Soon thereafter, the California ACLU fired back and filed suit in 
federal court seeking an injunction to prevent Jones from acting against 
vote-pairing sites due to the First Amendment implications of Jones’ 
actions.213 As of Monday, November 6, 2000 (the day before the 2000 
election), the ACLU’s federal court motion for a temporary restraining 
order against Jones languished in U.S. District Court Judge Kelleher’s 
chambers.214 Eventually, Kelleher ruled that the vote-pairing sites were not 
entitled to a restraining order preventing Jones from prosecuting or 
threatening to prosecute their operators or participants.215 Kelleher’s 
reasoning for denying the motion is unknown because his ruling was a 
simple one-line denial of the motion.216 Months later, Kelleher declined to 
rule on the underlying First Amendment question. Kelleher relied on the 
Pullman doctrine217 and abstained from making a decision.218  
 211. California’s Secretary of State Jones said that VoteSwap2000.org: 
[S]pecifically offers to broker the exchange of votes throughout the United States of America. 
This activity is corruption of the voting process in violation of Elections Code sections 18521 
and 18522 as well as Penal Code section 182, criminal conspiracy . . . any person or entity 
that tries to exchange votes or broker the exchange of votes will be pursued with utmost 
vigor. 
Email from California Secretary of State to operator of Vote-Swap 2000, forwarded on Nov. 1, 2000).  
 212. ASSOCIATED PRESS, ACLU Fights To Protect Vote-Brokering Web Sites, Nov. 2, 2000 
[hereinafter ACLU Fights], available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp? 
documentID=3518.  
 213. See, e.g., Patricia Jacobus, ACLU Files Suit Favoring Vote-Swapping Sites, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Nov. 27, 2000, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-249071.html; ACLU Fights, supra 
note 212. 
 214. Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700). Although the temporary restraining order was 
applied from Nov. 3, 2000, a week prior to the election, Kelleher did not rule until Nov. 7, and the 
denial was not transmitted to the parties until Nov. 8, which was the day before the election. See Brief 
of Plaintiff, at 4, at http://www.nvri.org/library/cases/Porter_v_Jones/PorterOpeningAppealBrief.pdf. 
 215. Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700). 
 216. Patricia Jacobus, Judge Rejects Request To Stop Vote-Swap Crackdown, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Nov. 6, 2000, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-248208.html?legacy=cnet (now defunct) (on file 
with author). 
 217. See Railroad Commission v. Pullman 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Porter v. Jones, 393 F.3d 483, 
492 (2003) (interpreting Pullman). 
 218. See Porter v. Jones, 314 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003); Porter v. Jones, 393 F.3d 483, 492 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
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Railroad Commission v. Pullman stands for the proposition that a 
federal district court may decline to adjudicate a controversy that is 
properly before it when such a controversy may be resolved in state 
courts.219 The doctrine is designed to avoid conflicts between state 
legislatures and federal courts by permitting federal courts to abstain from 
deciding sensitive federal constitutional questions when state law may 
decide the question or render it moot.220
A federal court may only properly invoke the Pullman doctrine if:  
(1) the case touches on a sensitive area of social policy upon which 
the federal courts ought not enter unless no alternative to its 
adjudication is open, (2) constitutional adjudication plainly can be 
avoided if a definite ruling on the state issue would terminate the 
controversy, and (3) [the proper resolution of] the possible 
determinative issue of state law is uncertain.221
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the first prong of the 
Pullman test was absent in Porter v. Jones.222 In fact, the appeals court 
observed that in First Amendment cases, the first Pullman factor “will 
almost never be present because the guarantee of free expression is always 
an area of particular federal concern.”223 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Kelleher’s ruling was an abuse of discretion because 
“constitutional challenges based on the first amendment or free expression 
are the kind of cases that the federal courts are particularly well-suited to 
hear. That is why abstention is generally inappropriate when first 
amendment rights are at stake.”224
Although some of America’s greatest legal minds including Alan 
Dershowitz and Laurence Tribe fought on behalf of the ACLU,225 the legal 
giants appear to have made a tactical error in bringing their action in 
federal court. Although bringing suit in federal court was jurisdictionally 
proper,226 from a strategic standpoint, it might have been superior to fight 
the vote-pairing legal battle in each applicable state court. The ACLU 
 
 
 219. See Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing Kelleher’s abstention as an 
abuse of discretion). See also Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501; Canton v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 498 
F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 220. See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 
1998).  
 221. Porter, 319 F.3d at 492. 
 222. 393 F.3d at 492. 
 223. Id. at 492 (quoting Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 224. Id. (quoting J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 487 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Porter, 319 F.3d at 483. 
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could have sought an interpretation of each state’s election law from each 
individual state’s courts. The state courts could have ducked the 
constitutional issue and would likely have based their rulings on simple 
interpretations of state election laws. Generally, courts will avoid 
constitutional questions when statutes may be interpreted on other 
grounds.227 However, given that (with the exception of Arizona) anti-vote-
pairing secretaries of state appeared to have stretched the intent of their 
respective states’ laws, vote-pairing cases could have turned on these 
grounds. The constitutional question might have then remained unsettled, 
but at least the websites would have had a chance of survival at the crucial 
moment when they came into play. 
B. California 
1. California Procedure 
The proper forum for the initial resolution of Porter v. Jones (the 
California vote-pairing case) was a California state court. While the ruling 
would have made less press and would have had less persuasive 
precedential value than a federal court decision, the rights of the voters 
could have been better served had the ACLU team sought injunctive relief 
against the Secretary of State in a California state court through a writ of 
mandate (the California equivalent of a restraining order).228 This remedy 
is appropriate where denial of relief permits an immediate infringement on 
First Amendment rights.229  
2. California Constitutional Law 
California courts follow the rule that when a prosecution creates an 
“ominous, chilling effect on the free exercise of political speech . . . [a] 
 227. See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1997) (statute should be construed to 
avoid constitutional question if possible); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 33 (1995) (federal courts will 
avoid constitutional questions when an alternative basis of decision is available); Public Citizen v. 
United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 481 (1989) (“Statutes should be construed to avoid 
constitutional questions.”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 333 (1988) (“[I]t is well established that 
statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions if such a construction is fairly 
possible.”); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741–42 (1984) (“Statutes should be construed to avoid 
constitutional questions.”); N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 
U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (same). 
 228. See Gonzales v. City of Santa Paula, 226 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 229. See, e.g., Gonzales, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (citing Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 
656, 532 P.2d 116, 117 (1975)); Durran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 574, 578–79, 104 Cal. Rptr. 793, 
796–97 (1972). 
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petition for writ of mandate is appropriate.”230 The California Constitution 
affords greater protection to free speech and association than the federal 
Constitution.231 As long as federal rights are protected, California legal 
principles will prevail in California state courts.232 Given this fact, an 
independent survey of California constitutional law is unnecessary, but an 
analysis of the California election law is crucial. 
3. California Election Law 
The California Secretary of State threatened to prosecute the operators 
of VoteSwap2000233 for violations of California Elections Code sections 
18521(a)234 and 18522(a)(2).235 These provisions prohibit citizens from 
giving or receiving payment or other “valuable consideration” to induce 
any voter to vote for a particular person or measure.236 Jones believed that 
the exchange of promises to vote for certain candidates fit the definition of 
“valuable consideration.”237 California law defines “valuable 
consideration” as follows: 
Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the 
promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully 
entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such 
person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully 
 230. Gonzales, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (citing Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 656 
(1975)); Duran v. Cassidy, 104 Cal. Rptr. 793, 797 (Ct. App. 1972). 
 231. See Gonzales v. City of Santa Paula, 226 Cal. Rptr. 164, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Robins v. 
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 343–46 (Cal. 1979), aff’d. 447 U.S. 81 (1980) (“[P]ast 
decisions on speech and private property testify to the strength of ‘liberty of speech’ in this state.”). 
 232. See Gonzales v. City of Santa Paula, 226 Cal. Rptr. 164, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Robins, 
592 P.2d at 907–10. 
 233. See also Farhad Manjoo, Vote-swapper Swatted Down, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 31, 2000, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,39892,00.html.  
 234. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521(a) (West 2000) (“A person shall not directly or through any other 
person receive, agree, or contract for, before, during or after an election, any money, gift, loan, or other 
valuable consideration . . . because he or any other person voted, agreed to vote, refrained from voting, 
or agreed to refrain from voting for any particular person or measure.”). 
 235. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(a)(2) (West 2000) (“Neither a person nor a controlled committee 
shall directly or through any other person or controlled committee pay, lend, or contribute, or offer or 
promise to pay, lend, or contribute, any money or other valuable consideration to or for any voter to or 
for any other person to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting at an election for any particular 
person or measure.”). 
 236. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18522(2)(2) (West 2000). 
 237. Scott Duke Harris, Ballot Busters: The Archaic Mechanism Used to Elect U.S. Presidents Is 
Under Assault by People Who Meet on the Internet and Pledge to Swap Votes in Next Year’s Election, 
L.A. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2445497. 
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in law.”247 Therefore, absent the elements of valuable consideration” that 
make it truly valuable, the consideration is merely gratuitous.248
The right to vote is a right that both parties might otherwise exercise, as 
is the right to refrain from voting, or the right to vote for whomever one 
pleases. The promises made in the arrangement of an online vote-swap did 
not change these rights. When voters agreed to swap their votes, they 
retained all of their rights to vote or refrain from voting, or to vote for 
whichever candidate they chose. Their pledge was unenforceable, and they 
were free to withdraw at any time without detriment. Therefore, at best, 
the agreements could be deemed gratuitous consideration. Gratuitous 
consideration is consideration that “is not founded upon any such loss, 
injury, or inconvenience to the party to whom it moves as to make it valid 
in law.”249 As such, the acts of vote-swappers were no more than 
exchanges of mere gratuitous consideration, and the website operators 
were working outside the scope of the statute. 
C. Oregon 
On November 2, 2000, Oregon Secretary of State Bill Bradbury said 
online vote-pairing, even without the exchange of money, violated his 
state’s voting corruption law.250 Bradbury acted swiftly and sent desist 
letters to six vote-trading sites that were based outside Oregon.251 
Although Oregon initially also targeted sites that merely advocated vote-
pairing, by November 2 the Oregon Elections Board softened its position 
only to prohibit entering into a contract to trade votes or facilitate such 
activity.252  
 247. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (6th ed. 1990). 
 248. Id. at 1550–51. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Oregon Warns, supra note 49, at A26. See also OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665 (West 1999). 
 251. Oregon Warns, supra note 49, at A26. This raises interesting questions as to whether he 
would even have been able to assert jurisdiction over the operators. This issue is beyond the scope of 
this study, but there have been many excellent studies of this question. See, e.g., Brian E. Daughdrill, 
Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Waiting For The Other Shoe To Drop On First 
Amendment Concerns, 51 MERCER L. REV. 919 (2000); Kevin R. Lyn, Personal Jurisdiction and the 
Internet: Is A Home Page Enough To Satisfy Minimum Contacts?, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 341 (2000); 
Todd D. Leitstein, Comment, A Solution For Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565 
(1999). 
 252. See Press Release, Oregon Secretary of State, Secretary of State Moves to Close Vote-
Swapping Sites, Nov. 2, 2000, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/executive/pressrel/110200swap.html (last 
visited July 4, 2003). 
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1. Oregon Election Law 
Oregon’s voting corruption law states that “[n]o person, acting either 
alone or with or through any other person, shall directly or indirectly 
subject any person to undue influence with the intent to induce any person 
to register or vote in any particular manner.”253 The statute defines “undue 
influence” as including the “giving or promising to give money, 
employment or other thing of value.”254
Oregon’s Secretary of State interpreted “thing of value” to include the 
exchange of a co-equal vote. Therefore, according to the State Election 
Division, any individual pair of voters engaging in an arrangement to swap 
votes was in violation of Oregon law,255 as was any website operator who 
facilitated such an arrangement. 
Analysis of whether online vote-pairing is illegal under Oregon law 
hinges on the question: Is a vote a “thing of value that would be used to 
induce a person to vote?” There is only one reported case in Oregon 
interpreting Oregon Revised Statute section 260.665 (“section 260.665”). 
Although this decision offers a nearly perfect roadmap for analysis of this 
issue under Oregon law, due to a procedural technicality, it offers little in 
the way of precedent upon which a court, the Secretary of State, or citizens 
can rely.  
Oregon Republican Party v. State256 dealt with a plan by the Oregon 
Republican Party to mail applications for absentee ballots with the voter’s 
name pre-printed on them.257 The application was to include a letter urging 
the voter to apply for an absentee ballot, if the voter was unsure of being 
able to vote on Election Day, and a postage-paid envelope in which the 
voter could send the application to Republican Party headquarters.258 The 
Party would then have the applications forwarded to the county clerk, who 
would have the ballots sent to the individual voters.259 The Republican 
Party sought a declaration that the mailing would not violate the election 
 253. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665(2)(c) (West 1999). 
 254. Id. § 260.665(1). 
 255. See Telephone Interview with Jennifer Hertel, Program Representative, Oregon State 
Election Division (Nov. 6, 2000) (confirmed by email from Norma Buckno, Oregon State Election 
Division, to Marc J. Randazza (Mar. 28, 2001) (on file with author)). Hertel stated that the individual 
voters would be in violation of Oregon Revised Statute section 260.665 but acknowledged that there 
would be no practical way to prosecute individual voters due to the impossibility of verifying exactly 
how each voter cast his or her ballot. See id. 
 256. 717 P.2d 1206 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) [hereinafter Oregon Republican I]. 
 257. Id. at 1207. 
 258. See Oregon Republican I, 717 P.2d at 1207. 
 259. See id. 
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statute, but the Circuit Court of Marion County, Oregon, held that it would 
violate the statute due to the fact that the stamped envelope was a “thing of 
value.”260  
The Oregon Republican Party appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon, which reversed the finding of the circuit court, and agreed that 
such a mailing would not violate section 260.665.261 The court wrote that 
when considering whether a “postage paid envelope is a thing of value that 
would be used to induce a person to vote,” the parties in the case had 
incorrectly focused on the first part of the question.262 The decisive factor 
was not whether the stamped envelope was valuable consideration, but 
rather whether there existed improper intent to induce persons to register 
or vote.263 Since inducement requires a promise of an advantage as a result 
of performing the desired act, for an act to be held as inducement, there 
must be persuasion coupled with a benefit or the absence of a threatened 
detriment.264 Therefore, in order for inducement to exist, there must be a 
benefit greater than what is involved in the act of voting.265 The law 
requires something with value independent of the right of suffrage.266 The 
court held that the envelope was a “thing of value” but that it did not 
reward the act of voting.267
This decision would appear to quell the vote-swap controversy, at least 
in the State of Oregon. However, the Oregon Supreme Court rendered 
Oregon Republican I moot upon appeal because the election was over.268 
While not accepting that the doctrine of “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review” existed in Oregon, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated that if it 
did, it would not be applicable to this case.269 Because the Republican 
 260. Id. (trial court opinion unpublished, but trial court reasoning derived from published court of 
appeals decision). 
 261. See id. at 1208. 
 262. See id.  
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See Or. Republican Party v. State, 722 P.2d 1237 (Or. 1986) [hereinafter Oregon Republican 
II]. See also Brumnett v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 848 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Or. 1993) (“Cases that are 
otherwise justiciable, but in which a court’s decision no longer will have a practical effect on or 
concerning the rights of the parties . . . [are] moot.”). 
 269. See Oregon Republican II, 722 P.2d at 1237. See also Brumnett, 848 P.2d at 1196 (“Cases 
that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court’s decision no longer will have a practical effect on 
or concerning the rights of the parties . . . [are] moot.”); Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 895 P.2d 765, 774–75 
(Or. 1995) (“[C]apable of repetition, yet evading review” has been rejected by the Oregon Supreme 
Court); Pham v. Thompson, 965 P.2d 482, 485 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (“Oregon does not recognize the 
‘capable of repetition, yet evading review doctrine.’”); Safeway, Inc. v. Or. Pub. Employees Union, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/4
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Party did not allege that it intended to utilize the same plan in the future, 
the issue evaded review.270 Therefore, the decision of the court of appeals 
in Oregon Republican I was reversed and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the appeal as moot.271  
The court of appeals obediently followed the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
instructions and wrote, in a per curiam opinion, “Dismissed as moot.”272 
The majority did not write a single additional word.273 However, in a 
scathing concurrence, Judge Van Hoomissen foresaw the vote-swap 
controversy when he wrote: 
The Supreme Court could have decided the issue on its merits and 
should have done so. Meanwhile, political parties, campaign 
committees, candidates and public officials responsible for 
enforcement of the election laws are left guessing about the legality 
of the conduct proposed here. More litigation, more expense and 
more delay are the only results of the Supreme Court’s directive to 
this court.274
2. Oregon Constitutional Analysis 
Van Hoomissen not only foresaw the constitutional issue presented by 
online vote-pairing but also offered guidance to the resolution of the issue 
on free speech grounds in his concurrence in Oregon Republican I. Van 
Hoomissen, in examining the legislative intent behind section 260.665, 
wrote: “[a]n election offense does not exist unless the act tends to produce 
the types of evils that the statute was designed to avoid.”275 Judge Van 
Hoomissen’s concurrence states that it is consistent with his interpretation 
of the statute to say that the giving of a thing of value does not include 
giving an item or service that does no more than facilitate the act of 
deliberative voting.276
954 P.2d 196, 198 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 270. See Oregon Republican II, 722 P.2d at 1238. But see, e.g., Whipple v. Or. Sch. Activities 
Ass’n, 629 P.2d 384, 421 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (“[M]atters of public interest should sometimes be 
resolved by the courts even in the face of apparent mootness of the particular case at hand.”).  
 271. Oregon Republican II, 722 P.2d at 1238–39. 
 272. Or. Republican Party v. State, 726 P.2d 412, 412 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) [hereinafter Oregon 
Republican III]. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. (Van Hoomissen, J., concurring). 
 275. Oregon Republican I, 717 P.2d at 1209–10 (Van Hoomisen, J., concurring). 
 276. Id. at 1210. 
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Van Hoomissen noted that the court did not address the constitutional 
aspects of the case that he believed were present, but his opinion suggests 
that Bradbury’s application of section 260.665 violated Article I, Section 8 
(freedom of speech)277 and Article I, Section 26 (freedom of assembly)278 
of the Oregon Constitution.279 Van Hoomissen’s analysis also suggests 
that Bradbury’s move was likely violative of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.280 Since Oregon’s Constitution 
usually provides greater protection to freedom of speech and assembly 
than the federal Constitution,281 there is no necessity for federal analysis 
when there is a violation of the state constitution.282
Bradbury’s application of section 260.665 impacted First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and assembly. The websites expressed 
political opinion and facilitated the assembly of citizens to achieve a 
common political goal. As such, the application of the statute must be 
subjected to strict scrutiny under the Constitution.283 Under this level of 
scrutiny, suppression of online vote-pairing is impermissible. 
Initially, Bradbury’s actions implicated Article 1, Section 8 and Article 
I, Section 26 of the Oregon Constitution. However, given his re-statement 
of position on November 2, 2000, only Section 26, the Oregon 
Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of association, was implicated.284 This 
provision states, in pertinent part, “No law shall be passed restraining any 
of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable 
manner to consult for their common good . . . .”285
Therefore, the constitutional question becomes whether, under Oregon 
law, a constitutional prohibition against laws suppressing freedom of 
association can be overridden by the actions of a secretary of state that 
 277. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or 
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be 
responsible for the abuse of this right.”). 
 278. OR. CONST. art. I, § 26 (“No law shall be passed restraining any of the inhabitants of the 
State from assembling together in a peaceable manner to consult for their common good; nor from 
instructing their Representatives; nor from applying to the Legislature for redress of grievances.”). 
 279. Oregon Republican I, 717 P.2d at 1210. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See, e.g., Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541, 549 (Or. 1975).  
 282. See id. at 549. 
 283. State v. Tusek, 630 P.2d 892, 894 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Crane, 612 P.2d at 737–38. See also 
State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d 491, 492–93 (Or. 1969).  
 284. Press Release, Oregon Secretary of State, Secretary of State Moves to Close Vote-Swapping 
Sites, Nov. 2, 2000, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/executive/pressrel/110200swap.html (last visited July 
4, 2003).  
 285. OR. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
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directly restrain freedom of association.286 This is a proposition that the 
Supreme Court of Oregon has already rejected.287 If the Secretary of State 
threatened citizens with prosecution that resulted in a restraint of 
Oregonians from assembling together to consult for their own common 
good, a balancing test is neither necessary nor proper.288 Bradbury violated 
the constitutional rights of Oregonians. 
D. Florida 
Before Katharine Harris gained fame (or infamy) for her involvement 
in the 2000 vote recount debacle, she weighed in on the issue of online 
vote-pairing. On November 2, 2000, the author of this study called the 
then Secretary of State and questioned her as to her opinion on the issue. 
Harris stated that the practice was “absolutely illegal” under Florida 
law.289 When pressed as to what statutes the practice violated, Harris stated 
that the practice was certainly illegal because “a vote is to be voted, not 
traded or swapped.”290 Despite this position, Harris never took public 
action against the online vote-pairing sites and never issued any official 
releases on the matter.  
Based on her statements, one could argue that the current Secretary of 
State lacks Harris’ conviction on the subject. Representatives of the 
Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, seemed confused as to 
how to apply Florida election law to vote-pairing. When questioned, 
Sharon Larson, Assistant General Counsel to the Florida Department of 
State, Division of Elections stated her expert opinion that online vote-
pairing “could possibly” be a violation of the law.291 Regardless, Larson 
suggested that any such violations were beyond the concern of the 
Division of Elections. “The Department of State does not have 
prosecutorial authority,” she said. 
Searching for a more definite answer, I pressed the Secretary of State’s 
office for an answer more definite than “maybe.” The General Counsel’s 
office deferred the inquiry to the judgment of the secretary’s public 
relations professionals. Bill Spann, Communications Director for the 
Florida Department of State, finally issued this official statement: 
 286. See Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d 541, 544 (Or. 1975). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 545–46 n.6. 
 289. Telephone Interview with Katharine Harris, Secretary of State, Florida, Nov. 2, 2000. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See Email from Sharon Larson, Assistant General Counsel to the Florida Department of State 
Division of Election, to Marc J. Randazza (July 18, 2003) (on file with the author). 
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[V]ote-swapping may, in fact, constitute voter fraud, and all Florida 
citizens should be aware of that. Specifically, the process of vote-
swapping may violate Florida Statute sections 104.045 and 104.061. 
The Florida Department of State considers any allegation of voter 
fraud to be a very serious matter and would immediately inform the 
proper investigative authority.292
Given that Florida was the most closely divided state in 2000, it is 
foreseeable that vote-pairing could have an effect in Florida in 2004.293 As 
one of the top prizes in the Electoral College, vote-pairing demands 
analysis under Florida law. This is especially true in light of the fact that 
the Secretary of State’s General Counsel’s office is so unsure as to 
whether the practice is illegal.  
As Spann mentioned above, Florida has two statutes that “may” be 
implicated by the practice of online vote-pairing: Florida Statute section 
104.045,294 the Florida “vote selling” statute, and Florida Statute section 
104.061,295 the Florida statute prohibiting the corrupt influence on the 
practice of voting. The Florida vote selling statute provides: 
104.045. Vote selling: Any person who: 
(1) Corruptly offers to vote for or against, or to refrain from voting 
for or against, any candidate in any election in return for pecuniary 
or other benefit; or 
(2) Accepts a pecuniary or other benefit in exchange for a promise 
to vote for or against, or to refrain from voting for or against, any 
candidate in any election, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, 
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
As discussed in Part IV, the federal vote-buying statute296 is limited to 
instruments of corruption that are pecuniary in nature. Section 104.045 
dispenses with this limitation and specifically includes pecuniary benefits 
and “other” benefits.  
 292. See Email from Bill Spann, Communications Director for the Florida Department of State, to 
Marc J. Randazza (July 21, 2003) (on file with the author). 
 293. See American University News Press Release, Jan. 1, 2001, at http://domino.american.edu/ 
AU/media/mediarel.nsf/0/fa835b21d699441a852569d10077aa8d?OpenDocument (last visited July 13, 
2003) (Jamin Raskin was quoted in the release as saying, “If Republican state officials had not shut 
down the vote-trading movement in Florida, it is very possible that Al Gore would have won that 
state.”). 
 294. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.045 (West 2002). 
 295. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.061 (West 2002). 
 296. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (2000).  
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Related Florida laws such as Florida Statute section 104.012, the 
Florida election law governing the giving of consideration for voter 
registration, prohibits the giving of “anything of value that is redeemable 
in cash to any person in consideration for his becoming a registered voter 
. . . .”297 By expressly prohibiting the exchange of pecuniary or monetary 
benefits for a voter’s registration, the Florida Legislature is presumed to 
have intended to exclude other types of benefits from the statute’s 
prohibition.298 The Legislature did not include such a limitation in section 
104.045, and therefore, one cannot be read into it. 
The Florida vote selling statute has expansive language that provides 
that any person who corruptly offers to vote for or against a candidate in 
exchange for not only a pecuniary but also any other benefit, or accepts a 
pecuniary or other benefit in exchange for a promise to vote for or against 
a candidate is guilty of a third degree felony.299 The language of this 
statute suggests that the Florida vote selling statute is intended to 
encompass behavior that might include online vote-pairing. However, the 
Florida Division of Elections interpreted this statute as permitting the 
transfer of something of value, pecuniary or otherwise, as long as the 
consideration given is not bestowed with the intent to “buy” or “corruptly 
influence” another’s vote.300
Unless online vote-pairing is held to be an act of a nature that is 
tantamount to “corruption,” then it is clear that online vote-pairing would 
not be punishable under section 104.045. However, what “corrupt intent” 
means is certainly open to interpretation.  
It is difficult to argue that “corruption” includes conduct that is 
regularly blessed in other political arenas.301 Perhaps this political 
consideration is why Larson was reluctant to take a firm legal position on 
the issue. However, the term “corruption” has a degree of vagueness to it 
that makes judicial predictions uncertain. Appellate decisions interpreting 
this term are not very illuminating, but they shed enough light on the 
subject to suggest that online vote-pairing does fit within the boundaries of 
this law.302 Most cases define “corruption” in the context of the Florida 
Corrupt Voting Practices Act, Florida Statute section 104.061, which 
provides: 
 297. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.012 (West 2002) (emphasis added). 
 298. See Op. Div. Elect. 87-08 (Aug. 3, 1987). 
 299. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.045 (West 2002). 
 300. See Op. Div. Elect. 87-08 (Aug. 3, 1987). 
 301. See Part V, Ethical Analysis. 
 302. See, e.g., Shiver v. Apalachee Pub. Co., 425 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Trushin v. 
State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1983); Russ v. State, 832 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). 
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Fla. Stat. § 104.061 Corruptly Influencing Voting 
(1) Whoever by bribery, menace, threat, or other corruption 
whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, attempts to influence, 
deceive, or deter any elector in voting or interferes with him or her 
in the free exercise of the elector’s right to vote at any election 
commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 for the first conviction, and a 
felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 
775.083, or s. 775.084 for any subsequent conviction. 
(2) No person shall directly or indirectly give or promise anything 
of value to another intending thereby to buy that person’s or 
another’s vote or to corruptly influence that person or another in 
casting his or her vote. Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. However, this subsection shall 
not apply to the serving of food to be consumed at a political rally 
or meeting or to any item of nominal value which is used as a 
political advertisement, including a campaign message designed to 
be worn by a person. 
Florida decisions interpreting this law have held that section 104.061 is 
intended to prohibit conduct that is “nonprotected” and “clearly 
criminal.”303 Although the definition of key terms in the statute, such as 
“anything of value,” “other corruption,” and “corruptly” will vary in the 
minds of reasonable observers, Florida appellate decisions uniformly hold 
that the statute and its key terms are not unconstitutionally vague.304
The benchmark in Florida for unconstitutional vagueness is whether a 
statute gives fair notice to a person of ordinary or “common intelligence” 
of what constitutes forbidden conduct.305 Any doubt as to what is 
prohibited is resolved in favor of the accused and against the 
prosecution.306  
Given that the statute is limited to what is “clearly criminal conduct,”307 
theoretically there should be little need for extensive analysis beyond this 
 303. See Shiver v. Apalachee Publ’g Co., 425 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). 
 304. See Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1983); Russ v. State, 832 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2002). 
 305. Russ, 832 So. 2d at 906; Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 1995); State v. Hagan, 
387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980). 
 306. Russ, 832 So. 2d at 906–07; State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605, 608 (Fla. 1977). 
 307. Shiver, 425 So. 2d at 1175. 
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point. As even the General Counsel’s Office of the Secretary of State 
could not definitively figure out if online vote-pairing violated Florida 
law, a person of “common intelligence” should not reasonably be expected 
to divine the answer. However, it does not take more than a citizen of 
average intelligence to determine that (despite the best intentions of the 
Florida appellate courts) greater analysis is not only warranted but also 
necessary. 
In Trushin v. State308 the defendant, an attorney, circulated a letter 
throughout a Miami Beach apartment complex promising to prepare a will, 
free of charge, to all residents who pledged to vote for a particular slate of 
candidates in a runoff election.309 Trushin was charged with promising 
something of value with the intent to buy votes and corruptly influence 
voting under section 104.061(2).310 On appeal, Trushin claimed that the 
terms “anything of value” and “corruptly” were unconstitutionally 
vague.311 However, the Florida Supreme Court considered only the 
“anything of value” language because Trushin failed to raise the vagueness 
of the term “corruptly” at the district court level.312
The Florida Supreme Court held that the term “anything of value” was 
not unconstitutionally vague.313 The court reasoned that any person of 
“ordinary mental capacity” was capable of understanding that section 
104.061 prohibited the giving of any item of any value whatsoever so long 
as the unlawful intent prohibited by the statute was present.314 The law 
prohibits only the giving of something, or the mere promise to do so, “only 
when the defendant intends thereby to buy [a] vote or to corruptly 
influence casting a vote.”315 The statute’s intent is to prohibit an individual 
from conditioning his or her vote upon the receipt of a “personal 
benefit.”316
Trushin’s last stand was an argument that the preparation of a will was 
not “a thing of value.”317 The Florida Supreme Court abstained from this 
determination and held that this is a decision for the trial court, which 
should only be overturned if the decision was clearly erroneous.318
 308. 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1983). 
 309. See id. at 1127. 
 310. Id. at 1127–28. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id.  
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 1131 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 316. See id. 
 317. Id. at 1132. 
 318. Id. 
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The question as to whether “other corruption” was unconstitutionally 
vague would wait nineteen years for an answer, until Russ v. State319 came 
before Florida’s First District Court of Appeals. In ruling on this issue, the 
appellate court again relied on the “person of ordinary or common 
intelligence” test and determined that the term “corruption” neither had a 
technical nor specialized definition and that the words were 
understandable in common parlance.320  
Given the fact that Russ engaged in clear threats and menacing 
behavior, there is little room to criticize the First District Court of Appeals 
for ducking the question and holding that Mr. Russ’s behavior might have 
fallen inside the clearly marked outline of the term “corruption.” However, 
the court left only an implied definition of “corruption” for us if we wish 
to look at the novel question of online vote-pairing. 
Because the issue is so novel and uncontemplated by the statute, it is 
fair to assume with some degree of confidence that a court would be hard-
pressed to hold whether two electors discussing mutual preferences and 
coordinating their votes falls either within the purview of an exchange of 
“things of value” or the catchall “other corruption.” Since any doubt must 
be resolved in favor of the defendant,321 the great doubt that even the state 
election board harbors must be resolved in favor of the protected nature of 
online vote-pairing. 
Even if one of Florida’s lower courts were presented with the question, 
the application of section 104.061 to encompass a prohibition against 
online vote-pairing should likely fail before a challenge of unconstitutional 
overbreadth as applied. In Florida, the overbreadth doctrine applies to 
statutes, or the application thereof, that are “susceptible of application” to 
constitutionally protected conduct such as political speech.322  
A successful overbreadth challenge must establish that the application 
of the statute reaches a “substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct.”323 Given that the most sacrosanct of constitutionally protected 
rights, freedom of assembly and speech in a political context, are 
implicated by any prosecution of persons engaged in online vote-pairing, 
and that their definitions provided by the statutes were written before the 
phenomenon even existed, any such prosecution would most likely fail, 
even before being subjected to federal constitutional scrutiny. 
 319. 832 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). 
 320. Id. at 906–07. 
 321. See State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605, 608 (Fla. 1977). 
 322. Russ, 832 So. 2d at 907 (citing Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 1980)). 
 323. See id. (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)). 
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E. Minnesota 
1. Minnesota Election Law 
On November 1, 2000, Minnesota Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer 
issued what could have been the most melodramatic statement of the 2000 
election: 
[Vote-pairing] seriously undermine[s] the integrity of the Minnesota 
electoral process and the high confidence that Minnesotans place on 
election results . . . . Minnesotans participate in political parties, 
nominate candidates, and work in campaigns with a high degree of 
expectation that their votes will have a significant and above-board 
impact on the election. . . . Vote-swapping is the ultimate in voter 
fraud. It proposes to change the outcome of the election through an 
underhanded scheme. . . . Fair and honest elections are the core 
foundation of our democracy. Vote-swapping undercuts the 
fundamental tenets that hold our country together. Vote-swapping 
cannot be permitted and will not be allowed in the State of 
Minnesota.324
Kiffmeyer’s prediction that online vote-pairing would bring about 
electoral Armageddon was derived from her arguably mistaken 
interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 211B.13,325 the section of the 
Minnesota election law governing bribery, treating, and solicitation:326  
211B.13 Bribery, treating, and solicitation. 
Subdivision 1. Bribery, advancing money, and treating prohibited. 
A person who willfully, directly or indirectly, advances, pays, gives, 
promises, or lends any money, food, liquor, clothing, entertainment, 
or other thing of monetary value, or who offers, promises, or 
endeavors to obtain any money, position, appointment, 
employment, or other valuable consideration, to or for a person, in 
order to induce a voter to refrain from voting, or to vote in a 
particular way, at an election, is guilty of a felony. This section does 
not prevent a candidate from stating publicly preference for or 
support of another candidate to be voted for at the same primary or 
 324. See Press Release, Minnesota Secretary of State, Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer Asks 
Vote-Swap Web Sites to “Cease and Desist” in MN, Nov. 1, 2000, at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/ 
office/voteswap%2011-1-00.doc (last visited July 7, 2003). 
 325. Id. 
 326. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.13 (West 2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
178 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a good 
consideration for a promise.238  
California courts have never interpreted the California Election Code to 
prohibit the type of behavior in which vote-swappers engaged. The general 
rule in California is that the gravamen of a charge of election corruption is 
an improper promise, usually of a pecuniary nature.239 For a promise made 
by a candidate to be “improper,” it must offer or imply a service or benefit, 
conferrable directly upon the voter, that “does not involve the proper 
administration of the office sought.”240 For example, in one case, a 
promise by a campaign worker to help free a voter’s brother from jail in 
exchange for an absentee ballot vote did not relate to the proper duties of 
the candidate (city councilman) and was therefore both “improper” and 
unlawful.241  
Generally speaking, under California law, the term “valuable 
consideration” is not necessarily money or a material benefit.242 
Consideration exists if the person to whom the promise is made loses any 
right he could have otherwise exercised or the person making the promise 
receives any benefit he would otherwise not have had.243 Both need not 
exist in order for there to be consideration, but if neither condition is met, 
there is no consideration.244  
If the promise leaves a party able to perform or withdraw at will 
without detriment, there is no consideration, and the contract is void.245 If 
even one of the promises given in an agreement leaves a party with the 
option to perform or withdraw at will, then the promise is illusory and 
provides no consideration.246
In comparison to “valuable consideration,” “gratuitous consideration” 
is defined as consideration “which is not founded upon any such loss, 
injury, or inconvenience to the party to whom it moves as to make it valid 
 238. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1605 (West 1982). 
 239. See Stebbins v. White, 235 Cal. Rptr. 656, 667–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 240. Id. at 667. See also Bush v. Head, 97 P. 512, 515 (Cal. 1908). 
 241. See Stebbins, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 668. 
 242. See Estate of Bishop, 25 Cal. Rptr. 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). 
 243. See Southern Cal. Enter., Inc. v. Walter & Co., 178 P.2d 785, 790–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); 
Chrisman v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 256 P.2d 618, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (stating that if the promisor is 
not otherwise lawfully entitled to the benefit, the benefit is sufficient to claim valuable consideration).  
 244. See Jordan v. Scott, 177 P. 504, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1918). 
 245. See Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1958); Cox v. Hollywood Film Enter., Inc., 
240 P.2d 713, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). 
 246. See Pease v. Brown, 8 Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). 
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election. Refreshments of food or nonalcoholic beverages of 
nominal value consumed on the premises at a private gathering or 
public meeting are not prohibited under this section. 
Subdivision. 2. Certain solicitations prohibited. A person may not 
knowingly solicit, receive, or accept any money, property, or other 
thing of monetary value, or a promise or pledge of these that is a 
disbursement prohibited by this section or section 211B.15.327
Although the plain language of the Minnesota Election Bribery Law 
offers little clue as to where Kiffmeyer found her definition of “fraud,” for 
the purposes of this study, it must be assumed that she derived her 
interpretation somewhere beyond her personal politics.328 However, 
Kiffmeyer’s very own Minnesota Campaign Manual appears to suggest a 
very different conclusion.329 The Manual explains section 211B.13 as 
follows:  
Bribery. As stated previously, there is a prohibition against giving 
any thing of monetary value to any person for the purpose of 
influencing that person’s vote.330
The logical fulcrum on which online vote-pairing balances under 
section 211B.13 is the question as to whether the coordination of an online 
vote-swap is a “thing of monetary value” or “valuable consideration.” 
Given its textual clarity, section 211B.13 has been rarely interpreted in the 
courts. However, there are a few Minnesota Attorney General opinions 
interpreting the statute and its predecessor.  
The most recent (1995) Attorney General opinion interpreting the 
Minnesota Election Bribery Law considered a situation involving a 
Minnesota town’s offer to provide money, land, roads, and utilities for a 
courthouse and related buildings if an initiative passed to move the county 
seat to that town.331 The Minnesota Attorney General concluded that this 
“offer” of significant real property and services was arguably a violation 
of section 211B.13.332 However, “the weight of authority tip[ped] against 
such a determination.”333
 327. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.13 (West 2003). 
 328. See Ethics discussed at Part V of this study. 
 329. See Minnesota Campaign Manual 2002, at http://www.sos.state.mn.us/election/Campaign 
Manual/campaignmanual-02.pdf (last visited July 10, 2003). 
 330. Id. (emphasis added). 
 331. See Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 106e, April 10, 1995, at 1–2. 
 332. Id. at 7. 
 333. See id. at 7. 
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In arriving at this determination, the Minnesota Attorney General 
distinguished the town’s offer from offers by candidates for office to serve 
without pay or at reduced pay.334 Such had been determined in an attorney 
general’s opinion from 1932 to have the potential to reduce electoral 
contests to a “race to the bottom,” with candidates willing to serve for the 
least pay having an undue advantage.335 Meanwhile coordinated civic 
action carried no such risk.336
A 1954 Attorney General Opinion (referenced in the 1995 Opinion) 
dealt with circumstances similar to the 1995 opinion, wherein a town 
made an offer of a gift of land and money to help finance courthouse 
construction if a referendum to move the county seat succeeded.337 The 
Attorney General wrote that such an offer was not a violation of the 
Corrupt Practices Act (a predecessor of section 211B.13) due to the public 
nature of the offer and benefit to be derived therefrom.338 Basing his 
analysis on a survey of court decisions in other states, the Attorney 
General wrote that since the party to be influenced was an entire electorate 
and the thing offered was of a public nature and not of a nature intended to 
benefit any individuals, “the elements requisite to constitute a bribery or a 
corrupt and unlawful influence within the meaning of bribery and corrupt 
practice statutes [was] lacking.”339
As mentioned above, judicial interpretations of section 211B.13 are 
few. However, the Minnesota courts have considered analogous 
circumstances that are of instructive value when reading section 211B.13. 
For example, Minnesota Statute section 210A.34 prohibited corporations 
from making a contribution of any money, property, free services, or other 
thing of value to any political party, nomination, election, or appointment 
to any political office.340 In response, corporations formed political action 
committees (“PACs”).341 In examining PACs, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held: 
A conduit PAC merely aids the political process by stimulating and 
facilitating the involvement of a larger number of citizens. So long 
 334. Id. 
 335. See id. 
 336. See Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 104a-9 (Jan. 29, 1932). 
 337. See Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 627-B-3 (May 6, 1954). 
 338. See id. 
 339. See id. 
 340. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 210A.34 (West 2003). 
 341. See generally Gil Troy, The Road to Hell . . . Where Reform Got Us in the Past: A Historian 
Suggests Reformers May Be Naïve, at http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/2721; see also 
http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm. 
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as the sponsoring entity exerts no influence on the member to 
contribute to a particular candidate, group of candidates, or type of 
candidate, the member is merely exercising his personal right to 
contribute to candidates of his choice. There may well be 
circumstances under which some subtle pressures are placed on 
conduit PAC members to support specific candidates, but this could 
be guarded against by protecting the anonymity of the individual 
contributor’s choice. For the same basic reasons, except for the 
further lack of the statutorily required “thing of value,” independent 
PAC’s [sic] are not violative of the legislative intent.342
The Minnesota Supreme Court additionally analyzed the statute to 
determine which specific mischief was to be remedied by the statute. 
Finding that it was “the disproportionate influence on the political process 
by corporate interests,”343 the Court held that PACs were outside of that 
disproportionate influence, and thus their incidental expenditures that 
benefited candidates were not violative of the law.344
By these same principles, although there is no authority that appears to 
support Kiffmeyer’s position, there is support for the opposite position. 
Minnesota election laws uniformly have been interpreted to find a “thing 
of value” to include “things which have a value measurable in money.”345 
Even if that “thing of value” is of negligible worth, it must be something 
that has some palpable monetary value.346
The specific mischief that section 211B.13 seeks to cure is that of 
bribery, not of the assembly and communication of Minnesota citizens to 
trade ideas leading to a decision as to how to vote. However, even if there 
were a colorable argument to support Kiffmeyer’s threat against vote-
pairing operators and users, any such interpretation would be violative of 
the Minnesota Constitution (discussed immediately below) and the U.S. 
Constitution (discussed further below). 
 342. Minnesota Ass’n of Commerce and Indus. v. Foley, 316 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. 1982). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. LaBelle v. Hennepin County Bar Ass’n, 288 N.W. 788, 792 (Minn. 1939).  
 346. See, e.g., Miller v. Maier, 161 N.W. 513 (Minn. 1917) (providing cocktails to voters while 
soliciting their support is prohibited); Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 627f-1 (Mar. 20, 1917) (candidate giving 
cigars to voters in the election room while polls were still open was in violation of Corrupt Practices 
Act); Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 627f-1 (June 3, 1930) (distribution of free tickets to a county fair violated 
Corrupt Practices Act). 
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2. Minnesota Constitutional Law 
Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution provides: 
The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and all 
persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on all 
subjects being responsible for the abuse of such rights. 
Kiffmeyer’s cease and desist demand of November 1, 2000 was a prior 
restraint of expression and, as such, would bear a heavy presumption 
against its validity under the Minnesota (and U.S.) Constitution.347 It is 
most likely that a Minnesota court would consider Kiffmeyer’s 
interpretation of section 211B.13 (or any other state action which 
prohibited online political discussion) as running afoul of either the 
Minnesota or U.S. Constitutions. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held 
that (in most cases) Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota constitution 
extends protections to free speech identical to those embodied in the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.348 That being said, Minnesota court 
decisions interpreting Article I, Section 3 primarily rely on United States 
Supreme Court First Amendment decisions. Therefore, a discussion of 
Minnesota constitutional law may be deferred, and the reader may refer to 
Part IV for the federal constitutional analysis.349
F. Arizona 
The Arizona State Election Director, Jessica Funkhouse (R), told the 
press that Arizona law prohibited the practice of online vote-pairing.350 
Funkhouse said, “It’s illegal in Arizona to give anything of value to vote 
in a certain way.351 According to Funkhouse, “anything of value” includes 
another person’s vote.352
 347. See Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 227 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Minn. 1975). 
 348. See, e.g., State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (free speech 
protection is not broader under the state constitution than under the federal); State v. Century Camera, 
Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 738 n.6 (Minn. 1981) (same). Cf. State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 
1992) (the state constitution may give broader protection than the federal). 
 349. Id. 
 350. See Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/4
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] HIGH-TECH POLITICS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 195 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Arizona Election Law  
In making her assessment, Funkhouse relied upon Arizona’s election 
corruption law, Arizona Revised Statute section 16-1014,353 which 
provides, in relevant part: 
§ 16-1014. Corruption of electors; classification  
A. It is unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, by himself or 
through any other person knowingly:  
(1) To treat, give, pay, loan, contribute, offer or promise money or 
other valuable consideration, or to give, offer or promise an office, 
place or employment, or to promise or to procure or endeavor to 
procure an office, place or employment, to or for a voter, or to or for 
any other person, to induce the voter to vote or refrain from voting 
at an election for any particular person or measure, or to induce the 
voter to go to the polls, or remain away from the polls at an 
election, or on account of the voter having voted or refrained from 
voting for any particular person or measure, or having gone to the 
polls or remained away from the polls at an election.354  
Section 16-1014 has received little appellate review in Arizona. The 
sole reported case mentioning the law offers no discussion of it but did 
recognize an obvious application of it—that a promise of a pay raise to 
school employees in exchange for their support of a budget-override 
initiative was a violation of the law.355
Given that there is so little instruction from the Arizona courts as to 
how to apply the Arizona election corruption law creatively, a broader 
survey of Arizona decisions is needed to determine whether an online 
vote-pairing participant’s promise to vote fits within the term “other 
valuable consideration,” and, if so, whether such an interpretation fits 
within the intent of section 16-1014. 
There is some support in Arizona law for Funkhouse’s position that a 
vote could be considered to be “valuable consideration.” In State v. 
Steiger,356 a defendant (Steiger) was a supporter of the then executive 
director of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.357 Steiger threatened 
 353. Id. 
 354. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-1014 (1980). 
 355. Miller v. Picacho Elem. Sch. Dist., 857 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Ariz. 1993) (Hathaway, J., 
dissenting), rev’d on other grounds, 877 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1994). 
 356. 781 P.2d 616 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). 
 357. Id. at 618. 
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Johnson, a member of the Board, who was leaning toward voting to 
remove the director of the Board.358 Steiger threatened that he would “see 
to it that you [Johnson] no longer serve as a Justice of the Peace, and I will 
further take every step necessary to have you removed from the Board.”359 
As a result of this attempt to influence Johnson’s vote, Steiger was 
charged with a violation of section 13-1804, theft by extortion.360
The prosecutor’s use of a theft statute in this circumstance was a 
creative interpretation of the law, and Steiger argued to the Arizona Court 
of Appeals that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not 
clearly indicate that a “vote” was within the definition of “property” as 
used in the extortion statute.361 The appeals court rejected Steiger’s 
argument and recognized that Arizona law defines “property” as “anything 
of value, tangible or intangible.”362 The court then continued to discuss 
that Johnson’s vote was no less “valuable” than his right to vote free from 
outside pressure363 and held: “Because a vote is an intangible and 
something of value, it is included within the definition of property in 
A.R.S. § 13-1804(A)(8) [extortion].”364
It does not automatically follow that Arizona courts would hold 
similarly when confronted with a gratuitous promise to vote a certain way, 
arranged between voters, free of pressure. However, given the Court of 
Appeals’ words in State v. Steiger, it is certain that Funkhouse’s 
interpretation of “anything of value” was not completely without support 
in the law. On the other hand, the Steiger court’s opinion falls with some 
logic within the intent of a statute intended to prohibit extortion, but the 
same might not be said for the election corruption law.365 The intent of the 
election corruption law is to prevent commerce in items of value in 
exchange for influence over an elector’s voting decision.366 In the online 
vote-pairing context, the participant wants to vote for the candidate for 
whom he or she votes, in stark contrast to Johnson who was under threat 
of losing her job. 
Regardless of the legislative intent, it appears that the balance of the 
law tips in favor of Funkhouse’s definition of “thing of value,” and given 
 358. Id. 
 359. State v. Steiger, 781 P.2d 616, 618 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). 
 360. Id. at 617. 
 361. Id. at 620. 
 362. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-105(29) (1995)). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
 365. See 1984 Op. Atty. Gen. Ariz. 110 (Aug. 28, 1984). 
 366. See id. 
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the Steiger opinion, a vote should be considered to be “valuable 
consideration” under Arizona law.  
2. Arizona Constitutional Law 
Although Funkhouse’s interpretation of the terms of art contained in 
section 16-1014 appears to be sound, the application of the law to prevent 
online vote-pairing might run afoul of the Arizona Constitution and its 
protection of free expression. Article 11, Section 6 of the state constitution 
provides: “Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” Arizona courts give 
great deference to free speech concerns.367 Such rights “go[] to the heart of 
the natural rights of citizens to impart and acquire information which is 
necessary for the well being of a free society.”368 The scope of protected 
activity under the Arizona Constitution is greater than that protected by the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.369
When we look at a theoretical state action to prohibit online vote-
pairing in Arizona, the threshold question is not whether section 16-1014 
is constitutional on its face. Statutes are presumptively constitutional in 
Arizona, and the text of the law does not appear to suffer from facial 
vagueness or overbreadth.370 The fact is that the issue of the election 
corruption law’s applicability is due to the novel nature of online vote-
pairing and not to any weaknesses in the drafting of the statute.371 Aside 
from the context of online vote-pairing, there is little doubt as to what 
section 16-1014 prohibits, and the text of the law is clear and 
understandable by citizens of ordinary intelligence, thus giving notice of 
the conduct it prohibits.372
 367. See, e.g., New Times, Inc. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 519 P.2d 169 (Ariz. 1974). 
 368. Id. at 173.  
 369. See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 773 P.2d 455, 459 
(Ariz. 1989); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594, 596 (Ariz. 1966); Empress 
Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson, 59 P.3d 814, 818 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Martin v. 
Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 
 370. See New Times, Inc., 519 P.2d at 173 (statutes come to the court clothed with a presumption 
of constitutionality); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) (Arizona courts resolve all 
uncertainties in favor of a statute’s constitutional firmness). 
 371. See State v. McLamb, 932 P.2d 266, 274 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (the fact that a statute could 
have constitutionally impermissible applications does not render it constitutionally void on 
overbreadth grounds) (citing Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 
(1984)). 
 372. See Bird v. State, 908 P.2d 12, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
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Because the election corruption law is firm and specific, there is little 
inherent danger of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.373 It is 
therefore not the law that needs to be subjected to constitutional analysis 
but rather an application thereof that might implicate constitutionally 
protected speech.374
In deciding whether conduct holds sufficient communicative power to 
bring notions of free speech into play, courts will ask whether there was an 
intent to convey a particularized message and whether there was a 
likelihood that those who received it would understand the message.375 
Online vote-pairing sites certainly had an intent to communicate a 
particularized message, and the fact that the sites facilitated reasoned 
agreements is persuasive evidence that the message was understood by its 
recipient. As such, there is little doubt that Arizona courts could justifiably 
see this issue in any light other than that cast by the free expression 
provision of the Arizona Constitution (and the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution).  
Given the fact that vote-swapping involves constitutional rights 
protected by the free expression provision of the Arizona Constitution, any 
test of such an application of section 16-1014 should be conducted under 
the rule of strict scrutiny.376 This highest level of constitutional scrutiny is 
engaged with a more exacting eye by Arizona courts than by federal 
courts.377 When presented with the possibility that constitutionally 
protected rights might be tread upon, Arizona courts will avoid, when 
possible, “attempts to erode [those] rights by balancing them against 
regulations serving governmental interests.”378
While the government has the constitutional power to prohibit 
corruption in elections, it does not have the power to restrict protected 
political speech.379 Political speech is entitled to the highest level of 
constitutional protection.380 Because any restraint of online vote-pairing 
sites would throw a roadblock between members of the electorate seeking 
to engage in political debate and caucus, but only on a particular subject, 
 373. See id. 
 374. See id. 
 375. See id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)). 
 376. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 773 P.2d 455, 462 (Ariz. 
1989). 
 377. See id. 
 378. See id. 
 379. See Lafaro v. Cahill, 56 P.3d 56, 61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); KZPZ Broad., Inc. v. Black 
Canyon City Concerned Citizens, 13 P.3d 772, 778 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). 
 380. KZPZ Broad., Inc., 13 P.3d at 778 (citing Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Fdn., 525 U.S. 
181, 186–87 (1999)). 
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there is the presumption that this is a content-based restriction on free 
expression.381 Even if it were given the benefit of doubt and considered 
content-neutral, the government would need to prove that it was restricting 
no more speech than necessary to serve the governmental interest of 
prohibiting corrupt elections.382 To enjoin this conduct would be to enjoin 
conduct beyond the scope of the legislative intent of the statute. Disrupting 
an online vote-pairing site prohibits progressive (and theoretically, in the 
future, tech-savvy conservatives) political elements from being placed in 
contact with one another, after which the topic of debate is up to them. 
Such a prohibition is equivalent to shutting down an online dating service 
because some users made arrangements for prostitution over the network, 
while others use it for legal reasons. 
3. Arizona Conclusion 
Against this strict backdrop of scrutiny and the heavy burden required 
to suppress speech, an interpretation of section 16-1014 that prohibited 
online vote-pairing would likely be found to run afoul of Article 11, 
Section 6 of the State Constitution. However, until an appellate court rules 
on the issue, this conclusion is uncertain.  
What is certain is that Funkhouse did not attach a novel definition to 
“valuable consideration” under her state’s election laws. Her application of 
the statute appears reasoned and not entirely improper. However, if 
subjected to constitutional scrutiny, the balance of the analysis seems to 
indicate that online vote-pairing would be protected under the Arizona 
Constitution.  
G. Wisconsin 
The operator of NaderTrade.org, Jeff Cardille, found himself in the 
unenviable position of being called in for a personal interview with the 
Wisconsin Attorney General.383 At this meeting, the Wisconsin officials 
told Cardille that vote-pairing was illegal under Wisconsin law and 
punishable by three years in prison and a $10,000 fine.384 Once 
NaderTrade.org agreed to cease its operations and post disclaimers on the 
 381. Id. 
 382. See Lafaro, 56 P.3d at 61. 
 383. See Wylie, supra note 53, at 2A. 
 384. Id. 
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site informing all visitors that the practice was illegal, the Wisconsin 
Attorney General backed off on his threats to prosecute.385
Wisconsin is one of the few states that prohibit vote-pairing on a 
legislative level. Wisconsin Statute Annotated section 13.05 makes it a 
felony for legislators to engage in vote-swapping, which the law calls 
“logrolling”: 
13.05. Logrolling prohibited. Any member of the legislature who 
gives, offers or promises to give his or her vote or influence in favor 
of or against any measure or proposition pending or proposed to be 
introduced in the legislature in consideration or upon condition that 
any other person elected to the same legislature will give or will 
promise or agree to give his or her vote or influence in favor of or 
against any other measure or proposition pending or proposed to be 
introduced in such legislature, or who gives, offers or promises to 
give his or her vote or influence for or against any measure on 
condition that any other member will give his or her vote or 
influence in favor of any change in any other bill pending or 
proposed to be introduced in the legislature, is guilty of a Class I 
felony.386
Perhaps with this statute in mind, the Wisconsin Attorney General 
chose to threaten Mr. Cardille. However, this statute is specifically tailored 
to limit the actions of legislators, not voters. The Wisconsin election 
bribery statute is found at section 12.11, and it, like most state election 
laws, relies on the term “anything of value.”387 The Wisconsin law 
prohibits anyone from offering, giving, or lending anything of value, or 
any job, privilege, or immunity to any person in order to induce the person 
to vote, refrain from voting, or voting for a certain candidate.388
This catchall term, “valuable consideration,” would normally require a 
perusal of case law to determine exactly how the state interprets this term. 
However, in Wisconsin, the legislature has done this work for us. Section 
12.11(1) specifically defines “valuable consideration” under the state 
election bribery law to include: 
[A]ny amount of money, or any object which has utility 
independent of any political message it contains and the value of 
 385. See id. 
 386. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.05 (West 2003). 
 387. Id. § 12.11. 
 388. Id. § 12.11. 
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which exceeds $1. The prohibitions of this section apply to the 
distribution of material printed at public expense and available for 
free distribution if such materials are accompanied by a political 
message.389
A vote-swap promise clearly falls within the exception carved out by 
the Wisconsin legislature and outside the statute’s prohibition. A vote-
swap does not involve money, nor is it an object. A vote-swap pledge has 
no utility independent of the political message it contains. The Wisconsin 
Attorney General clearly misapplied Wisconsin law when he threatened 
NaderTrade.org. 
H. States That Explicitly Permitted Online Vote-Pairing 
Maine’s Secretary of State, Dan Gwadosky, joined Nebraska’s 
Secretary of State, Scott Moore, in sanctioning the legality of online vote-
pairing. The only two states that permit an apportionment of their electoral 
college votes on a basis other than winner-take-all, Maine and Nebraska, 
also stand out as the only two states from where official statements did not 
threaten vote-pairing operators or participants. 
1. Maine 
In contrast to his counterparts in California, Oregon, Arizona, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota, Maine Secretary of State Dan Gwadowsky 
neither threatened to prosecute online vote-swappers, nor did he give an 
official statement that the practice was punishable under Maine law. In 
fact, Gwadowsky stood out as the only state official to condone the 
practice both in law and in practice. Gwadowsky said, “It’s a provocative 
way to use a new medium.”390  
While Gwadowsky’s enthusiasm for vote-pairing is beyond the scope 
of this study, his decision to endorse it should be studied against a 
backdrop of Maine law. To begin, Maine’s prohibition against bribery in 
political matters is enshrined in the State’s Constitution.391 The relevant 
article of the Maine Constitution provides: 
The Legislature may enact laws excluding from the right of 
suffrage, for a term not exceeding ten years, all persons convicted of 
 389. Id. § 12.11(1). 
 390. Connerty-Marin, supra note 58, at A1. 
 391. See ME. CONST. art. 9, § 13. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
202 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bribery at any election, or of voting at any election, under the 
influence of a bribe.392
The Maine Legislature followed this mandate and enacted the state’s 
law prohibiting bribery in official and political matters, Maine Revised 
Statute section 602.393 This law provides, in relevant part: 
§ 602. Bribery in official and political matters 
1. A person is guilty of bribery in official and political matters if: 
A. He promises, offers, or gives any pecuniary benefit to another 
with the intention of influencing the other’s action, decision, 
opinion, recommendation, vote, nomination or other exercise of 
discretion as a public servant, party official or voter; 
B. Being a public servant, party official, candidate for electoral 
office or voter, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary 
benefit from another knowing or believing the other’s purpose to be 
as described in paragraph A, or fails to report to a law enforcement 
officer that he has been offered or promised a pecuniary benefit in 
violation of paragraph A.  
2. As used in this section and other sections of this part, the 
following definitions apply. 
C. “Pecuniary benefit” means any advantage in the form of money, 
property, commercial interest or anything else, the primary 
significance of which is economic gain; it does not include 
economic advantage applicable to the public generally, such as tax 
reduction or increased prosperity generally. “Pecuniary benefit” 
does not include the following: 
(1) A meal, if the meal is provided by industry or special interest 
organizations as part of an informational program presented to a 
group of public servants; 
(2) A meal, if the meal is a prayer breakfast or a meal served during 
a meeting to establish a prayer breakfast; or 
 392. ME. CONST. art. 9, § 13. 
 393. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3602 (West 2003). 
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(3) A subscription to a newspaper, news magazine or other news 
publication.394
Given that the Maine statute limits its applicability to benefits in the 
form of an economic gain, little additional analysis is necessary in order to 
determine that Gwadowsky had it right. Online vote-pairing is permissible 
under Maine law. 
2. Nebraska 
Nebraska’s secretary of state, Scott Moore, did not share his Maine 
counterpart’s enthusiasm for online vote-pairing. In fact, in a news 
interview, he seemed to disapprove on a moral level but kept this 
judgment separate from his interpretation of state law.395 Nebraska’s 
election bribery law provides: 
§ 32-1536. Bribery; prohibited acts; penalty. 
(1) Any person who accepts or receives any valuable thing as a 
consideration for his or her vote for any person to be voted for at 
any election shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor. 
(2) Any person who, by bribery, attempts to influence any voter of 
this state in voting, uses any threat to procure any voter to vote 
contrary to the inclination of such voter, or deters any voter from 
voting shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor.396
Nebraska’s use of the term “valuable thing” seems to imply an object 
and not a vote, but there is a degree of ambiguity inherent in the term. 
There are no appellate court decisions interpreting the bribery statute, and 
the statute is equally without mention in the archives of the opinions of the 
Nebraska Attorney General. There is, however, instruction available in the 
Nebraska Constitution. Article XV, Section 1 provides for the oath of 
office for Nebraska elected officials, and the oath provides, in pertinent 
part: 
I have not improperly influenced in any way the vote of any elector, 
and have not accepted, nor will I accept or receive, directly or 
indirectly, any money or other valuable thing from any corporation, 
 394. Id. 
 395. Associated Press, “Nader Traders” Shut Down Their Web Site Under Pressure, WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at A12. 
 396. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1536 (West 2003). 
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company or person, or any promise of office, for any official act or 
influence for any vote I may give or withhold on any bill, 
resolution, or appropriation.397  
It only follows that if a vote is a “valuable thing” then any candidate 
for office in Nebraska who promises anything in exchange for a vote 
would be in violation of his or her oath of office, and by extension, the 
Nebraska Constitution. Logically, Moore’s conclusion is sound. Online 
vote-pairing is not illegal under any rational interpretation of Nebraska 
law. 
I. General State Conclusions 
At this point, it is instructive to note that during the 2000 presidential 
election, there were individuals who used the Internet to attempt to “sell” 
their votes.398 It should be apparent by this point in this study, that these 
sites are not considered to be within the purview of the above analysis. 
Every state election statute prohibits selling or offering to sell a vote for 
pecuniary gain, and the Supreme Court has held that despite any 
constitutional concerns, such solicitation falls outside of the protections 
offered by the First Amendment.399
The secretaries of state who moved against online vote-pairing sites 
regarded this online networking as the application of undue influence in 
the voting process and made a leap: that discussion equals money.400 With 
the exception of Arizona, this was in direct contradiction to their 
respective states’ laws.401 However, most secretaries of state posited that 
 397. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 398. See, e.g., Richard Stenger, Constituent Puts Vote up for Sale on Ebay, CNN.com (Aug. 16, 
2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/08/16/internet.vote/index.html (last visited July 
27, 2003) [hereinafter Stenger, Ebay] (quoting Maryland officials stating that offering to sell a vote 
was punishable by fines and imprisonment in Maryland); Richard Stenger, Vote for Sale?, Pulling a 
“Political Prank” Marylander Puts Ballot on Ebay, CNN.com (Aug. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Stenger, 
Vote], at http://www.cnn.com/2000/fyi/news/08/17/vote.sale/index.html (last visited July 27, 2003); 
Jeremy Derfner, Buy This Vote!, SLATE (Aug. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Derfner], at http://slate.msn.com/ 
id/88646/ (reporting on voteauction.com) (last visited July 27, 2003); Ronna Abramson, Want To Sell 
Your Vote? Not So Fast, SLATE (Oct. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Ronna Abramson], at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/91418/ (last visited July 27, 2003); David Weber, Web Site Auctioning Vote as 
a ‘Joke’ Ordered Stopped, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 8, 2000, at 14 [hereinafter Weber]; Stefan 
Bechtold, Governance in Namespaces, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1239 (2003) [hereinafter Bechtold] 
(discussing the shutdown of voteauction.com). 
 399. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982). 
 400. However, the Supreme Court has made the converse statement: money equals speech. See 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 401. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.665 (1999); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521(a) (2000); CAL. ELEC. CODE 
§ 18522(a) (2000). 
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sites merely discussing online vote-pairing were permissible under their 
offending states’ laws. For example, consider California402 and Oregon:403 
It was the conduct of “brokering” votes that was explicitly prohibited 
under California law and the application of “undue influence”404 that ran 
afoul of Oregon law.  
When vote-swap participants agreed to pair their votes, they engaged in 
speech and association related to a campaign for political office. Each 
voter agreed with another to coordinate his or her vote in order to achieve 
a common political goal. There was no exchange of money or goods, and 
there was no enforceable binding arrangement.405 For the most part, this 
lack of a pecuniary exchange weakened the claims of the secretaries of 
state who believed that there was an illegal contract inherent in an online 
vote-swap. Jessica Funkhouse of Arizona appears to be the only election 
official who spoke out against online vote-pairing, but she did not speak 
completely out of turn.406
IV. FEDERAL ANALYSIS 
A. Federal Election Law 
1. Matching Funds Law 
The online vote-pairing movement had its roots in some of the more 
bizarre nuances of U.S. election law. The electoral college has had the 
effect of creating a duopoly in American politics, and the federal matching 
funds law smothers infant political movements in their cradle.407 This state 
 402. The California Secretary of State said that http://www.winwincampaign.org/ (defunct) was 
permissible under California law. Burden of Proof, CNN television broadcast, Nov. 2, 2000. 
 403. Letter from Paddy McGuire, Chief of Staff, Oregon Elections Division, to Jeffrey Cardille, 
Operator of www.nadertrader.com and www.nadertrader.org (Nov. 3, 2000) (on file with author). See 
also Oregon Secretary of State Press Release, Nov. 2, 2000, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/executive/ 
pressrel/110200swap.html (last visited July 25, 2003). 
 404. OR. REV. STAT § 260.665(1) (1999) (“As used in this section, ‘undue influence’ means force, 
violence, restraint or the threat of it, inflicting injury, damage, harm, loss of employment or other loss 
or the threat of it, fraud or giving, or promising to give money, employment or other thing of value.”). 
For elaboration, see also Oregon Republican Party v. State, 717 P.2d 1206, 1207, rev’d on other 
grounds, 726 P.2d 412 (1986) (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he promise of an advantage as a result of 
performing the desired act; it is persuasion coupled with a benefit or the absence of a threatened 
detriment.”) .
 405. Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (on file with author). 
 406. See text accompanying notes 355–66. 
 407. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not 
Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331, 341 [hereinafter Duopoly] (noting that the Republicans and Democrats use “campaign 
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of affairs gave rise to the bottleneck in democracy that forced the left-
leaning coalition of Green/Democrat supporters into action. 
The purpose of most online vote-pairing sites was to circumvent the 
mechanisms that protect the duopoly and, for the most part, to help Ralph 
Nader’s Green party achieve a sufficient percentage of the popular vote in 
the 2000 presidential race so that the Greens would qualify for funding in 
2004, while simultaneously helping (or at least not harming) Al Gore’s 
chance for victory in the electoral college. It is crucial for the reader to 
note that not all vote-pairing participants were Gore/Nader allies. Also, 
despite the fact that online vote-pairing was primarily a Green/Democrat 
alliance movement in 2000, it is just as likely that a Reform/Republican, 
Libertarian/Republican, or any other manner of cyber-coalition could rise 
up in future elections.408
Even in 2000, votexchange2000.com provided a far more complex 
algorithm than the typical Green/Democrat alliance.409 
Votexchange2000.com allowed the visitor to select his or her state, the 
candidate the visitor preferred to win the election (among Bush and Gore) 
and then allowed the visitor to select which alternative candidate he or she 
wished to support.410 After filling in the fields, the visitor was asked for his 
or her email address, and the site connected the visitor with a similarly 
minded voter in another state.411
Federal law provides for the voluntary public financing of candidates 
for presidential office.412 The law differentiates between the “major” 
political parties and “minor” or “new” parties.413 The eligible presidential 
candidates from each major party are entitled to equal payments limited by 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.414 Candidates of minor parties 
are eligible only for funding if their party received a threshold number of 
votes in the previous election equal to five percent or more of the total 
number of votes cast.415 Once a party meets this threshold, it is entitled to 
finance laws, policies regulating access to public television, patronage practices, partisan 
gerrymandering, and potentially a wide variety of other measures” to lock third parties out of the 
political process). 
 408. See supra Part II. 
 409. See http://www.votexchange2000.com/questionnaire.html (last visited July 25, 2003). 
 410. Id. 
 411. See Appendix B for a screen shot of votexchange.com. 
 412. 26 U.S.C. § 9004-06 (2001). 
 413. Id. § 9002 (1976). 
 414. Id. § 9004(a)(1) (2001). 
 415. Id. § 9004(a)(3). 
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a proportional amount of funds pegged to the percentage of votes the party 
received in the previous election.416
2. Federal Election Corruption Law—42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) 
Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution establishes 
congressional authority to regulate presidential elections.417 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted this clause as granting Congress “very broad 
authority” to enact legislation to prevent corruption in presidential 
elections.418 Given the fact that Congress has substantive legislative 
jurisdiction over the right to prevent corruption in presidential elections, 
its authority in this area is extremely broad419 as long as the exercise of 
this authority does not trample any other constitutionally protected right.420
Congress has long recognized the damage to our democracy that would 
result if federal elections were tainted by bribery, vote buying, or 
manipulation. Using its plenary power, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973i(c) “as the means to overcome this public evil in those instances 
wherein it does, or could, infect a federal election.”421 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1973i(c) criminalizes fraudulent voting or registration in every election 
where national candidates appear on the ballot.422 The law prohibits 
payment, offers of payment, or acceptance of payment, in exchange for a 
vote.423  
The threshold question in the online vote-pairing context, in light of 
appellate court decisions construing § 1973i(c), is whether a vote is a 
“payment” or other applicable type of benefit bestowed upon an elector, 
when the elector swaps votes. Amidst a backdrop of action by state 
officials, the U.S. Department of Justice failed to move against any of the 
vote-pairing website operators. A spokesperson at the Department was 
quoted as saying, “[T]here is no pecuniary exchange, and [vote-pairing] is 
 416. Id. § 9004. 
 417. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may 
at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.”). 
 418. See, e.g., Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 549 (1934); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 132 (1976).  
 419. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). 
 420. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132. 
 421. See United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1012 (Fifth Cir. 1981). 
 422. See United States v. Lewis, 514 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa 1981).  
 423. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) (2001) (prohibiting conspiracy “with another individual for the purpose 
of encouraging his false registration to vote or illegal voting, or pays or offers to pay or accepts 
payment either for registration to vote or voting.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
208 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
an agreement amongst private parties.”424 Additionally, the spokesperson 
stated there is no violation in terms of voter fraud.425
To successfully prosecute a defendant under § 1973i(c), there is no 
requirement that the government show specific intent to affect the outcome 
of a federal election.426 The congressional intent in passing the statute was 
to protect the integrity of the right to vote by protecting the integrity of the 
vote.427 “[T]he payment itself, not the purpose for which it is made, is the 
harm and the gist of the offense.”428
The federal vote-buying statute proscribes all activities with the 
potential to damage the integrity of a federal election.429 The Fourth 
Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals has held, similar to the Fifth Circuit, 
that whether the violator intends to expose the federal election to 
corruption or the possibility of corruption is of no legal effect.430 All that 
need be shown to establish a violation of § 1973i(c) is that the defendant 
bought or offered to buy a vote and that this activity exposed a federal 
election to the mere possibility of corruption.431 There is no requirement 
that actual corruption take place, nor is there a requirement that the 
defendant have the specific intent to expose the election to corruption.432  
The courts have not spoken on the issue of whether Congress would 
have the right to regulate a purely statewide election.433 However, the Fifth 
Circuit held that it is proper to apply § 1973i(c) to any election in which 
state and federal candidates for office appear on the ballot.434 The rationale 
being that even if corruption were directed solely at the state candidates, 
the potential for corruption of a federal race makes the conduct proper for 
Congress to regulate.435
In United States v. Cole, the defendants were convicted of corruption in 
an election in which all the candidates for federal office were running 
unopposed.436 The defendants argued that since the federal aspect of the 
 424. See Cerolyn Cresser, A Vote For a Vote, THE DAILY IOWAN, Nov. 2, 2000, available at 2000 
WL 28358386. 
 425. Id. 
 426. See Bowman, 636 F.2d at 1011. 
 427. See id. 
 428. Id. at 1012. 
 429. See id. 
 430. See United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 
(1983). See also infra note 434 and accompanying text. 
 431. See id. at 908. 
 432. Id. 
 433. See Bowman, 636 F.2d at 1012 (specifically declining to consider this issue). 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. 
 436. United States v. Cole, 41 F.3d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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election could not possibly be impacted by the corruption, the federal law 
would be inapplicable.437 The defendants conceded that § 1973i(c) would 
apply to the election if the race were opposed but argued that absent an 
opposition, no corrupt influence could exist.438 The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with this argument and construed § 1973i(c) to apply in any 
mixed federal/state election, regardless of whether the candidates for 
federal office faced opposition.439
The amount of money used to bribe a voter is of no consequence. 
United States v. Campbell440 involved a payment of $50. United States v. 
Saenz involved a $45 welfare voucher and a six-pack of beer.441 United 
States v. Daugherty442 involved a mere $3, and United States v. Lewin443 
involved a payment of a single dollar. The law is equally unforgiving, no 
matter how insignificant the compensation. However, benefits must be 
individual in nature.444 The assistance of a civic group to prospective 
voters, or even a continuance of employees’ fringe benefits, are not 
prohibited by the statute.445
Whether the actual corruption takes place, or whether the participants 
in the scheme intended that it take place, is irrelevant.446 However, for 
“corruption” to exist under the statute, there must be at least an offer of 
pecuniary gain to the voter.447 This pecuniary gain need not be in the form 
of cash.448  
The definition of “payment” in §1973i(c) is not necessarily limited to 
the transfer of money or its equivalent.449 The legislative history of the Act 
makes it clear that Congress contemplated an exchange of a benefit 
beyond actual cash.450 The Congressional Record shows that a non-
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. See United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 782, 787 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 441. See United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 935 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 442. See United States v. Daugherty, 952 F.2d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 443. See United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 444. See id. 
 445. See id. at 1136. 
 446. See United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 447. See United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 99, 101–02 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that Congress’ 
intent was to prohibit the offering or giving of items of pecuniary value to an individual voter in 
exchange for his vote). 
 448. Id. (“We therefore find that Congress did not intend to restrict the term payment . . . to offers 
of money . . . . Payment . . . includes the offer of redeemable, cash-equivalent, food vouchers.”). 
 449. See id. at 101. 
 450. Id. (quoting 111 CONG. REC. S8423 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1965) (statement of Sen. Williams) 
(“Third, the amendment would provide a penalty for anyone offering or accepting money or something 
of value in exchange for registering or voting.”) (emphasis added)). 
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monetary payment would qualify as a “payment.”451 However, the Fifth 
Circuit held that this definition is limited to benefits of a truly pecuniary 
nature.452  
In United States v. Garcia, the defendants were indicted under the 
federal vote-buying statute.453 Garcia was the county welfare director and 
was responsible for distributing vouchers for food, clothing, prescriptions, 
and medical services to indigent citizens.454 The defendants were accused 
of offering food vouchers to voters in exchange for their pledges to vote 
for certain candidates in the primary election.455 The defendants 
challenged § 1973i(c) as unconstitutionally vague.456 The gravamen of 
their vagueness argument was that if food vouchers could be included as 
“payment” under § 1973i(c), then no citizen could be certain of what was 
proscribed and what was permitted.457 The court rejected this analysis of 
§ 1973i(c), relying on the legislative history to support the conclusion that 
§ 1973i(c) was never intended to be limited to cash payments.458
In United States v. Garcia, voters received a government benefit—
welfare vouchers.459 The voters stated that they believed that receipt of the 
vouchers depended upon how they agreed to vote and not upon their 
eligibility.460 Therefore, a federal prosecutor could forseeably expand this 
analysis and claim that the exchange of votes is the exchange of a 
government benefit—the right to vote—for another vote. This is 
somewhat of a nonsensical stretch, but multiple state election officials 
made similar stretches. If this issue arises again, and the party in power 
does not stand to benefit, as it did in 2000, federal conduct may be entirely 
different.  
The defendants in Garcia further argued that unless the government 
showed that the recipients of the vouchers would have been otherwise 
ineligible to receive them, nothing was truly “paid” to them.461 The Fifth 
 451. Id. (quoting 111 CONG. REC. S8986 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1965) (statement of Sen. Jarvits) (“I 
wish to make it as clear as it is possible to make it that it is intended solely to prohibit the practice of 
offering or accepting money or a fifth of liquor, or something—some payment of some kind—for 
voting or registering.”)). 
 452. See, e.g., Garcia, 719 F.2d at 100. See also United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th 
Cir. 1972). 
 453. Garcia, 719 F.2d at 100. 
 454. Id. 
 455. Id. 
 456. Id. at 101. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Id. 
 460. Id. at 100. 
 461. Id. at 103. 
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Circuit found that although the recipients were already eligible for this 
government benefit, and thus were not receiving anything to which they 
were not otherwise entitled, the receipt of the vouchers still amounted to a 
pecuniary benefit since the vouchers came in specific dollar 
denominations and could be directly exchanged for goods as if they were 
cash.462 In light of the above analysis, it appears that the Justice 
Department’s statement, that there is no voter fraud in online vote-pairing, 
was correct. However, this statement and analysis only controls the federal 
Voting Fraud Act. What if Arizona’s election officials, properly 
interpreting their own state law, attempted to prosecute an online vote-
pairing site operator or participant? No matter where the small skirmishes 
over this issue are fought, eventually the matter will come down to an 
analysis under the First Amendment. 
B. Federal Constitutional Law 
The acts of the individual secretaries of state touch upon the core of 
constitutionally protected necessities for democracy—the trinity of speech, 
assembly, and association. Online assembly, association, and speech 
intended to further public political goals are at the core of First 
Amendment values.463
Freedom of speech is essential to a self-governing society.464 The 
constitutional guarantee that speech shall remain unencumbered by 
governmental intervention exists to ensure the free exchange of ideas for 
the promotion of political and social change.465 When speech involves 
political issues, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized it as 
the core of First Amendment values.466 Even jurists who would protect 
only a narrow sliver of what is now untouchable agree that political speech 
must be protected.467  
 462. Id. at 101. 
 463. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (protecting political speech outside foreign 
embassies); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (members of an 
organization organized for lawful political motives may not be punished for association with other 
members who may act unlawfully). Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[W]hen a public 
employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon 
matters only of personal interest,” federal courts will not normally protect the employee’s speech). 
 464. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 63, at 26–27. 
 465. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 466. See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 318 (protecting political speech outside foreign embassies). Cf. 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (explaining that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters 
of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, federal courts 
will not normally protect his speech). 
 467. Bork, supra note 63, at 23 (“[E]ven without a first amendment . . . representative democracy 
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Restraint of websites promoting online vote-pairing implicates both the 
specifically enumerated First Amendment protection for freedom of 
speech and the closely related and entwined freedom of association.468 
Like the right to free speech, the right to assemble in furtherance of a 
common political goal is fundamental to our system of government and 
law.469  
1. Content-Based Speech Regulation 
It is presumptively unconstitutional for the state to burden speech based 
on its content.470 Political speech is zealously guarded as the core value 
protected by the First Amendment,471 “[f]or speech concerning public 
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.”472 At the very pinnacle of this core value is the notion that 
. . . would be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies. Freedom for 
political speech could and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment.”). 
 468. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective 
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the 
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 
(1937); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (explaining that the right to associate in order to 
express one’s views is “inseparable” from the right to speak freely). 
 469. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 577 (2000) (holding that members of 
a political party have the right to select their nominees for higher office); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995) (quoting J. Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927), that the right of assembly is a fundamental right).  
 470. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986); U.S. v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its 
content will ever be permissible.”); Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 
105, 115 (1991) (striking down New York’s “Son of Sam” law due to financial disincentives to 
expression created by a law requiring proceeds to criminals from expression describing their crime be 
placed in escrow for the benefit of the victims). 
 471. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966). The majority wrote: 
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the 
free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, 
structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should 
be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes. 
Id. See also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment 
demands unfettered and uninhibited robust political debate); Bork, supra note 63, at 23 (“Even without 
a first amendment . . . representative democracy . . . would be meaningless without freedom to discuss 
government and its policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even if there 
were no first amendment.”). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 
305–06 (1992) (“[A]n insistence that government’s burden is greatest when political speech is at issue 
responds well to the fact that here government is most likely to be biased. The presumption of distrust 
of government is strongest when politics are at issue.”). 
 472. Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis wrote in his concurring opinion: 
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speech related to a campaign for political office is worthy of the “fullest 
and most urgent application” of First Amendment protection.473 In Police 
Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley,474 the city of Chicago passed an ordinance 
prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful 
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.475 The Supreme Court 
held that the ordinance discriminated on the basis of viewpoint because it 
distinguished between peaceful picketing to further a labor cause and other 
forms of peaceful picketing.476 Under this ordinance, the message on the 
picket sign would determine whether the picketer was engaged in 
protected speech or guilty of disorderly conduct.477 This is clearly 
impermissible, as “above all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”478 “To permit the continued 
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each 
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free 
from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is 
content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its 
content would completely undercut the ‘profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open.’”479  
Regulations are content-based when they distinguish permissible 
speech from impermissible speech on the basis of the ideas or views 
expressed.480 Courts presume that government actions are invalid when 
[The Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think 
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free 
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government. 
Id. 
 473. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (citing Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 
265, 272 (1971)). 
 474. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 475. Id. at 93. In Mosley, Chicago’s Municipal Code, § 193-1(i) provided that a person commits 
the crime of disorderly conduct when he “[p]ickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of 
any primary or secondary school building . . . provided that this subsection does not prohibit the 
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute. . .” 
 476. Id. at 95–96. 
 477. Id. at 95. 
 478. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
 479. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270). 
 480. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (“Whether individuals may exercise 
their free-speech rights near polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a 
political campaign.”). 
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they suppress speech on the basis of its message, ideas, subject matter, or 
content.481 In fact, “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because 
of its content will ever be permissible.”482 This is because the government 
attacks the very heart of the First Amendment when it restricts speech due 
to the message it conveys.483 Restrictions based on the message conveyed 
impede society’s search for truth,484 impair the individual’s right to 
meaningful self-fulfillment,485 and obstruct the ability of citizens to fully 
participate in a system of deliberative self-government.486
Laws that impair speech with a blind eye toward the ideas and views 
expressed are content-neutral and often permissible.487 For example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that government may restrict all speech 
emanating from a sound-amplification truck regardless of the message 
broadcasted.488 Billboards may be prohibited to minimize visual clutter 
and enhance aesthetics.489 Also, the Court upheld a National Park Service 
anti-camping rule that prohibits people from sleeping on the National Mall 
as part of a coordinated political statement because it was equally 
applicable to traditional campers.490 Each of these regulations impacted 
 481. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (“[A]bove 
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). See also Cohen v. Ca., 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); 
Street v. N.Y., 394 U.S. 576 (1969); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 
370 U.S. 375, 388–389 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 
U.S. 353, 365 (1937). 
 482. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
 483. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 
803 (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”). 
For a complete discussion of content-neutral analysis, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral 
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). 
 484. Id. at 56 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“The best test of truth is ‘the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.’”)); McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 124 S. Ct 619, 730 (2003); McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); 
Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 186 (1979). 
 485. See id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
 486. Id. (“[I]n a self-governing nation, the people, not the government, ‘are entrusted with the 
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.’”) (quoting First 
National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978)). 
 487. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (city requirement that 
concerts use city sound equipment and city technician valid under First Amendment as a time, place, 
and manner regulation); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) 
(prohibition on the posting of signs on lampposts did not address the content of the signs); Heffron v. 
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) (regulation requiring that 
organizations may sell and solicit funds only from designated kiosks was an even-handed rule 
applying to all potential participants). 
 488. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949). 
 489. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507–10 (1981). 
 490. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
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speech, potentially even political speech, but none was created for the 
purpose of impairing speech based on its message.491
Even the most fundamental of constitutional rights may be curtailed if 
the infringement passes a strict scrutiny test.492 Speech, assembly, and 
associational rights may be infringed only by regulations that are designed 
to serve a compelling governmental interest;493 are unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas; and are means that are narrowly tailored to achieve 
the stated interest—they must be the least restrictive and least drastic 
means available to achieve the stated purpose.494  
The application of strict scrutiny hinges on whether the restriction 
severely burdens rights of speech495 or association.496 If a restriction 
severely burdens these rights, then this elevated standard applies.497 
However, most cases eliminate this step; without examining the degree of 
burden a restriction creates, they simply state that if political speech or 
association is at issue, then strict scrutiny applies.498 In NAACP v. 
 491. Facially even-handed regulations on speech are not always content-neutral. See, e.g., 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423, 428–29 (1963) (Virginia law prohibiting attorneys from 
accepting business from anyone who was not a party to a suit or that had no pecuniary interest in the 
case held to impermissibly prevent NAACP’s political action). 
 492. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1992) (prohibition of the solicitation of votes and 
distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the polls is permissible). See also infra note 494. 
 493. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (articulating strict scrutiny test); Sable Communications of 
California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (rejecting the strict scrutiny test on grounds of 
overbreadth); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (explaining that freedom of 
association is a fundamental element of personal liberty which may be curtailed if the restriction 
passes strict scrutiny); Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); 
Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572–573 (1987); 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United States v. 
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Sanitation Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 
997 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Even regulations that substantially infringe upon [the right of expressive 
association] will pass constitutional muster if they serve compelling government interests unrelated to 
the suppression of ideas, and those interests cannot be achieved through less restrictive means.”). 
 494. Id.  
 495. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 208 (1999) (“[R]estrictions 
on core political speech so plainly impose a ‘severe burden.’”); Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Cent. Comm’n., 489 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1989). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 115 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 536, (1980); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
 496. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to 
speak, to worship, and to petition the government could not be vigorously protected from interference 
by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward these ends were not also 
guaranteed.”). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 
 497. See San Fran. County Democratic Cent. Comm’n, 489 U.S. at 222–23 (1989). 
 498. Buckley, 525 U.S at 207 (“When core political speech is at issue, we have ordinarily applied 
strict scrutiny without first determining that the State’s law severely burdens speech.”); McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (same). 
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Alabama ex rel Patterson,499 the Supreme Court stated, “[I] t is immaterial 
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to 
political, economic, religious, or cultural matters, and state action which 
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the 
closest scrutiny.”500  
Strict scrutiny has been applied to situations involving solicitation of 
voters and distribution of literature within 100 feet of a polling place 
entrance,501 regulation of campaign promises,502 and a law prohibiting 
businesses from making expenditures to influence the outcome of 
referenda.503 Unquestionably, if a political group’s associational rights are 
implicated, strict scrutiny must apply.504  
2. Freedom of Association 
Political speech, which is protected by the First Amendment, “is 
undeniably enhanced by group association.”505 The Constitution not only 
protects the freedom of citizens to join together to discuss and further their 
common political beliefs,506 but affirmatively demands it.507 Moreover, the 
right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs is “an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”508
However, even the fundamental constitutional right of association may 
be infringed if the state’s action passes the test of strict scrutiny.509 If the 
 499. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 500. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 
 501. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
 502. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52–54 (1982) (finding that the state has a legitimate interest 
in protecting the integrity of the electoral process, but when it seeks to do so by “restrict[ing] directly 
the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters,” strict scrutiny is triggered). 
 503. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). 
 504. See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986) (holding that burdens on the 
associational rights of a political party must be subjected to strict scrutiny); see also Buckley, 525 U.S. 
at 207–09 (1999); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (holding that burdens on association by 
limiting new parties’ access to the ballot is subject to strict scrutiny); San Francisco County 
Democratic Cent. Comm’n., 489 U.S. at 223–26 (1989); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974). 
 505. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. 
 506. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) (holding state law mandating 
that only party members, and not independents, may vote in party primaries placed “an 
unconstitutional burden on the fundamental freedom of political association guaranteed by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”) (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party, 
479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986)). 
 507. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 63, at 26–27. 
 508. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1923)); Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937). 
 509. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (prohibition of the solicitation of votes and 
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government seeks to regulate associational rights, it must demonstrate that 
it is doing so to further a compelling state interest, unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved by any less restrictive 
means.510
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court held that while 
the freedom to associate presupposes a freedom from compelled 
association, the government was nevertheless justified in forcing the 
Jaycees to admit women.511 The Court was persuaded that the state of 
Minnesota had a compelling state interest in ending discrimination against 
women, and requiring the Jaycees to open their membership to women 
was a valid step toward this goal.512 Despite the fact that forcing the 
Jaycees to admit women adversely impacted the associational freedoms of 
the Jaycees, this regulation passed strict scrutiny.513
In a similar case with the opposite result, Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale,514 the Court held that a state anti-discrimination law could not 
properly bar the Boy Scouts from prohibiting an openly gay assistant 
scoutmaster from serving.515 The Court held that since one of the sincerely 
held beliefs of the Boy Scouts is that homosexuality is immoral,516 forcing 
them to include a homosexual scoutmaster would significantly burden 
their associational right to disfavor homosexuality.517
In Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee,518 the Court 
held that in the context of the Socialist Workers’ Party (“SWP”), an Ohio 
statute that mandated the disclosure of campaign contributors and fund 
recipients would unconstitutionally burden associational rights.519 The 
Court held that given the historical public hostility toward the SWP, such 
public disclosures would subject contributors and recipients to harassment 
distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the polls is permissible); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (the compelling governmental interest in maintaining an armed 
forces in time of war justifies the suppression of the speech element of the expressive political conduct 
of burning a draft card); Cf., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (law prohibiting the 
publication of political editorials on an election day is an “obvious and flagrant” violation of the 
principles of the First Amendment). 
 510. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 511. Id. 
 512. Id. 
 513. Id. 
 514. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 515. Id. at 659. 
 516. Id. at 656. 
 517. Id. at 659. 
 518. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 519. Id. at 101–02. 
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and reprisals, effectively discouraging them from acts of protected 
political association.520
One could argue that the framers of the Constitution intended to extend 
freedom of expression and association only to technologies existing in the 
1700s.521 However, even strict constructionists argue that courts must 
apply constitutional values to new circumstances, especially when those 
circumstances arise due to changes in technology.522 Cyberspace is entitled 
to the same degree of protection as other more traditional public forums 
and media.523
Under strict scrutiny, a regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling governmental interest.524 Although the First Amendment 
may be considered to encompass the most sacrosanct of rights, on rare 
occasions there are competing governmental interests to which the First 
Amendment rights of speech must yield.525 For example, fair trial rights 
have been held to trump the First Amendment in specific circumstances.526 
The government’s interests in order, safety, and traffic outside abortion 
clinics, as well as its interests in safeguarding property rights and womens’ 
freedom to pursue reproductive health services, are sufficient to allow the 
use of fixed buffer zone limits on abortion protesters.527 And in 
circumstances most analogous to the issue at hand, in order to assure “fair 
and honest” elections, the right to freedom of speech is frequently 
trumped528 because the right to cast a ballot in an uncorrupt election is just 
as important as the right to discuss that election.529  
 520. Id.; see also Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63. 
 521. Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking The Cycle of 
Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 308 (1994). 
 522. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) 
(Bork, J., concurring) (holding that the First Amendment must be interpreted “to encompass the 
electronic media.”). 
 523. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“We agree with its conclusion that our cases 
provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium.”). 
 524. See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; Perry Educ. Ass’n., 460 U.S. at 45. 
 525. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 
47 (1919). 
 526. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that First Amendment yields to 
fair trial rights). 
 527. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 382 (1997).  
 528. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (holding 
campaign contributions, although protected, yield to the maintenance of the appearance of uncorrupt 
elections); Burson, 504 U.S. 191 (maintaining a polling environment free from intimidation trumps 
free speech); Brown, 456 U.S. 45 (holding that integrity of electoral process trumps free speech); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 (campaign contribution limits are justified to prevent appearance of 
corruption). 
 529. See Burson, 504 U.S. 191; Brown, 456 U.S. 45 (stating that the state has a legitimate interest 
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There would be little value in open debate prior to an election in which 
the democratic process itself was subverted by intimidation and fraud. 
Accordingly, “states have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity 
of their electoral process.”530 The prevention of corruption, or even the 
appearance of corruption, in government has been held to be a compelling 
governmental interest validating the restriction of constitutionally 
protected speech.531  
If the compelling governmental interest is the integrity of the polling 
process, the state may infringe upon free speech rights to achieve this 
interest.532 However, even the most compelling governmental interest may 
not be promoted by overbroad means that suppress otherwise protected 
expression.533 Because of the danger of governmental censorship of 
politically disfavored ideas, content-based restrictions can be employed 
only when absolutely necessary to achieve the compelling interest 
asserted.534
C. Federal Constitutional Conclusions 
1. Regulation of Vote-Swap Sites Requires Strict Scrutiny 
The secretaries of states’ actions and statements against the vote-
pairing website operators’ rights to disseminate information of a political 
nature, issued on the eve of a pending election, implicate core First 
Amendment values to such an extent that strict scrutiny must apply.535 
Those secretaries that acted less dramatically nevertheless contributed to a 
dangerous chilling effect of constitutionally protected conduct. The impact 
in protecting the integrity of the electoral process, but when it seeks to do so by restricting speech, 
strict scrutiny is triggered). 
 530. Brown, 456 U.S. at 52 (explaining that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the 
integrity of the electoral process, but when it seeks to do so by restricting speech, strict scrutiny is 
triggered). 
 531. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 (restriction of campaign contributions is justified by the need to 
prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption in the electoral process). 
 532. See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 45. 
 533. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449.  
 534. See, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 199; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395–96; Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 535. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986) (explaining that the 
burdens of the associational rights of a political party must be subjected to strict scrutiny); see also 
Buckley, 525 U.S. at 212; Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992) (burdening association by 
limiting new parties’ access to the ballot is subject to strict scrutiny); Eu, 489 U.S. at 224–25 (noting 
that laws that restrict a political party’s right to endorse candidates are subject to strict scrutiny); Storer 
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728–29 (1974) (holding that restrictions that limit a candidate’s right to 
political association are subject to strict scrutiny). 
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upon the rights of association of these sites’ users and potential users 
should independently trigger strict scrutiny.536 Given the fact that both 
groups’ rights were implicated, only strict scrutiny would be logical.  
2. Actions by the Offending Secretaries of State Were Not Content-
Neutral 
The secretaries of state regulated (or attempted to regulate) protected 
political speech and association in a public forum.537 In many cases, these 
actions were enough to trigger strict scrutiny.538 However, to determine the 
appropriate level of scrutiny applicable to their actions, it is first necessary 
to determine whether the secretaries of states’ actions were content-based 
or content-neutral.539 
According to one website operator’s counsel, the threat of prosecution 
turned on the particular message the sites carried: the “user’s willingness 
to participate in an exchange of unenforceable pledges as a methodology 
for communicating a political viewpoint.”540 Websites containing any 
other content were not subject to threats of reprisal by the government.541  
While the vote-pairing battle raged, the Republican National 
Committee had a website that permitted users to enter their names, 
addresses, email addresses, and other personal information so that they 
could “Get involved with the Republican Party!”542 The Democratic 
National Committee had a similar website inviting visitors to sign up and 
“Take Action!”543 The Libertarians,544 Natural Law Party,545 and the 
Yahoo! personals546 each had web forms permitting users to enter their 
names in a database in order to communicate with other individuals with 
common political or social goals. The secretaries of state considered 
illegitimate the simultaneous goals of electing Al Gore as President and 
 536. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 199. 
 537. See supra Part III. 
 538. See, e.g., Buckley, 525 U.S. at 207; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995) (same); Eu v. San Fran. County Democratic Cent. Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1989) 
(same). 
 539. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791. 
 540. Brief for Plaintiffs at 12, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700). 
 541. Id. 
 542. http://www.rnc.org/RNCWeb/action.asp, replaced by http://www.gopteamleader.com/ (last 
visited July 7, 2003). 
 543. http://www.democrats.org/action/takeaction.html (last visited July 7, 2003). 
 544. http://www.lp.org/action/email.html (last visited July 7, 2003). 
 545. http://www.natural-law.org/get_involved.html (last visited July 7, 2003). 
 546. http://www.personals.yahoo.com/ (last visited July 7, 2003). 
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helping the Green Party acquire five percent of the popular vote.547 As 
such, this does not appear to be a content-neutral regulation, but one that 
specifically targets the political goals of the so-called “Nader traders.” In 
as much as they restricted websites that urged people to vote in a particular 
manner in a publicly held election, their actions were unconstitutional 
under strict scrutiny.548
3. Compelling Governmental Interests 
a. Compelling Interest: The Prevention of Corruption 
The interest alleged by the secretaries of state was the elimination of 
“undue influence”549 or “corruption”550 from the voting process in their 
respective states. These interests are certainly compelling state interests.551 
Given this fact, the secretaries would have had little difficulty arguing they 
were motivated to act by a desire to further a compelling state interest by 
restricting the speech and associational rights of the website operators and 
users. However, it does not appear that their actions bore a reasonable 
relationship to the compelling governmental interest. 
If a vote-swap is an actual situation of “bartering” votes, it could be 
construed as conduct that the state can legitimately prohibit.552 However, 
as demonstrated above, nothing in this arrangement was truly bartered. 
Voters entered into a discussion and convinced one another to vote a 
certain way based on common political goals. The Court has drawn a 
distinction between entering into an exchange of this type and an illegal 
exchange by distinguishing between voting based on a promise of public 
political action and voting based on an illegal exchange for “private 
profit.”553
There can be no determination, or even serious assertion, that anyone 
entered into a vote-swap arrangement for private profit or any other form 
of enrichment. Perhaps if the “vote-swap” sites been more correctly named 
“vote consensus” sites, or “vote strategically” sites, they would have 
 547. See supra Part III. 
 548. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). 
 549. Letter from Bill Bradbury to website operators (Nov. 2, 2000) (on file with author). 
 550. Email from California Secretary of State to operator of Vote-swap 2000 (forwarded Nov. 1, 
2000) (on file with author). 
 551. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (restriction of campaign contributions is 
justified by the need to prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption in the electoral process). 
 552. Id. 
 553. Brown, 456 U.S. at 55 (soliciting an agreement to vote for pecuniary gain is an illegal 
exchange due to its relationship to private profit). 
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passed by unnoticed. “Barter” only exists in this situation as a matter of 
semantic misfortune. The trades are unenforceable, confer no private 
benefit, and do not transfer anyone’s voting authority.554 To the contrary, 
these websites and their users engaged in political speech and association, 
which is protected by the First Amendment.555  
b. Compelling Interest? Protecting the Duopoly 
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,556 the Supreme Court 
upheld a Minnesota law banning “fusion parties.”557 Fusion is “the 
nomination by more than one political party of the same candidate for the 
same office in the same general election.”558 In Timmons, a minor political 
party, the “New Party,” sought to nominate Andy Dawkins as its candidate 
for state representative, but he was already on the ballot as a candidate 
under the banner of another party.559 Minnesota election officials refused 
to accept the nomination because of a Minnesota statute which stated: “No 
individual shall be named on any ballot as the candidate of more than one 
major political party.”560
The New Party filed suit, claiming that the Minnesota ban 
unconstitutionally infringed on its members’ right to free association.561 
The Court held that while the Minnesota ban did affect the New Party’s 
members’ right to free association, it did so in service of compelling 
governmental interests of “ballot integrity” and “political stability.”562  
Some of the Court’s reasoning is inapplicable to the online vote-pairing 
model. For example, the Court considered the Minnesota arguments that 
fusion tickets could exploit the ballot in misleading ways: 
 554. Brief for Plaintiffs at 5, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (quoting Hasen, Vote 
Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1338–48 (2000)). 
 555. Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S. at 660–61 (“[The Founding Fathers] believed that freedom 
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth.”). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
[W]ithout free speech and assembly[,] discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion 
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the 
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and 
that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. 
Id. 
 556. 520 U.S. 351 (1997). For an excellent criticism of Timmons, see Duopoly, supra note 407. 
 557. Id. at 369–70. 
 558. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197–98 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 559. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354. 
 560. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 204B.04 (1991). 
 561. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 355. 
 562. Id. at 370. 
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Petitioners contend that [a] candidate or party could easily exploit 
fusion as a way of associating his or its name with popular slogans 
and catchphrases. For example, members of a major party could 
decide that a powerful way of “sending a message” via the ballot 
would be for various factions of that party to nominate the major 
party’s candidate as the candidate for the newly-formed “No New 
Taxes,” “Conserve Our Environment,” and “Stop Crime Now” 
parties.563  
The Court also considered Minnesota’s argument that fusion parties 
might allow new minor parties artificially to gain popularity by affiliating 
themselves with a popular candidate and bootstrapping that candidate’s 
appeal onto their own group.564  
Neither of these arguments applies to online vote-pairing because vote-
pairing does not affect nominations or the ballot. Nonetheless, the Court’s 
determination that states possess a “strong interest in the stability of their 
political systems” is problematic and could be a constitutional sticking 
point should online vote-pairing come before the Court.565 Specifically, the 
Court determined that “[t]he Constitution permits the Minnesota 
Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy 
two-party system.”566
The Court concluded that the Minnesota statute did not create a severe 
burden and accordingly did not apply strict scrutiny.567 Instead, the Court 
applied a lesser standard which merely required that “the asserted 
regulating interests are sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation on the 
party’s rights.”568 The Court concluded that “the burdens Minnesota’s 
fusion ban imposes on the New Party’s associational rights are justified by 
 563. Id. at 365. 
 564. Id. at 366. 
 565. Id. at 367. 
 566. Id. 
 567. The fact that the Supreme Court relied on dicta to create new law with potentially expression-
stifling consequences is better discussed by Richard Hasen in Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political 
Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1997). Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364. Id. at 307 (citing and quoting 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The stabilizing 
effects of [a two-party] system are obvious.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144–45 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-
party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government.”); Branti 
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 532 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Broad-based political parties supply an 
essential coherence and flexibility to the American political scene.”). 
 568. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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correspondingly weighty valid state interests in ballot integrity and 
political stability.”569  
The implication of Timmons for online vote-pairing is obvious. Online 
vote-pairing and Minnesota fusion parties are quite factually distinct. But, 
if a state regulator switched gears and relied on the interest of political 
stability instead of relying on the justification that their actions were taken 
to protect the electoral process from corruption, then this could be a 
constitutional sticking point for a challenger of such a prohibition570
4. The Offending Secretaries of States’ Actions Were Not the Least 
Restrictive Method of Serving the Governmental Interest 
Prohibiting vote-pairing websites in order to prevent corruption in the 
political process is misguided. The secretaries relied upon statutory 
provisions against the exertion of undue influence upon a voter or the 
voting process. Were these agreements in some manner enforceable, then 
the voters who entered into them would enter the polls subject to the 
external influence of an enforceable contract preventing them from voting 
according to their own political beliefs. Even content-based restrictions on 
political speech in a public forum would be permissible if this were the 
case.571
However, the agreements were in no manner binding or enforceable. 
Upon entry into the voting booth, voters were motivated only by their 
conscience and self-interest. There can be no valid determination that any 
vote-swapper entered the voting booth compelled to vote by any 
motivation other than the desire to achieve his or her own personal 
political goals. 
Not only did the threats of prosecution place an unnecessary burden on 
providers of protected content but such threats did not effectively address 
the harm they sought to prevent. The government bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the regulation will in fact address the problem of 
corruption of the electoral process.572 Since all the sites were only putting 
individuals in contact with one another by email, an allegation of coercion 
 569. Id. at 369–70 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 570. Although this theory has not been tested, it is the author’s opinion that this sticking point 
would be forced to yield to the contrarian view due to the great factual distinctions between fusion 
parties and online vote-pairing coalitions. 
 571. Burson, 504 U.S. 191. 
 572. See Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (government bears the burden 
of demonstrating that its restrictions will prevent the alleged harms in a direct and material way). 
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is fanciful at best.573 Had the contact taken place in close proximity to the 
polling place, the analysis might be different, but absent this kind of direct 
coercion and considering the voluntary nature of participation in the 
program, governmental regulation of vote solicitation was an 
impermissible burden on speech.574
V. ETHICAL ANALYSIS  
A. Introduction 
The majority of this study is devoted to the question of whether online 
vote-pairing is legal and constitutionally protected. However, to end the 
inquiry with a legal conclusion leaves the study incomplete. There are an 
ample number of practices that involve legal behavior that is not 
necessarily ethical. For example, an attorney who leaves no stone 
unturned when representing a client, who follows a research thread to an 
absurd extent, and who is motivated more by a desire to pad his timesheet 
than by a desire to provide the client with zealous representation is not 
breaking the law.575 Absent fraud, no criminal or civil sanctions await the 
attorney, although the state bar may elect to take professional disciplinary 
action.576
Despite the legal ramifications or constitutionality of online vote-
pairing, no discussion of this phenomenon is complete without an 
examination of the ethics of bringing together cyberspace, the Electoral 
College, and the building of a political party. 
 573. Brief for Plaintiffs at 14, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (on file with author); 
see also Burson, 504 U.S. 191; Mills, 384 U.S. 214. 
 574. Burson, 504 U.S. at 210; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1966). 
 575. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Ethics of Time-Based Billing by Attorneys, 58 ALA. LAW. 40 
(1997). 
 576. See, e.g., ELLEN R. PECK AND ROBERT L. KEHR, RULING ON THE RULES, LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, at http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=752; Toledo Bar Assn. 
V. Zerner, 718 N.E.2d 1283 (Ohio 1999); Laurie Cunningham, State Justices Suspend Robles 
Indefinitely, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Apr. 4, 2003, at 8; The Florida Bar v. Robles, 846 So.2d 
1150 (Fla. 2003) (unpublished table opinion). 
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B. The Issue is Rampant With Bias577
Like the Bush v. Gore Supreme Court decision, the divergent opinions 
over the ethics of vote-pairing are determined almost solely on the basis of 
the political sympathy of the official giving the opinion. The chart on the 
following page displays each election official responsible for comments or 
action regarding vote-pairing sites, his or her party affiliation (if known), 
his or her position on vote-pairing, whether action was taken against vote-
pairing sites, and whether the official correctly applied the state’s election 
law. 
State Party 
Affiliation 
Position on 
Vote-pairing 
Action on  
Vote-pairing 
Correct Application of 
Election Law? 
AZ R Anti Statement No 
CA R Anti Threat No 
KS R Anti Threat No578
ME D Pro Statement Yes 
MN R Anti Threat No 
MO NP Anti None Not Analyzed 
NE R Anti None Yes 
NY R Anti Threat Not Analyzed 
OR D Anti Threat/Aborted No 
 
 
 577. In the interest of full disclosure, the author will reveal his political biases. The author’s 
parents are two of five registered republicans in their voting district in Massachusetts. The author’s 
father calls refers to the author as “that goddamned liberal.” Despite this fact, the author is a registered 
Republican and served as a volunteer for the 2000 McCain presidential campaign. The author 
supported Bill Weld (R), Paul Celucci (R), and Mitt Romney (R) for Governor of Massachusetts. The 
author wrote himself in for President in 1992 and 1996 in unsuccessful bids for the White House. 
Therefore, the author considers himself to have been unbiased as far as a preference for or against 
either major party in the 2000 presidential election. He was equally disgusted by both.  
 578. Although Kansas law is not analyzed in this study, the Secretary of State himself admitted no 
knowledge of an applicable law. Another Lost Cause, TOPEKA CAP. J., Nov. 6, 2000, at A11; Vote 
Trading Lambasted, at http://www.kansas.com/arch/2000fall/11_02_00/news/votetrade.com (now 
defunct) (on file with author). 
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State Party 
Affiliation 
Position on 
Vote-pairing 
Action on  
Vote-pairing 
Correct Application of 
Election Law? 
WI NP Anti  Threat No 
Fed. D Pro None Yes 
Although far from scientific, the above chart shows that party 
affiliation was the greatest indicator of whether a state election official 
would move against online vote-pairing. Maine’s Democratic Secretary of 
State commented that online vote-pairing was a “provocative use” of new 
media;579 meanwhile, Minnesota’s Republican Secretary of State 
melodramatically stated, “Vote-swapping undercuts the fundamental 
tenets that hold our country together.”580  
This is not to suggest that the Republican Party engaged in an anti-First 
Amendment conspiracy. The author predicts that had the tables been 
reversed and a Libertarian-Republican coalition formed on the Internet, 
Democratic secretaries of state would have been just as vigorous in their 
opposition to online vote-pairing. 
As the above chart indicates, several state election officials expressed 
the opinion that vote-pairing was illegal or unethical. In sharp contrast, the 
popular media had very few commentators who spoke ill of the new 
practice. The critics included a student at the University of West Virginia 
who wrote an editorial in the school newspaper which stated that “[s] 
ociety has gone way too far this time. By encouraging this type of 
behavior, how will this [2000] election’s outcome be one of truth?”581 Ken 
Layne wrote in the USC Annenberg Online Journalism Review, “[vote-
pairing is] a terrific plan, equally useful for a Buchanan fan who lives in a 
battleground state where Dubya needs all the votes he can muster.”582
Nebraska’s Republican Secretary of State, Scott Moore, who refrained 
from trying to subdue the vote-pairing practice, added “I’m not saying it’s 
 
 
 579. Connerty-Marin, supra note 58, at A1. 
 580. See Press Release, Secretary of State Mary Kiffmerey Asks Vote Swap Web Sites to “Cease 
and Desist” in Minnesota, Minnesota Secretary of State Mary Kiffmeyer (Nov. 1, 2000), at 
http://www.sos.state.mn.us/office/voteswap%2011-1-00.doc (last visited July 7, 2003).  
 581. Christina Schrum, Vote-swapping Besmirches Point Of Educated Voting, WESTERN FRONT 
ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2000), at http://westernfront.wwu.edu/2000/November/opinions3597.html (now 
defunct) (on file with author). 
 582. Ken Layne, Vote-swapping Isn’t Adultery, and Other Lessons From Decision 2000, USC 
ANNENBERG ONLINE JOURNALISM REV. (NOV. 6, 2000) (modified Apr. 4, 2002), at 
http://www.ojr.org/ojr/business/1017962745.php (last visited July 14, 2003). 
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right, I’m just not saying there is any illegal activity in this one.”583
The only author to date, with the exception of the author of this work, 
who has commented in any way on the ethical implications of this practice 
in a scholarly journal is Jesse Sisgold of the University of California at 
Hastings.584 Sisgold wrote: “Vote-swapping gives citizens a chance to say 
more precisely what they think about the country’s politics. This is good 
for democracy.”585 However, Sisgold did not elaborate. 
C. Vote-Pairing in Other Contexts 
As online vote-pairing is a new phenomenon, there are few 
commentaries on the ethics of the practice.586 To evaluate the ethical 
implications of the practice, this study analyzes analogous behavior.  
The words “vote-swapping” conjure up images of Franco-Russo 
collusion in the 2002 Winter Olympics; therefore, this Part will discuss 
this subject and its ethical implications. This Part will follow up with a 
discussion of vote-pairing among appellate judges and politicians, 
studying the ethical implications of vote-trading in each specific context. 
The eventual goal is to draw some kind of parallel to high-tech political 
vote-pairing. 
1. Vote-Pairing Among Olympic Judges 
After the 2002 Winter Olympics, the very term “vote-swapping” 
conjures images of wrongdoing. In the 2002 Winter Olympics, French 
figure-skating judge Marie-Reine Le Gougne voted for a Russian pairs 
team over a Canadian couple, despite what many believed to be the clear 
superiority of the Canadian pair.587 Following the public outcry, Alimzan 
Tokhtakhounov was arrested in Italy on U.S. charges, after being accused 
of being behind the scheme to get Gougne to vote for the Russian pairs 
team, in exchange for a Russian judge’s vote for the French ice-dancing 
team.588 The controversy resulted in two gold medals being awarded for 
 583. Nader Traders Shut Down Their Web Site Under Pressure, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at 
A12. 
 584. Sisgold, supra note 73, at 167. 
 585. Id. 
 586. Cf. Christina Schrum, Vote Swapping Besmirches Point of Educational Voting, THE 
WESTERN FRONT ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2000) at http://westernfront.wwu.edu/2000/November/ 
opinions3597.html (last visited July 14, 2003). 
 587. See Tom Hays, Russian Charged in Olympic Skating Scandal; Reputed Mobster Linked to 
Plot to Bribe Judges, THE RECORD, Aug. 1, 2002, at A9 . 
 588. See id. 
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the same event—one to the Russian pair and the other to the Canadian 
pair.589 The International Skating Union quickly proposed reforms to 
reduce the possibility of vote-pairing from figure skating.590
There is little debate as to the ethical implications of the Franco-
Russian collusion in the Olympic games. The proper objective of a figure 
skating judge is to evaluate the ability of the skater to the best of his or her 
ability and judge the performance in a fair and unbiased manner.591 Any 
collusion or vote-pairing in this context is improper and unethical.592  
2. Vote-Pairing and the Judiciary 
The mere suggestion that appellate judges might engage in vote-pairing 
draws criticism from some of the highest echelons of legal punditry. 
Richard Posner strongly condemned any suggestion of the practice.593 
Einer Elhauge wrote, “[u]nder prevailing ethical norms judges cannot 
engage in the sort of logrolling that legislators commonly employ.”594  
Despite some minority views to the contrary,595 the dominant belief is 
that appellate judges will vote on legal principle and “not trade votes as 
though they were so many horses at a swap meet.”596 Although no judge 
will likely admit it, Evan Caminker believes that on multi-member courts, 
 589. See id. 
 590. See Skating Revolution Proposed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Feb. 19, 2002), at 
http://www.stpetersburgtimes.com/2002/02/19/Olympics/Skating_revolution_pr.shtml (last visited 
July 15, 2003). 
 591. See, e.g., Amy Shipley, Skating Dances Around Judges’ Choices, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
May 12, 2002 at D1 (reporting that national bias among skating judges has “drawn accusations ranging 
from cheating to poor sportsmanship.”); Vicki Michaelis, New Judging For Skating Still Leaves Room 
For Political Bias, USA TODAY, June 10, 2002, at 7C. 
 592. See, e.g., Chris Broussard, Shaky Calls Breed Talk of Conspiracies, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 
2003, at D1 (discussing officiating in the NBA, “[T]he officials’ motives should not be in question,” 
said Stu Jackson, the N.B.A.’s senior vice president of basketball operations. “Their motives are very 
simple and very clear, and that is to administer the game safely and fairly with an eye on getting calls 
correct. That is their only motive.”). 
 593. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 126 (1995) (“[V]ote trading by judges is 
condemned”), cited in Evan H. Caminker, Sincere And Strategic Voting Norms On Multimember 
Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2380 n.10 (1999). 
 594. Legislative vote-trades are discussed infra in this part. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group 
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 106 (1991).  
 595. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into 
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1826 n.164 (1992) [hereinafter 
Stout] (arguing that vote trading on multi-member courts helps to gauge the preferences of the justices 
and promotes stability of appellate voting and its accuracy in measuring group preferences, but 
acknowledging that the judicial appointment process may mean that not all subgroups of society are 
adequately represented.). 
 596. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar 
of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996) [hereinafter Edelman & Chen]. 
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judges and justices routinely trade votes implicitly.597 This practice is 
completely unregulable by the legislature. The legislative branch only has 
the power to establish some rules of procedure.598  
Caminker wrote an exhaustive study of this phenomenon, which I will 
not endeavor to fully recap in this study. However, suffice it to say that 
Caminker’s conclusion was that vote-pairing in the judiciary is 
unethical.599 Professor Caminker feared that widely accepted vote-trading 
among judges might cause this to become the dominant means of deciding 
cases.600 Instead of using persuasion to lobby colleagues, judges would be 
in a constant state of barter for opinions.601 Caminker additionally feared 
that vote-trading on multi-member courts could create a “continual 
imbalance of judicial influence over discrete realms.”602 For example, if 
one group of justices had strong convictions about free speech issues but 
weak convictions about antitrust issues603 and another group of justices 
held opposite priorities, vote-swapping would allow the first group to 
dictate free speech doctrine and the second could dictate antitrust 
doctrine.604 This would create a departure from the appellate court’s 
equilibrium position with respect to these particular issues.605
The proposition that judicial vote-pairing is improper and unethical is 
difficult to refute. Judicial opinions should reflect reasoned and learned 
judicial thought, borne of the maturation of their legal theory and 
collective decision-making by the judicial body.606 They should not reflect 
a mere measurement of the justices’ ability to cooperate.607 While debate 
and compromise are a normal exercise in any deliberative body, when a 
judge strays from application of the law in favor of expediency or 
collegiality, the judge strays from a proper judicial role.  
 597. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere And Strategic Voting Norms On Multimember Courts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999). 
 598. See Michael S. Paulsen, Lawson’s Awesome, 18 CONST. COMMENTARY 231, 232 (2001) 
[hereinafter Paulsen] (“Congress simply has no power to pass any laws that affect the process of 
judicial case-deciding . . .”). 
 599. Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2297, 2380 (1999) (“While vote trading and other strategic maneuvers can plausibly be 
viewed as furthering legitimate judicial objectives, I have sketched a number of objections suggesting 
that vote trading nevertheless constitutes improper judicial behavior.”). 
 600. See id at 2373–74. 
 601. See id. 
 602. Id. at 2378. 
 603. See id. 
 604. See id. 
 605. See id. 
 606. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 596, at 139.  
 607. Id. 
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Despite Lynn Stout’s opinion to the contrary,608 the need for appellate 
judges to engage in vote-trading in order to help gauge judicial preferences 
is unnecessary. The ability of judges to render dissenting and concurring 
opinions assists not only the preference-gauging function, but allows the 
preferences of a minority justice to morph over time into the prevailing 
law.609 Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes brought more 
influence to the evolution of American jurisprudence than many justices 
brought in their entire careers. Where would American jurisprudence be 
had Holmes traded his vote in Olmstead v. United States?610 The case 
itself would have come out the same way, but the foundation of the law 
surrounding wiretapping would never have been built, and Katz v. United 
States611 might never have even been granted certiorari.  
Closer to home in the vote-pairing context, Holmes and Brandeis both 
offered dissenting and concurring opinions, with no effect upon the 
outcome of the cases, in Abrahms v. United States (Holmes)612 and 
Whitney v. California613 (Brandeis joined by Holmes). These two pieces of 
uncontrolling dicta later became the foundations of First Amendment 
jurisprudence.614 Prior to Holmes’ dissent in Abrahms, John Stuart Mill’s 
“marketplace of ideas” theory had no place in jurisprudence. Now, the 
marketplace of ideas is firmly entrenched in the conscience of the 
American judiciary.615
It is unlikely that any citizen would prefer to have his or her rights 
decided on the basis of a vote-trade rather than a reasoned examination of 
the actual merits of his or her case, especially when the outcome of the 
case could be incarceration, the death penalty, or a strong impact on civil 
rights. “[L]egislative-style ‘logrolling’ and negotiating would be 
reprehensible conduct in a judge and would violate the core principles 
governing the judicial role.”616 In fact, if there were a widespread 
 608. Stout, supra note 595, at 1826 n.164. 
 609. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (adopting Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 610. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 611. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 612. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 613. 274 U.S. at 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Homes, J., concurring). 
 614. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 
(1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–270 (1964) (and cases cited); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388–389 (1962); Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). 
 615. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377, 384 (1969) (the public 
interest requires “‘ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views’”) (quoting Great 
Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929)). 
 616. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1535 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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perception that appellate courts engaged in logrolling, the very legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the courts would be threatened. “[T]he Court’s 
legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under 
circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible 
to be accepted by the Nation.”617 Would it be plausible to the nation to 
hear that First Amendment rights were rolled back because Justice Scalia 
owed Justice O’Connor a vote from a previous decision on maritime 
jurisdiction? It is most likely that the court would lose its air of legitimacy 
if it came with a perception that its decisions were made in any manner 
other than as a product of law.618  
With regard to the judiciary, the rights of society, or at least the parties 
before the court, hang in the balance of the decision. In criminal cases, the 
defendant has a right to counsel and a right to an impartial jury.619 These 
values were established to safeguard the goal that the merits of the case 
should prevail on any given day.620 Given the potential for impact upon the 
rights of litigants and citizens alike, a judge should not depart from 
standard judicial procedure in the name of expediency or intra-court 
politics. 
3. Vote-Pairing in the Political Arena 
The framers of the Constitution would have recognized the practice of 
online vote-pairing as a modern equivalent of a procedure they 
affirmatively embraced at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.621 At the 
Convention, The Committee on Standing Rules and Orders originally held 
that delegates’ votes would be recorded and entered in the minutes of each 
meeting.622 However, at the urging of Rufus King and George Mason, this 
measure was revoked because of a fear that delegates would thereby be 
bound to their past statements, thus stifling persuasive caucus and vote-
pairing.623
 617. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992); see 
also Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal 
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L. J. 703, 783 (1994) 
(adherence to established law provides the court with its legitimacy). 
 618. See John C. Yoo, Bush v. Gore: In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
775, 782 (2001). 
 619. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 620. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (recognizing the fact-finding 
duty of the jury). 
 621. See Dana Lansky, Proceeding to a Constitution: A Multi-Party Negotiation Analysis of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 279, 302 (2000). 
 622. See id. at 301–02. 
 623. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/4
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] HIGH-TECH POLITICS & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than 200 years later, legislative vote-trading is part of the normal 
business of the United States Congress.624 In fact, both the federal and 
state legislative bodies are prime soil for cultivation of vote-trades. 
Legislative voting is public, thus easily-monitored, and retaliation for 
unreciprocated vote trades is simple and inexpensive.625 Of course, 
whether legislative vote-trading occurs is not the most relevant question. 
The question is: Is it ethical?  
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has held that legislative vote-pairing 
is a normal, proper part of the legislative process.626 “Compromises are 
reached. Votes are traded; you vote for my bill and I’ll vote for yours.”627 
Many judges and scholars agree that the very nature of the legislative 
process requires compromise, and in some cases, trading of votes.628 There 
are some political scientists who theorize that vote-trading actually creates 
value, allowing individuals to exchange sets of preferences for another, 
thus making all voters better off and none worse off.629  
There is no debate that a legislator or other public officeholder trading 
votes for personal gain is both illegal and unethical.630 However, even 
traditional compromise-based vote-pairing among politicians is not 
universally accepted. For example, Wisconsin631 and Washington632 have 
enacted statutes prohibiting lawmakers from agreeing to vote for their 
colleagues’ legislation in exchange for support on other initiatives. 
 624. See Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing vote-trading as part 
of the normal consensus-building process in the House of Representatives). 
 625. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 707, 721–23 (1991) [hereinafter Baker].  
 626. Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel., 498 So.2d 346, 359 (Miss. 1986). 
 627. Id. 
 628. See Christian Science Reading Room v. San Francisco, 807 F.2d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(Norris, J., dissenting from the court’s rejection of a rehearing en banc); Tom C. Rawlings, Comment, 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: The Supreme Court Deserts the Free 
Exercise Clause, 25 GA. L. REV. 567, 589 (1991) (recognizing that legislators routinely swap votes to 
pass pet projects). 
 629. See Baker, supra note 625, at 721. 
 630. See, e.g., Young v. Edwards, 207 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Mich. 1973) (vote trading impermissible 
where a legislator engages in it to gain a pay raise or a position); Raynovich v. Romanus, 299 A.2d 
301, 308 (Penn. 1973) (Eagen, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Clapps, 512 A.2d 1219 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1986) (politicians charged with conspiracy, bribery, and ethics violations for trading votes for 
jobs); Wright v. State, 202 S.W. 236 (Ark. 1918) (trading votes for a promise to use political influence 
to bring about supporters’ nominations to public service positions). 
 631. See WISC. STAT. ANN. § 13.05 (West 2003) (prohibiting legislative vote-trading by statute). 
 632. See Roberts v. Millikin, 93 P. 2d 393 (Wash. 1939) (equating vote-trading with “malfeasance 
in office”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.82.0l0 (West 2003) (“‘Misfeasance’ or ‘malfeasance’ in 
office means any wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts, or interferes with the performance of 
official duty”), amended by 2003 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 111 (S.S.B. 5221) (West 2003). 
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Colorado goes one step further and prohibits legislative vote-trading under 
the State Constitution.633
Regardless of the jurisdiction’s legal posture toward legislative vote-
trading, scholars and judges alike recognize that bargaining is a necessary 
component of the political process.634 However, the ethical line begins to 
blur when legislators are seen as supporting a bill out of a desire to serve 
themselves (perhaps supporting a colleague’s bill in exchange for that 
colleague’s support in gaining a committee seat). The ethical yardstick, 
when examining legislative behavior, is to decide whether the vote-trade 
was done for a corrupt reason. Of course, this then begs the question, what 
does “corrupt” mean? 
“Attempts to cabin the definition of ‘corruptly’ within a single rule 
have proven unsatisfactory.”635 Judge Kozinski of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit brings the reader through a minefield of 
definitions in his dissent in United States v. Dorri.636 Kozinski presents a 
collection of definitions from “done with the intent to secure an unlawful 
benefit either for oneself or for another,”637 to the Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition of the word, referring to a wrongful design to acquire an 
advantage, pecuniary or otherwise.638 Finally, Kozinski settles on the 
premise that “corruptly” can only be defined on a case-by-case basis.639 
Kozinski’s final thesis sounds a lot like the “I know it when I see it”640 test 
that Potter Stewart laid down in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio.641 
Kozinski’s case-by-case basis conclusion raises some grave doubts. The 
jury instruction at issue in U.S. v. Dorri instructed the jurors that: “An act 
is ‘corruptly’ done if it is done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about 
either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method with 
a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to one’s self 
or to another.”642
 633. See COL. CONST. art. V, § 40 (prohibiting legislative vote-trading by constitutional mandate 
in Colorado). 
 634. See, e.g., Francesco Parisi and Jonathan Klick, The Differential Calculus of Consent, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES, at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=316482 (last visited 
July 14, 2003). 
 635. See United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 636. Id. 
 637. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 
1991)). 
 638. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 639. Id. 
 640. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 641. Id. 
 642. Dorri, 15 F.3d at 890. 
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Under this instruction, unethical behavior would be punished, while 
unorthodox behavior done for an uncorrupt reason would not. The 
Colorado constitutional and Washington and Wisconsin statutory 
prohibitions against legislative vote-trading take all discretion over one 
method of compromise out of the hands of each legislator.643 This is too 
harsh. If a legislator obeys the law but looks pragmatically beyond the 
result of an individual vote, seeking greater consensus-building and 
perhaps some other proper benefit to his constituents in the future, it 
cannot be considered to be “corrupt” and should likely not be considered 
“unethical.” If a legislator exchanged a vote for a personal gain, pecuniary 
or otherwise, then the exchange would be corrupt and thus unethical. 
Absent corrupt intent or effect, therefore, a legislator building consensus 
should not be considered to be unethical. 
D. Ethical Conclusion 
The full ethical conclusion with regard to online vote-pairing is 
discussed in Part VI of this study, in conjunction with a legal conclusion 
on the issue. However, in the above examples, the overriding logic 
suggests that whether a vote-trade ventures into the realm of the unethical 
turns on whether the trade negatively impacts the rights of others, or 
whether it is somehow “corrupt.” 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
There are two questions that this study endeavors to answer. The first is 
whether vote-pairing is legal. To some extent, the individual state studies 
in Part III, supra, answer this question. However, the constitutional legal 
parachute must be opened and checked for holes. This Part begins by 
doing so. This Part then picks up where Part V ends and reconciles the 
ethical conclusion. 
 643. See supra Part III. 
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A. Legal Conclusion 
The online vote-pairing phenomenon involved thousands644 of people 
nationwide gathering in the new town square to associate for the 
furtherance of a common political goal. California Secretary of State Bill 
Jones should have been aware of this fact, given the decision that he had 
just lost in California Democratic Party v. Jones.645 In that case, the 
United States Supreme Court gave Jones a civics lesson in interference 
with the right to political association: 
Representative democracy in any populous unit of governance is 
unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in 
promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their 
political views. . . . Consistent with this tradition, the Court has 
recognized that the First Amendment protects “the freedom to join 
together in furtherance of common political beliefs.”646  
Had thirty thousand people met in a convention hall to form a political 
coalition, few would question the meeting’s legality. In a less extreme 
example, had a husband and wife discussed their presidential preferences, 
discovered that they had opposite views, and thus decided to both refrain 
from voting, a prosecutor would certainly have had no place bringing the 
couple to court.  
Nevertheless, the secretaries of state of California, Oregon, Florida, 
Arizona, and Wisconsin reacted to new technology by imperiling a 
fundamental constitutional right.647 However, the Constitution demands 
that government regulations that burden political speech and assembly 
rights must withstand some degree of scrutiny. The positions taken by the 
then secretaries of state would likely fail such scrutiny. 
 644. According to a study conducted by http://votetrader.org/results/ (last visited July 13, 2003), 
www.nadergore.com facilitated the pairing of 221 participants and had 314 individual visitors, 
www.nadergore.org had 300 participants and 1791 visitors, www.tradevotes.com had 310 participants 
and 1851 visitors, www.voteexchange.com had 9698 participants and 58509 visitors, 
www.voteexchange.org had 692 participants 88524 visitors, www.voteswap2000.com had 2500 
participants and 29850 visitors, www.voteswap2000.net had 6325 participants and 37760 visitors, 
www.votetrader.org had 228 participants and 1486 visitors, www.voteexchange2000.com had 3000 
participants and 17910 visitors, and www.winwincampaign.org had 10251 participants and 60460 
visitors. From this data, votetrader.org estimated that there were 36,025 participants. It is not far-
fetched to theorize that some of the individual visitors also participated in vote-exchanges with other 
individuals without use of these websites as coordination engines. 
 645. California Democratic party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
 646. Id. (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986)). 
 647. See supra Part III. 
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A citizen pledging to swap votes followed her conscience, un-policed 
and unobserved in the voting booth.648 Even Oregon officials admitted that 
there was no way to ascertain how another person voted.649 A citizen using 
a website to pledge a vote could have changed her mind, or may not even 
have been a citizen or a registered voter.650 Website users could have used 
fictitious or multiple email addresses or identities because information on 
the website and information concerning the entire arrangement is not 
verifiable.651 Even if the agreement could be verified, the end result is a 
vote cast to achieve a preferred political goal, albeit in a non-traditional 
manner. Before being threatened with prosecution, the websites that 
facilitated vote-swapping facilitated political association and speech.652 
They asked a user a series of questions about her political goals and 
geographic location and then used that information to match her with 
another user who had complimentary political goals. Once so matched, the 
two voters could arrange coordinated political action.653  
Ultimately, what controls this issue is that vote-pairing is protected by 
the federal Constitution. Voting to achieve a political goal is the essence of 
democracy.654 The vote-pairing websites took the consensus-building 
aspect of the political meeting and political speech from the town hall and 
transferred it into cyberspace. That the political meeting and discussion 
took place in the digital world as opposed to a meeting room does not 
change the level of constitutional protection that should be afforded.655 
While this phenomenon may have broken Duverger’s law656 and inverted 
his theories of strategic voting, no American law was broken. Online vote-
pairing is legal and subject to the highest level of constitutional protection. 
It is certain that no individual component of vote-pairing was illegal. 
When the user visited a vote-pairing site, the site would ask the voter his 
or her state of residence. Nothing illegal there. The next step was to ask 
 648. Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (on file with author). 
 649. Telephone interview with Jennifer Hertel, Program Representative, Oregon State Election 
Division (Nov. 6, 2000) (Hertel stated that the individual voters would be in violation of OR. REV. 
STAT. § 260.665 but acknowledged that there would be no practical way to prosecute individual voters 
due to the impossibility of verifying exactly how each voter cast his or her ballot). 
 650. Id. 
 651. Id. 
 652. Brief for Plaintiffs at 11, Porter v. Jones, (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700) (on file with author). 
 653. Id. at 7. 
 654. Cf. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988) (the expression of a desire for political change 
and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change is afforded the highest level of First Amendment 
protection). 
 655. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (website content is afforded the same First 
Amendment protection as traditional print). 
 656. See supra Part II. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
238 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the voter about his or her preferences in the presidential race. Again, 
nothing illegal there. The next step was for the site to find someone with 
an analogous preference and match the two users up. At this point, the 
activity the users arranged was out of the site-operator’s hands. Each user 
in the pair would be sent the other’s email address, and if they were able to 
reach a level of trust and agreement, then they would agree to vote-pair. 
Conceivably, the two might not be able to agree, might not trust each 
other, or might decide that they preferred to discuss how to manufacture 
illegal drugs, engage in prostitution, or hatch a murder-for-hire plot. The 
sites had no control over what the two voters discussed. If they conspired 
to violate drug laws, then the paired voters committed a crime. But, no 
vote-pairing participant was accused of this. Vote-pairing participants 
were, after the sites put them in contact with each other, engaged in a 
private conversation, ostensibly about their support for a certain political 
ideology. To call this “illegal” is to toss aside any notion of freedom of 
association and freedom of speech.  
If there were evidence that these sites were used primarily for illegal 
activity, or that they were intended to do so, the conclusion would be 
different. As discussed in Part III, individuals did attempt to sell their 
votes online during the 2000 election, although most examples were found 
to be hoaxes or practical jokes.657 It is clear that the above analysis does 
not apply to this kind of behavior. Every state election statute prohibits 
selling or offering to sell a vote for financial gain, and such an 
arrangement would be beyond the protections of the First Amendment.658
B. Ethical Conclusion 
Despite its clear legality, online vote-pairing was not without its 
detractors. In fact, Ralph Nader himself was an outspoken opponent of the 
practice.659 Nader said, “I like people to vote their conscience and vote for 
who they’d really like to be elected.”660 Other Greens echoed his 
sentiment. David Silva, a staunch Green Party member in Santa Cruz, 
 657. See, e.g., Stenger, Ebay, supra note 398 (quoting Maryland officials stating that offering to 
sell a vote was punishable by fines and imprisonment in Maryland); Stenger, Vote, supra note 398; 
Derfner, supra note 398 (reporting on voteauction.com); Abramson, supra note 398; Weber, supra 
note 398, at 14; Bechtold, supra note 398 (discussing the shutdown of voteauction.com). 
 658. See Brown, 456 U.S. at 55. 
 659. See, e.g., Interview with Ralph Nader, Talk of the Nation (Nov. 17, 2000), available at 2000 
WL 21459177. 
 660. Id. 
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California called the practice “silly,” and “probably illegal . . . or it should 
be.”661  
However, aside from Nader, Silva, Oregon’s Democratic Secretary of 
State Bill Bradbury, a handful of Republican secretaries of state, an 
undergraduate student at West Virginia University, and the editorial board 
of The Grand Rapids Press, there were no published commentaries citing 
specific criticism of the movement.662
The Grand Rapids Press ran the most articulate criticism of the 
practice in an editorial on November 4, 2000, stating: “The online 
dealmaking diminishes the American electoral process. Citizens should 
vote their convictions when they enter the voting booth, not close the deal 
on a brokered interstate agreement. Mr. Nader has said that specifically in 
urging his supporters to reject the temptation.”663
Nader’s ire was understandable, in that Nader frequently was quoted as 
supporting neither Gore nor Bush, seeing no difference between them.664 
Neither, the Grand Rapids Press, the undergraduate student, nor any one 
of the secretaries of state seemed to understand the practice and appeared 
to rely on the baggage-laden term “vote-swapping” as the ground upon 
which they rested their unsupported conclusions. The secretaries of state 
merely stated that the practice was “illegal” because it ran afoul of their 
states’ laws, but never elaborated.665  
Voting to achieve a political goal is the essence of democracy,666 and 
democracy is meaningless without the ability of citizens to assemble to 
promote their political views.667 The author questions whether such 
assembly approached unethical behavior, and if it does, questions what 
this means as far as an ethical analysis of all political organizations. In the 
Olympic vote-trading scandal, the skaters expected to be judged fairly, and 
the spectators expected to view a fairly judged competition. Without some 
 661. Dan White & Darrell Cole, Green Party Members Seeing Red Over Defections, SANTA CRUZ 
SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 2000, at F1.  
 662. A thorough search of online sources revealed no additional published commentaries 
criticizing the ethics of online vote-pairing. 
 663. Voting Your Conscience: Presidential Election Should not be Treated as a Swap Meet, 
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 4, 2000, at A12. 
 664. See, e.g., Todd Gitlin, Nader: Savior or Spoiler?, ANCHORAGE PRESS, Nov. 2, 2003, 
available at http://www.anchoragepress.com/archives/documentf4ac.html (last visited July 27, 2003); 
Louis Freedberg, Nader Denies Spoiling Gore’s Shot at Victory, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 8, 2003, at 
A3. 
 665. To the extent that they did, their statements are fully reported in Part III of this study, supra. 
 666. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421 (the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion 
of the merits of the proposed change is afforded the highest level of First Amendment protection). 
 667. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 564, 574 (2000). 
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fundamental level of impartiality and fairness, the entire process of 
judging the event becomes nonsensical. 
With regard to the judiciary, again, the impact is upon the rights of the 
individual standing before the court and the rights of the citizenry bound 
by the case law the court can establish. Federal judges are appointed, 
ostensibly, for their legal expertise and their ability to judge the law and 
the facts fairly.668 Furthermore, a multi-judge court is established for the 
purpose of diluting each individual judge’s voice and to force the judges to 
debate and come up with the legally correct answer.669 Judges are fallible, 
but the belief is that, in the end, the adversarial process will create good 
law. Vote-pairing on judicial panels is clearly ethically corrupt because it 
reduces decisions impacting the rights of citizens to be judged impartially 
to a horse-trade which has the potential to send someone to prison (or roll 
back the rights of all citizens in the jurisdiction) based on factors extrinsic 
to the facts and the law of the case at bar.  
The ethical analysis of vote-trading changes when it enters the political 
arena, both when it comes to a politician and an individual voter. 
Politicians and individual voters alike organize themselves politically on 
the basis of consensus. Politicians form coalitions and blocs while 
individuals organize themselves into political parties. Forming a coalition, 
political party, or voting bloc by necessity requires cooperation; however, 
the element of corruption, seeking improper gain in exchange for support, 
is different than establishing a political consensus.  
Corruption would exist in a vote-trading arrangement if a politician 
traded his or her vote for a pecuniary gain or if a voter traded a vote for the 
same.670 This element is absent in the context of online vote-pairing as it 
appeared in the 2000 presidential election. The participants in the 2000 
vote-swaps formed an online caucus to promote a Progressive-Democrat 
coalition that could be properly described as the first political coalition to 
exist solely in cyberspace. 
The mere fact that a practice is legal or constitutionally protected does 
not always answer the question as to whether it is ethical.671 Both threads 
of logic run with each other in online vote-pairing. Online vote-pairing is 
 668. See, e.g., Perry v. Kemna, 356 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 669. Cf. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 PENN. L. 
REV. 1639 (2003). 
 670. See, e.g., Stebbins v. White, 235 Cal. Rptr. 656, 670–71 (1987) (discussing judicial 
corruption; see also Federal Voter Corruption Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c)). 
 671. See Paulsen, supra note 598, at 232 (Congress cannot pass any laws that affect the judicial 
case-deciding process.). 
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void of corrupt intent or outcome and is a perfectly ethical use of an 
individual’s personal political power. 
C. Conclusion 
With the sole exception of Jessica Funkhouse, State Election Director 
for Arizona, every state regulator who attempted to smother the online 
vote-pairing movement did so under an erroneous application of his or her 
state’s election law.672 Although Funkhouse appears to have properly 
interpreted her state’s law, even her analysis fails to pass constitutional 
muster. High-tech strategic voting in the form of online vote-pairing was 
the world’s first online political coalition, and any attempt to stifle it runs 
afoul of the First Amendment.  
Often First Amendment advocates find themselves with strange 
bedfellows. Nazis,673 Klansmen,674 and child pornographers675 are usually 
at the forefront of First Amendment debate. Online vote-pairing is not a 
case in which a First Amendment advocate must suspend ethical beliefs in 
order to support the greater good of free expression. Online vote-pairing is 
legal, ethical, and constitutionally protected. 
The fact remains that online vote-pairing could have a significant 
impact on future elections. This study has examined the ramifications of 
the practice under state law, federal law, and under an ethical lens. 
However, questions remain for future study.  
One frequent question raised in discussions about the topic is the 
subject of the faithless vote-pairing participant. Given that the process of 
online vote-pairing has no mechanism for enforcement of a promise, all 
participants trust other participants to live up to their promise. This speaks 
to the issue of should a voter participate in vote-pairing? This question is 
clearly beyond the scope of this study. This study is intended to analyze 
online vote-pairing under state election laws, constitutional analysis, and 
an ethical lens. Any suggestion that the practice should be outlawed 
because someone might participate dishonestly is laughable, and such an 
 672. See supra Part III. 
 673. See, e.g., National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) 
(granting stay of injunction that would allow Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois while the Nazis 
appealed lower court’s injunction due to First Amendment concerns). 
 674. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (reversing a Ku Klux Klan leader’s 
conviction for advocating unlawfulness as a means of political reform as a violation of the First 
Amendment). 
 675. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2001) (holding that a ban on 
“virtual child pornography” was unconstitutionally overbroad because it abridged the freedom to 
engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p143 Randazza book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
242 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
argument asserted by a state regulator would invite an amicus brief from 
Ebay’s general counsel.676 Stifling a means of communication because 
someone might use it to lie is as ludicrous as outlawing the telephone 
because people arrange illicit marital affairs over the phone lines.  
This brings us to a follow-up question of is online vote-pairing a good 
idea? Again, this is a philosophical question that is beyond an examination 
of whether it is legal and ethical. Whether it is a good idea seems to turn 
on one’s personal views toward democracy. A Republican or a Democratic 
activist is unlikely to approve of a process that opens the political process 
to increased competition. Staunch Green Party supporters spoke out 
against the process, even as it stood to benefit their movement. However, 
the author’s instinct is that anything that brings another cart into the 
marketplace of ideas is good for democracy.  
Off the philosophical bent and into the mechanical is the question: 
How does an online vote-pairing site affect a candidate’s disclosure 
requirements under state and federal campaign financing laws? Jeff 
Cardille, creator of one of the more popular vote-pairing sites, is reported 
to have spent $200 to post his site.677 Should either Al Gore or Ralph 
Nader have reported this as a campaign contribution?  
Additional study should also be focused on online vote-pairing and its 
exacerbation of the technology gap. Does this practice, which requires 
access to a computer and Internet access, marginalize the poor? When 
online coalition politics requires an “entry fee” that many underprivileged 
voters cannot afford, is its goal of broadening participation in democracy 
frustrated by its very instrumentalities? 
Another angle of study for this practice is its effect or use by 
minorities. Is online vote-pairing subject to abuse by racists? It is 
imaginable that (for example) racist voters on both sides of the Democrat-
Republican divide could ally themselves against a minority candidate. On 
the other hand, minority voters on either side of the divide could bring 
themselves together in a coalition to increase minority participation in 
politics far beyond the hopes of Lani Guinier, without racial 
gerrymandering by state legislatures.678  
 676. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Fraud on EBay Lands Culprit in Jail, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, 
Nov. 2 1999, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,7375,00.html (now defunct) (on file with 
author) (although the fraud culprit was prosecuted and incarcerated, not a single commentator 
suggested that Ebay should be shut down because users committed fraud on its system). 
 677. See Meg Kissinger, UW’s Student’s Web Site Promotes Vote Trading to Aid Nader, Gore, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 2000, at 1B, available at 2000 WL 26093361. 
 678. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the 
Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589 (1993) (advocating cumulative voting to rank voter 
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Of course, the very issue of online vote-pairing will (now that the 
Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals has remanded the issue to a 
federal trial court) be the subject of continued litigation.679 Where will that 
case end? Is a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
future for high-tech coalition politics? If so, will the Supreme Court follow 
precedent and protect the right to political association on the Internet or 
will it create novel interpretations of federalism and equal protection as it 
did in Bush v. Gore?680 Will a center-right coalition take advantage of the 
technology and turn the tables on Maine’s Democratic Secretary of State’s 
statement that this was a “provocative use of a new medium” to defeat a 
Democratic candidate?  
Even as this study was on its way to press, Libertarians were 
advocating the use of online vote-pairing to register protest against George 
W. Bush without conferring an unintended electoral benefit upon John F. 
Kerry.681 Meanwhile, Nader apparently finally embraced the practice for 
the 2004 election season,682 and the operator of www.voteswap.com 
updated his site to state boldly: “NOTE: Voteswap will return for 2004 
shortly!”683
As the 2004 election season dawns, and Porter v. Jones winds its way 
through the courts,684 it is apparent that the other election controversy of 
Y2K is far from resolved. These questions can only be answered by the 
2004 election, the eventual outcome of Porter v. Jones, and further study 
of the issue.  
preferences and thus increase minority political representation). 
 679. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 680. 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (majority’s position was clearly counter to 
notions of federalism, and the majority valued expediency over accuracy in tabulating votes). 
 681. See Chuck Muth, Vote Swapping: Protesting Bush Without Electing Kerry (Mar. 14, 2004), 
at http://www.opinioneditorials.com/contributors/muth_20040314.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). 
 682. See Bill Adair, Nader Clings To Lonely Quest, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Mar. 28, 2004). 
 683. See http://www.voteswap.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). 
 684. See Porter v. Jones, 00-CV-11700 (On Dec. 12, 2003 Judge Kelleher entered a case 
management order that all law and motion matters, except for motions in limine, must be heard by 
May 17, 2004). 
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